Claim No: CA 006/2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN

ASIF HAKIM ADIL

                                                                                          Claimant

and

FRONTLINE DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS LIMITED

Defendant

ORDER OF H.E. JUSTICE ALI AL MADHANI

UPON reviewing the Appellant’s Application No. CA-006-2016/1 for security for costs

AND UPON reading submission from Applicant and the Respondent

AND UPON reading the documents on the Court file

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Application be dismissed.
2. The Appellant shall pay the Respondent’s costs of the application, to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.

Issued by:

Amna Al Owais

Deputy Registrar

Date of issue: 27 October 2016

At: 12pm

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UAE-China trade ties deepen with landmark judicial cooperation agreement

• DIFC Courts and Shanghai High People’s Court to work together to achieve shared objectives
• DIFC Courts separately publish guide to recognition and enforcement of money judgments, produced in partnership with law firm King & Wood Mallesons

Trade ties between the UAE and China received a significant boost today with the signing of a landmark cooperation agreement between two of the countries’ key commercial courts.

The Shanghai High People’s Court, the foremost business court in the commercial and financial centre of mainland China, and the DIFC Courts have agreed to work together to achieve shared strategic objectives, provide the basis for future judicial exchanges, and deliver legal excellence.

The DIFC Courts are the first foreign commercial court to cooperate closely with the Shanghai High People’s Court, with the agreement designed to reinforce commercial links between the two cities by bringing certainty to businesses through enabling them to trade securely.

Annual trade between the UAE and China is estimated to be worth in excess of $55 billion annually, while more than 4,200 Chinese companies are currently operating in the UAE. The DIFC has particularly close links to China and is home to four of its biggest banks.

The agreement was signed by the respective heads of the two courts, Chief Justice Michael Hwang and Vice President Sheng Yongqiang, ahead of Dubai Week in China.

Chief Justice Michael Hwang said: “Given the strength of trade ties between the UAE and China, we have made forging links with our counterparts in the world’s second largest economy a strategic priority in recent years, particularly given Dubai’s position as an important node for China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. We have now reached the stage where we can formalise these relationships and work together to make a significant contribution to the Dubai-China relationship in relation to judicial matters. The DIFC Courts and Shanghai High People’s Court are at the heart of business in our respective countries, with this agreement creating a valuable framework to support the increasing number of companies operating between the UAE and China.”

In its official announcement, the Shanghai High People’s Court noted the “collaboration will act as a stimulus for economic and social development between the two cities”.

DIFC Courts Chief Justice Michael Hwang and Shanghai High People’s Court Vice-President Sheng Yongqiang

In a related but separate move, the DIFC Courts have published a guide for law firms and business on the mutual recognition and enforcement of monetary judgments in China and Dubai. It has been drafted jointly by the DIFC Courts and King & Wood Mallesons, a leading global law firm headquartered in Asia and China, and provides detailed explanation as to how a DIFC Courts judgement can be recognised and enforced in China, and vice versa. The guide is based on the existing 2004 Judicial Assistance Treaty between the People’s Republic of China and the UAE, and each court system’s own laws, and is available on www.difccourts.ae.

Mr. Shao Zili, Co-Chairman of King & Wood Mallesons China’s Management Committee, commented, ”As one of China’s leading law firms, we are honoured to support DIFC Courts by jointly drafting this Guide. It not only represents our close cooperation, but also provides valuable explanations for law practitioners in both countries. ”
Since their jurisdiction was opened to businesses worldwide in October 2011, the DIFC Courts have established one of the world’s strongest enforcement regimes. Their judgments can be enforced internationally through treaties such as the GCC Protocol and Riyadh Convention; treaties with China and France; and arrangements with many common law courts overseas, including the Commercial Court of England and Wales, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Federal
Court of Australia, the New South Wales Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Korea, the High Court of Kenya (Commercial and Admiralty Division), and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

DIFC Courts Chief Justice Michael Hwang and KWM Co-Chairman of China’s Management Committee Shao Zili

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Claim No: CFI-026-2014

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE THE DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE SIR DAVID STEEL

BETWEEN

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK

Claimant

and

INVESTMENT GROUP PRIVATE LIMITED

Defendant

ORDER OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE SIR DAVID STEEL

UPON reviewing the Claimant’s Application No. CFI-026-2014/3 dated 19 May 2016, seeking an immediate judgment under RDC 24.1 (the “Claimant’s Application)

AND UPON reviewing the Order of the Chief Justice of the Dubai Court of Cassation dated 13 October 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Claimant’s Application shall be suspended until a decision is made by the Judicial Committee.

2. The Defendant shall pay the Claimant’s costs on an indemnity basis, in the amount of USD 10,000, payable within 30 days.

Issued by:

Amna Al Owais

Deputy Registrar

Date of issue: 27 October 2016

At: 4pm

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

1. This hearing is for an immediate judgement in a very substantial case. It was fixed on 29 August 2016.  The significance of that date is brought into focus by the fact that Decree 19 which on which the application for a stay is based came in force on 9 June 2016.  The application to the Tribunal created by Decree 19 was made on 11 October (three working days ago).  It was sent to the Tribunal chairman and then sent to the Claimant on 12 October.  The proceedings in respect of which the Defendant asserts that a conflict of jurisdiction has arisen are proceeding instituted by them in the Dubai Courts in May 2016.

2. Those dates reveal that this application is made at the last possible moment. No explanation is forthcoming as to why no application was made much earlier, so as to avoid the waste of costs and time involved in waiting until the eve of the immediate judgement hearing.  This Court confirmed its jurisdiction in the judgments of the Court of Appeal dated 19 November 2015.  In the meantime, it had already been the subject of proceedings in Sharjah but all three levels of the Sharjah Courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction.

3. It is only over a year after the judgment of the Court of Appeal and three months after the Committee was set up in June that this application is made. Notably, the Defendant have also thought it appropriate to make at least two applications for a stay for the purpose of proceedings in the Union Supreme Court.  This machine gun form of litigation by the Defendant perhaps does potentially attract the notation of abuse of process.  The claim is a very substantial one and it is not immediately clear what if any arguable defence there is on the merits of the claim.  So these proceedings appear to have no greater ambition than to cause as much inconvenience to the Claimant and to the court as possible.

4. Nonetheless, it is not appropriate for me to disregard that the Order that has been made by the Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation on 13 October, and accordingly I suspend the hearing on the merits of this case. I have no idea what in due course the tribunal will decide in relation to the application, but I do know that, prima facie, they need to decide it within 30 days as expressed in the terms of the decree.  It follows that the Order being dated 13 October, it is appropriate to pencil in a date for a refixture of a hearing on the merits for 13 November 2016, being just over 30 days from today.

5. It is clearly right that the hearing on the merits is determined as promptly as possible. The original proceedings were issued in this court in August 2014 in relation to loans that had been outstanding since 2009. In effect, the present manoeuvres afford no credit to the activities of the Defendant.  Neither do they redound to the credit of this Court and the Courts of Dubai.  In those circumstances, it seems to be clearly appropriate to make some order in relation to the significant costs that have been thrown away by this late application and the emergence of this order.

6. It seems to me that the Defendant must pay the costs thrown away in any event and it should do so on an indemnity basis. I order that a payment on account of costs should be made of USD 10,000 payable within 30 days.

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Claim No:  CFI 016/2016

          THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

RASMALA INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LIMITED

                                                                                                                                   Claimant

and

AMER SAAD FAWZI AL KHAYYAT

Defendant

 CONSENT ORDER

UPON the Claimant and the Defendant agreeing to the terms set out hereto

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED BY CONSENT THAT:

1.The Order of Justice Sir Richard Field dated 16 May 2016 against the Defendant is varied for the sole purpose of allowing the Parties to complete the transactions documented in the Framework Agreement dated on or around 19 October 2016 (the “Framework Agreement”) between the Defendant, the Claimant (now known as Rasmala Holdings Limited, “Rasmala”) and Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle and the related Escrow Agreement dated on or around the same date. In this respect alone, the Defendant shall be allowed to whether by himself, for and on behalf of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle, any of its shareholders or otherwise howsoever (1) redeem his or any other shareholder’s shares in Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle, a company incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands; and (2) sell or otherwise dispose of all or any of the shares held by Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle in Madaares PJSC (a private joint stock company incorporated under the laws of the UAE) to Mr. Ahmad Saad Fawzi Al Khayyat and/or Al Mal Capital PSC and/or to any person nominated pursuant to clause 2.10 of the Framework Agreement by: (i) Rasmala; or (ii) any other shareholder of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle (provided that the requirements of clause 2.10 are satisfied), whether on his own behalf, for and on behalf of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle or any shareholder of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle or otherwise (and whether in his role as director and/or shareholder of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle or otherwise) in each case subject to and in accordance with the terms of the Framework Agreement in each case subject to and in accordance with the terms of the Framework Agreement.

2. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Issued by:

Amna Al Owais

Deputy Registrar

Date: 30 October 2016

At: 3pm

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Claim No: CA 006/2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN

FRONTLINE DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS LIMITED

                                                                                          Appellant

and

ASIF HAKIM ADIL

Respondent

ORDER OF H.E. JUSTICE ALI AL MADHANI

UPON reviewing the Respondent’s Application No. CA-006-2016/1 for security for costs

AND UPON reading submissions from Appellant and the Respondent

AND UPON reading the documents on the Court file

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Application be dismissed.
2. The Respondent shall pay the Appellant’s costs of the application, to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.

Issued by:

Amna Al Owais

Deputy Registrar

Date of issue: 31 October 2016

At: 8am

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China and the UAE first established diplomatic relations in the mid-1980s. In the intervening three decades, trade between the two countries has grown strongly, and is now estimated to be worth in excess of $55 billion annually. Indeed, since 2011 China has been the UAE’s second largest trading partner, while since 2014 it has been the number one trading partner of the emirate of Dubai.

In 2005, just 18 Chinese companies operated in the UAE. Today that figure is more than 4,000, with Chinese companies actively involved in many key sectors of the UAE economy, with a particular focus on construction, real estate, financial services and technology. The emirates are also an important hub for reaching new markets, with approximately 60% of trade between China and the UAE re-exported to Africa and Europe.

With more contracts being signed between Chinese and UAE companies than ever before, the potential for commercial disputes to arise has also risen. Given Dubai’s position as part of China’s “One Belt One Road” initiative, the DIFC Courts have made forging links with their counterparts in the world’s second largest economy a strategic priority in recent years.

Understanding how different courts will interpret the each other’s money judgments is an absolutely essential catalyst for boosting trade between countries. October 2016 witnessed a significant first step in this regard as the DIFC Courts signed a landmark cooperation agreement with the Shanghai High People’s Court, the foremost business court in the commercial and financial centre of mainland China, designed to bring certainty to businesses through enabling them to trade securely.

The DIFC Courts are the first foreign commercial court to cooperate closely with the Shanghai High People’s Court, with the two organisations agreeing to work together to achieve shared strategic objectives, provide the basis for future judicial exchanges, and deliver legal excellence.

Chief Justice Michael Hwang of the DIFC Courts said the agreement can “make a significant contribution to the Dubai-China relationship in relation to judicial matters.” In its official announcement, the Shanghai High People’s Court noted the “collaboration will act as a stimulus for economic and social development between the two cities.”

In a separate but related move, the DIFC Courts have published a guide for law firms and business on the mutual recognition and enforcement of monetary judgments in China and Dubai.

It has been drafted jointly by the DIFC Courts and King & Wood Mallesons, a leading global law firm headquartered in Asia and China, and provides detailed explanation as to how a DIFC Courts judgement can be recognised and enforced in China, and vice versa. The guide is based on the existing 2004 Judicial Assistance Treaty between the People’s Republic of China and the UAE, and each court system’s own laws, and is available on the DIFC Courts website.

Mr. Shao Zili, Co-Chairman of King & Wood Mallesons China’s Management Committee, said the guide “provides valuable explanations for law practitioners in both countries.”

The two China initiatives build on the DIFC Courts’ work to be the world’s most connected court system. Since their jurisdiction was opened to businesses worldwide in October 2011, they have established one of the world’s strongest enforcement regimes through arrangements with many common law courts overseas, including the Commercial Court of England and Wales, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Federal Court of Australia, the New South Wales Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Korea, the High Court of Kenya (Commercial and Admiralty Division), and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

By signing agreements with the Shanghai High People’s Court and King & Wood Mallesons, the DIFC Courts are helping to ensure legal ties between the UAE and China match the strength of the trade links between the two countries.

The DIFC Courts look forward to building on these initiatives over the coming months and years to ensure that any business operating between China and the UAE can have completely certainty that a dishonoured contract will be enforced.

***

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Claim No: XXXX

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

IN THE SMALL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

BEFORE SCT JUDGE NATASHA BAKIRCI

BETWEEN 

GRETA

Claimant 

and

GUNNER LLC

Defendant 

Hearing:          13 October 2016

Judgment:       2 November 2016

JUDGMENT OF SCT JUDGE NATASHA BAKIRCI

UPON this Claim having been called for Consultation on 29 September 2016 before SCT Officer Mahika Hart;

UPON the parties not having reached settlement;

UPON hearing the Claimant and the Defendant’s representative;

AND UPON reading the submissions and evidence filed and recorded in the Court’s file and reviewing the DIFC Courts Small Claims Tribunal judgments in Gervois v (1) Gittana LLC & (2) Gacinta LLC [2016] DIFC SCT and Genie PJSC v Gellert [2016] DIFC SCT;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Claimant’s claim seeking renewal of the Lease Agreement under the same terms and conditions as the previous year(s) is dismissed.

2. The Claimant’s claim regarding utilities bills is dismissed.

3. Each party shall bear their own costs.

THE REASONS

Parties:

4. The Claimant, Greta, is a tenant in Gunner building.

5. The Defendant is Gunner LLC, the Claimant’s landlord.

Background:

6. In 2011, the Claimant entered into a Lease Agreement with Gunner LLC for the rent of apartment in Gunner building, DIFC. It is common ground that from 2011 until the current dispute arose, the Lease Agreement has been renewed annually substantially on the same terms and conditions with 5% rental increases. The annual rent for the period of 27 October 2015 until 26 October 2016 was AED 57,110.

7. By email dated 16 August 2016 the Defendant’s agent informed the Claimant that “We would like to advise you that your tenancy contract with Gunner LLC pertaining to the Gunner Unit will expire on 26-Oct-2016. As per the tenancy agreement you shall vacate the unit on the 26-Oct-2016 and we will send you further information relating to the vacating procedure”. The Claimant responded that she would like to renew the Lease Agreement to which the Defendant’s agent responded “Thank you for your confirmation. Please be advised you [sic] rent for the period 2016 – 2017 will be AED 75,000/-.”

8. The Claimant then responded that she would like a renewal and for the renewal documents to be prepared. When it became clear that the Defendant and the Defendant’s agent were insisting on a rental increase to AED 75,000 per year, representing a more than 30% increase, the Claimant objected. It is common ground that such an increase was not in accordance with the RERA calculator, as required by Decree No. 13 of 2013, although the Defendant claimed that this new rent would be pursuant to a new lease agreement rather than a renewal of the previous Lease Agreement.

9. During the past year, the Claimant has also faced issues with the district cooling in her apartment, which she argued was being billed at unreasonable rates considering consumption. She stated that in 2015, the district cooling company disconnected her service and charged her an unreasonable reconnection fee.

10. On 29 September 2016 the Claimant filed a claim with the DIFC Courts Small Claims Tribunal (SCT) against the Defendant, seeking confirmation of her lease renewal at a reasonable rate in accordance with the RERA calculator and for reimbursement of unreasonable utilities billing and clearance of her pending utilities charges. Her total amount claimed was USD $ 5,623.12, equivalent to AED 20,664.97.

The Claim:

11. The Claimant detailed in her claim form that she was not in an equal position when negotiating with the landlord as a private individual. She was told she would either be evicted or that the new rental amount would be AED 75,000 for the next year, which is not in compliance with Decree No. 13 of 2013, which limits rental increases in Dubai and in the DIFC. She argued that Clause 3.34 of the applicable Lease Agreement has been breached by the Defendant for failure to comply with the relevant and required law. She continued that as there is no alleged sale of the unit, the Defendant is not entitled to refuse to renew the Lease Agreement, pursuant to Clause 5.1 of the Lease Agreement.

12. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that the Defendant failed to remedy her troubles regarding the unauthorised billing she endured from the district cooling utility company and the Defendant should therefore be required to reimburse her losses in this regard pursuant to Clause 4.9 of the Lease Agreement. Finally, the Claimant contends that, with regard to both the rental increase and utilities payments, the Defendant is in breach of Clause 4.3 of the Lease Agreement which protects peaceful enjoyment of the unit without unreasonable or unlawful interruption.

13. The Claimant’s subsequent submissions alleged that the Defendant has been attempting to use Clause 5.1 of the Lease Agreement as a mechanism to “avoid the concerning legislation” which serves to limit the amount of rental increase allowed when a lease agreement is renewed. She alleged that as the Lease Agreement is unclear, the dispute should be resolved in the tenant’s favour as the less sophisticated negotiating party.

14. The Claimant reiterated that Clause 5.1 of the Lease Agreement implies that the agreement will only be terminated upon sale of the apartment. Furthermore, the Claimant reiterated her arguments regarding Clause 3.34 and Clause 4.3 of the Lease Agreement. Thus, the Claimant seeks a renewed contract on the existing terms of the Lease Agreement with a maximum price of AED 59,965 for the year rather than a new lease agreement at AED 75,000 for the year, as proposed by the Defendant.

15.The Claimant further reiterated her arguments as to the unauthorised utility bills. She claims that both the Defendant and the third-party utility provider have failed to address her concerns about exaggerated utilities bills. She further claimed that the Defendant should not be able to evict her for failure to pay disputed utilities bills. The Claimant alleged that she should be reimbursed in the amount of AED 1,821.27. She also claimed her court fee of AED 984.05.

The Defence:

16. The Defendant indicated its intention to defend the claim, stating that it has “no intention to renew the tenancy contract which is yearly fixed term.” The Defendant argued that it is not obliged to renew the Lease Agreement and it does not wish to do so in this case.

17. Regarding the claim for reimbursement of the utility bills, the Defendant contended that the Claimant is responsible to pay all utilities as per the Lease Agreement and any complaints about the service provided should be taken up directly with the service provider.

Finding:

18. First and foremost, the relevant Lease Agreement states at Clause 9.1 that the “Agreement shall be governed by the prevailing laws of the DIFC, United Arab Emirates” and that upon failure to resolve any disputes connected to the Lease Agreement, the “dispute shall be referred to the DIFC courts.” Therefore, it is clear and undisputed that the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to decide this matter. As the claim value is less than AED 500,000, this claim is properly before the Small Claims Tribunal of the DIFC Courts.

19. The Claimant referred to several allegedly relevant portions of the Lease Agreement and several provisions of the Lease Agreement are relevant to the dispute, namely:

a. Clause 3.7 states that the Tenant undertakes to “[p]ay all charges for water, electricity, telephone, internet, air- conditioning, and district cooling capacity and consumption charges and the related third party billing fees”.

b. Clause 3.8 states that the Tenant undertakes to “[p]ay the district cooling bills on time and without delay. The Tenant acknowledges and agrees that the district cooling billing will be prepared and collected by a third party company. . . The Tenant has read and understood all of the terms and conditions mentioned in the End User Agreement attached to this Tenancy Agreement as Annexure 1 and he accepts the same.”

c. Clause 3.34 which states that the Landlord undertakes to “[c]omply with all rules, regulations and laws application to the Unit(s) as set by the federal, emirate, municipality . . . or other relevant authority. . . . The Tenancy agreed that it is the Tenant’s responsibility to familiarize themselves with all applicable regulations, rules and laws”.

d. Clause 4.3 which states that the Landlord undertakes to “[p]ermit the Tenant peaceful enjoyment of the Unit(s) for the Period of Tenancy without any unreasonable or unlawful interruption”.

e. Clause 5.1 which states that the “Tenant is hereby served with one (1) year written notice that this Tenancy Agreement is for one year only , in the event of the sale of the Unit(s) by the Landlord to a third party purchaser. Both Parties agree that should the Landlord decide not to sell the property to a third party purchaser as aforesaid, then the Tenancy Agreement will be renewed solely upon mutual agreement between parties and to such a period as then mutually agreed.”

f. Clause 5.5 which states that “[i]f the Tenancy Agreement is not renewed the Tenant shall vacate the Unit(s) by the Expiration Date.”

20. There are two main issues in this case. First, there is the question of whether the Defendant is required, under the relevant Lease Agreement and applicable law, to renew the Claimant’s Lease Agreement on substantially the same terms as the previous year. Second, there is the question of whether, under the Lease Agreement, the Defendant is responsible towards the Claimant for the problems she has faced with the third-party district cooling utility provider and should thus reimburse the Claimant for the costs that have ensued. I will address these two issues in turn.

A. Lease Renewal Claim

21. The relevant Government of Dubai Decree No. 43 of 2013, which serves to limit rental renewal increases does apply to rental renewals within the DIFC. This law limits the amount that a landlord can increase rent when renewing a tenancy agreement. Neither party contests the application of this law, but they disagree on the interpretation and effect of Clause 5.1 of the Lease Agreement as it interacts with Decree No. 43.

22. The Claimant contends that the first sentence of Clause 5.1 creates a limitation on the circumstances under which the Defendant can refuse to renew the Lease Agreement. Refusal for renewal can only occur, according to the Claimant, “in the even of sale” of the unit to a “third party purchaser.” The Defendant contends that no such limitation is applicable as the Clause clearly states that, “should the Landlord decide not to sell the property”, renewal of the agreement will be based “solely upon mutual agreement between the parties” and they do not agree to renew.

23. The clear and apparent interpretation of Clause 5.1 of the Lease Agreement is that the parties must come to a “mutual agreement” in order to effect renewal. As held in a previous SCT Judgment, Gervois v (1) Gittana LLC & (2) Gacinta LLC, tenants of properties in DIFC are free to contract in accordance with applicable laws in the DIFC, including negotiating such termination terms as are mutually agreeable between the landlord and tenant. There is no provision for a forced renewal and thus, the Defendant’s failure to agree on a renewal is their right. The DIFC Courts cannot order them to enter into a renewal at a certain rental price against their will unless some proof is offered that they have made an agreement as to the same.

24. The Claimant’s contention that the Defendant has offered a new lease agreement at 30% rental increase as a manoeuvre to avoid the application of Decree No. 43 is well taken and was addressed in Gervois v (1) Gittana LLC & (2) Gacinta LLC. As discussed in that case, it is questionable whether the landlord’s attempt to create a new lease would qualify as a new lease or a renewal. The parties in the instant proceedings have not entered into an alleged new lease agreement. Instead, they have failed to come to an agreement for a renewal or a new lease agreement.

25. The Claimant’s contention that she is at a disadvantage in negotiating with the Defendant as an individual without legal training is also noted. While the claimant in Gervois v (1) Gittana LLC & (2) Gacinta LLC was an attorney, which the Judge in that case found relevant, this does not determine the outcome in this case. While the Claimant contends that there is disagreement as to the correct interpretation of Clause 5.1 of the Lease Agreement and that disagreement should be resolved in her favour as the less sophisticated negotiating party, I can find no point of uncertainty in Clause 5.1. It clearly states that mutual agreement between the parties is required for a lease renewal to take effect and no such agreement was made in this case.

26. Therefore, the Claimant’s request to require the Defendant to renew the contract in compliance with Decree No. 43 of 2013 is dismissed. The Claimant must comply with the terms of the Lease Agreement as agreed, including the provisions of Clause 5.1 requiring that the contract terminates without mutual agreement between the parties regarding renewal.

B. District Cooling Claim

27. As regards the Claimant’s contention regarding unauthorised utilities billing, the Defendant has responded that this claim must be taken up with the third-party district cooling utility provider as the Claimant has a separate End-User Agreement with this third-party provider. The Claimant conceded during the Hearing that she had a separate agreement with the third-party provider but claimed that the Defendant should provide a remedy for her dispute with the third-party provider in order to provide “peaceful enjoyment” of the unit.

28. I refer to my previous SCT Judgment in Genie PJSC v Gellert, which held that under effectively the same lease agreement terms, a landlord/claimant could not force a tenant/defendant to pay his district cooling bills, consequently a claim should be taken up between the third-party provider and the tenant. This principle holds true even when the tenant is claiming payment from the landlord regarding district cooling. In both cases, the district cooling bills were in dispute and the appropriate remedy can only be achieved between the parties to the relevant End-User Agreement.

29. Therefore, the Claimant’s claim regarding reimbursement of her district cooling bills is dismissed as the Claimant’s proper remedy is to take up a claim against the district cooling provider for any dispute as per the End-User Agreement.

C. Conclusion

30. As per the above reasoning, the Claimant’s claim for renewal of her Lease Agreement on substantially the same terms as previously is dismissed. Her claim for reimbursement of district cooling bills is also dismissed.

31. Parties shall bear their own costs.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

SCT Judge

Date of issue: 2 November 2016

At: 12pm

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laim No: SCT 167/2016

SCT 169/2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS 

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai 

IN THE SMALL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL OF DIFC COURTS

BEFORE SCT JUDGE MARIAM DEEN

BETWEEN

GISSELLE 

Claimant 

v

GORDON DIFC  

Defendant 

Hearing:          3 November 2016

Judgment:       7 November 2016

JUDGMENT OF SCT JUDGE MARIAM DEEN

UPON the Claim Form in SCT 167/2016 being filed by the Claimant on 17 October 2016 (the “Claim”);

UPON the Claim Form in SCT 169/2016 being filed by the Defendant on 23 October 2016 (the “Counterclaim”);

UPON the parties being called on 23 October 2016 for a Consultation regarding the Claim with SCT Officer Ayesha Bin Kalban, with the Claimant and the Defendant’s representative attending in person;

UPON the parties being called on 2 November 2016 for a Consultation regarding the Counterclaim with SCT Officer Ayesha Bin Kalban, with the Claimant and the Defendant’s representative attending in person;

UPON the parties not having reached settlement with respect to the Claim or Counterclaim;

UPON a Hearing having been scheduled before SCT Judge Mariam Deen on 3 November 2016 at 10am, with the Claimant participating via telephone and the Defendant’s representative attending in person;

AND UPON reviewing all documents and evidence submitted in the Court file;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Defendant shall pay the Claimant a final settlement of AED67 owed by the Defendant for unpaid salary;

2. The Defendant shall pay the Claimant AED 5,523.28 as a penalty pursuant to Article 18(2) of DIFC Employment Law and an additional AED 63 per day from the date of this Judgment, until payment is made;

3. The Defendant shall reimburse the Claimant’s Court fee in the amount of AED 367.50; and

4. The Defendant’s Counterclaim is dismissed.

THE REASONS

Parties

5. Gisselle (hereafter the “Claimant”) is an individual formerly employed as a hostess at Restaurant LLC, trading as Gordon DIFC, under an employment contract dated 3 May 2016.

6. Gordon DIFC (hereafter the “Defendant”) is a subsidiary of Restaurant LLC located within the DIFC, formerly employing the Claimant.

Background and the Preceding History

7. On 17 October 2016, the Claimant filed a claim in the DIFC Courts’ Small Claims Tribunal (the “SCT”) for the return of her passport and salary allegedly owed to her following her resignation from employment with the Defendant, in addition to reimbursement of the Court fee.

8. On 23 October 2016, the Defendant filed a claim with the SCT for AED 3,000 as reimbursement of the cost of recruiting and training the Claimant pursuant to Clause 13.b of the employment contract, as she resigned prior to the completion of 12 months of employment with the Defendant.

9. The parties were called for a Consultation relating to the Claim, with SCT Officer Ayesha Bin Kalban on 23 October 2016, and for a Consultation relating to the Counterclaim on 2 November 2016 with SCT Officer Ayesha Bin Kalban, however, a settlement could not be reached in either.

10. A Hearing was scheduled before me on 3 November 2016, with the Defendant’s representative in attendance and the Claimant participating via telephone. SCT 167/2016 and SCT 169/2016; the Claim and Counterclaim respectively, were consolidated and I ordered that they be dealt with jointly at the Hearing. I heard submissions from both parties, following which the case was reserved for judgment.

The Claim

11. The Claimant’s case is that she was employed by the Defendant as a restaurant hostess pursuant to a contract of employment dated 3 May 2016, which states her joining date as being 20 May 2016. Following her resignation, the Claimant completed her last day of employment on 30 August 2016 and in her Claim Form asserts that she has not been paid for 8 working days and that this salary is owed to her, together with the cost of the Court fee. In the Hearing the parties helpfully agreed that it was in fact 9 working days, which directly preceded the Claimant’s last day of 30 August 2016, that the Claimant had not been paid for.

12. In the Hearing, the Claimant amended her Claim to include the application of Article 18 of DIFC Employment Law, requiring an employer to pay all wages owing to an employee within 14 days of termination of the employment, failing which the employer shall become liable to pay the employee a penalty equivalent to the last daily wage for each day the employer is in arrears.

13. It was also clarified in the Hearing that the Claimant’s passport had been returned to her and was no longer an issue in the case.

The Counterclaim

14. The Defendant did not put forward a defence to the Claim, instead it acknowledged that the Claimant has not been paid for her last 9 days of work and sought for AED 3,000 to be deducted from the amount owed to the Claimant pursuant to Clause 13.b of the employment contract, which provides for training and recruitment costs to be reimbursed to the Defendant if the Claimant resigns before completing 12 months of employment.

15. The Defendant submitted that the training took place between 20 May 2016 to 1 June 2016 with the Claimant receiving a full salary and food during that time. It was also asserted that it was clear in the employment contract that the Claimant would be liable to pay AED 3,000 to the Defendant in the event that she resigned before completing 12 months of service; the Defendant asserts that the Claimant willingly entered into the employment contract and should be bound by Clause 13.b.

16. In response to the Counterclaim the Claimant submitted that the training was conducted by her former manager and was more of an induction or orientation than training. In the Hearing she submitted that she gained no additional expertise as a result of the training as she already had experience in hospitality and she requested evidence of the cost of the training and some corresponding certification if she was expected to pay for it.

Discussion

The Claim

17. The Claim is undisputed and both parties agreed in the Hearing that the Claimant was entitled to 9 days’ wages. The Claimant’s monthly salary was AED 3,000; accordingly, her daily salary can be calculated as follows:

(3,000 x 12) / 365 = AED 98.63

Therefore, I am satisfied that the Claimant is entitled to receive AED 887.67 (9 x 98.63) as unpaid wages owed to her.

The Counterclaim

18. In relation to the Counterclaim, DIFC Employment Law governs this dispute and Article 19 provides the following:

“No unauthorized deductions

An employer shall not deduct from an employee’s wages or accept payment from an employee, unless:

(a) the deduction or payment is required or authorised under a statutory provision or the employee’s contract of employment;

(b) the employee has previously agreed in writing to the deduction or payment;

(c) the deduction or payment is a reimbursement for an overpayment of wages or expenses; or

(d) the deduction or payment has been ordered by the Court.”

19. Therefore, employers and employees may contractually agree for payments or deductions to be made in certain circumstances, such as in this case, where the Claimant fails to complete a minimum period of employment. However, Article 20 of DIFC Employment Law specifically prohibits employers from seeking payments relating to the recruitment of employees, as follows:

“No charge for hiring or providing information

(1) A person shall not request, charge or receive, directly or indirectly, from a person seeking employment a payment for:

(a) employing or obtaining employment for the person seeking employment; or

(b) providing information about employers seeking employees.

(2) A person does not contravene this section by requesting, charging or receiving payment for any form of advertisement from the person who placed the advertisement.

(3) A payment received by a person in contravention of this section is deemed to be wages owing or a debt due to and this Law applies to the recovery of the payment.”

20. In the Hearing, the Defendant sought to clarify that there had been no costs in recruiting the Claimant and no part of the AED 3,000 being sought related to costs for hiring her. However, no additional evidence supporting the actual costs of the training could be provided by the Defendant.

21. Clause 13.b of the employment contract states:

“Should you resign during your before completion of 12 months of service with the Restaurant, you will be required to pay an amount in recruitment and training fees of AED 3,000.00 in addition to reimbursing to the Restaurant all costs pertaining to bringing you to Dubai including but not limited to, recruitment agency fees, joining ticket, repatriation costs and associated costs with the Restaurant this amount will be reduced on a prorate basis over a period of 24 months on a sliding scale of one twenty-fourth per month from the joining date.”

22. I found the wording of the employment contract to clearly attribute the sum of AED 3,000 to ‘recruitment and training fees’ and requested further evidence from the Defendant to breakdown what the actual training fees were. In the Hearing, the Defendant’s representative conceded that there was no evidence to support the cost of the Claimant’s training, although it was submitted that the training was over a 10-day period, during which accommodation and food was provided. In the absence of evidence to specify what part of the AED 3,000 corresponded to recruitment and what part corresponded to the Claimant’s training, I defer to the wording of the employment contract which groups the ‘recruitment and training fees’ together. The Court is prohibited from awarding any of this amount by Article 20 of DIFC Employment Law, which prevents the Defendant from recovering the cost of hiring or recruiting the Claimant from the Claimant.

Article 18 of the DIFC Employment Law

23. At the Hearing, the Claimant amended her Claim, seeking the penalty under Article 18 of DIFC Employment Law to be activated, it provides:

“(1) An employer shall pay all wages and any other amount owing to an employee within fourteen (14) days after the employer or employee terminates the employment.

(2) If an employer fails to pay wages or any other amount owing to an employee in accordance with Article 18(1), the employer shall pay the employee a penalty equivalent to the last daily wage for each day the employer is in arrears.”

24. The Defendant submitted that it had always been willing to pay the Claimant her owed wages but sought to deduct AED 3,000 from the amount by its Counterclaim, accordingly, by the Defendant’s calculation the Claimant would have owed the Defendant AED 2,129. Irrespective of whether the Counterclaim succeeded or not, the Claimant was not paid within 14 days of her termination; therefore, in accordance with the DIFC Courts precedent set by the judgment of Justice Roger Giles in Asif Hakim Adil v Frontline Development Partners Limited (CFI-015-2014, 3 April 2016) and the judgment of H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani in Pierre-Eric Daniel Bernard Lys v Elesco Limited (CFI-012-2014, 14 July 2016), the Claimant is entitled to Article 18 penalties running from 14 days after her official date of termination until the date payment is made. For the purposes of Article 18, the Claimant’s date of termination was 30 August 2016, being her last day of employment.

25. Accordingly, the Defendant has been in arrears since 13 September 2016 (14 days following termination) and the penalty began to accrue at the daily rate of AED 63 from this date. Accordingly, as of the date of this Judgment, the penalty is owed for 56 days from 13 September until 7 November 2016, totaling AED 5,523.28 (56 x 98.63). The daily penalty of AED 98.63 will continue to accrue until the date of payment.

Conclusion

26.I find that the Defendant is liable to pay the Claimant’s unpaid salary for 9 working days and an additional penalty for every day that it has been in arrears, pursuant to Article 18 of DIFC Employment Law. The Claimant’s Court Fee is also to be reimbursed. The Defendant’s Counterclaim is dismissed and there shall be no order for reimbursement of the Defendant’s Court fee.

Issued by:

Mariam Deen

SCT Judge

Date of issue: 7 November 2016

At: 3 pm

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Claim No: CFI 023/2015

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

WISSAM RIFAI SARRAJ

                                                                                          Claimant

and

NAY LEBANESE RESTAURANT AND LOUNGE

Defendant

   ORDER OF H.E. JUSTICE OMAR AL MUHAIRI

UPON reviewing the Claimant’s Application Notice CFI 023-2015/1 dated 15 November 2015 seeking a court order to reopen the appeal decision of H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani dated 2 September 2015 (“the Application”);

AND UPON reading the relevant material in the case file;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Claimant’s application to reopen the appeal decision of H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani dated 2 September 2015 is denied.
2. There be no order as to costs.

Reasons

1. The Claimant filed a claim in the Small Claims Tribunal of the DIFC Courts for his employment entitlements on 4 May 2015. On 22 June 2015 the Registry issued a Judgment by H.E. Shamlan Al Sawalehi amended on 1 July 2015, in which the Claimant was awarded AED 7,692.
2. On 16 July 2015, the Claimant filed an appeal in the Court of First Instance. On 2 September 2015, a decision by H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani was issued dismissing the appeal filed by the Claimant.
3. On 15 November 2015, the Claimant filed an application to reopen the decision of H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani pursuant to Rule 44.179 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”) on the grounds that: i) it is necessary to do so to avoid real injustice; ii) the circumstances are exceptional; iii) there is no alternative remedy.
4. The Claimant’s arguments and requests were similar to the arguments and requests made before the Small Claim Tribunal and the Court of First Instance (the appeal court at this stage). The Claimant failed to provide any new grounds or evidence to support the Application to reopen the decision of Ali Al Madhani dated 2 September 2015.
5. The Claimant’s arguments were previously argued and rejected in the Small Claims Tribunal and the Court of First Instance pursuant to Article 19(5) of the DIFC Courts Law No. 10 of 2004 which states that, “unless DIFC Law specifically provides to the contrary, no appeal shall lie from a decision of the Court of First Instance in relation to an appeal from a tribunal”. Accordingly, Article 1 of Rule 44.179 of the RDC cannot be applied in this case.
6. Furthermore, Article 2 of Rule 44.179 of the RDC cannot be applied as the Claimant failed to provide any new documents or evidence in relation to the application and all the evidence provided was previously argued and rejected in the SCT and CFI.
7. In addition, the Claimant failed to prove that there is no alternative remedy as per Article 3 of Rule 44.179 of the RDC in order to request to reopen the appeal order.
8. For the reasons mentioned above, I am satisfied that the arguments raised by the Claimant were already dealt with at the SCT and CFI Courts and that the Defendant failed to establish new grounds or evidence to reopen the appeal. Therefore, I have refused the Claimant’s Application to reopen the appeal decision of H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani.

Issued by:

Nassir Al Nasser

Judicial Officer

Date of issue: 22 December 2015

At: 4pm

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Claim No: CFI-020-2014

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE JUSTICE ROGER GILES

BETWEEN

GFH CAPITAL LIMITED 

                                                                                                Claimant

and 

DAVID LAWRENCE HAIGH 

                                                                                                Defendant

Hearing: 17 October 2016

Counsel:  Andrew Bodnar instructed by Bryan Cave for the Claimant

No representative appeared on the Defendant’s behalf

Judgment: 18 October 2016

JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE ROGER GILES

Transcribed from the oral judgment delivered on 18 October 2016, revised and approved by the Judge.

1.The Claimant commenced these proceedings on 26 May 2014. The brief description of its claim in the Claim Form is –

“The Defendant misappropriated funds from the Claimant in a sum with a value approximating USD 5 million by creating or procuring the creation of false invoices and procuring payment of those false invoices from funds belonging to the Claimant. These actions were in breach of contract and/or in breach of fiduciary duties owed by the Defendant to the Claimant.”

2. Particulars of Claim were filed on 26 May 2014. A Defence was filed on 22 December 2014, and amended Particulars of Claim were filed on 2 February 2015. An Amended Defence has not been filed.

3. On 17 March 2015 the Claimant filed an application for immediate judgment. There was delay in bringing the application on for hearing. The Defendant was imprisoned from shortly before the proceedings were commenced until March this year. A freezing order was made against the Defendant, and there were a series of applications for release of funds and some subsequent appeals. There were a number of other applications by the Defendant.

4. Appeals with any bearing on bringing the application to a hearing were dismissed in early September, essentially for non-prosecution. The application for immediate judgment was then listed for 17 and 18 October 2016.

5. The Defendant was notified of the dates fixed for the hearing, but did not appear and was not represented. The third witness statement of Mr Jinesh Patel, the principal material on which the Claimant relies for the application, was provided to him in March 2015 when he was represented, and other materials on which the Claimant relies were made available thereafter. In May 2016 funds were released for preparing for and dealing with the application. The hearing bundle was recently served on a firm of solicitors otherwise representing the Defendant, and it was ordered that the service be deemed good service.  Nothing has been filed by the Defendant in response to the application.

6. I am satisfied that the Defendant has had due notice of the application and had the opportunity to respond to it, and that I can properly hear and determine the application in his absence.

Applications for immediate judgement

7. By Rule 24.1 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”), immediate judgment may be given by the Court if –

“(1) it considers that:

(a) [the] claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or

(b) [the] defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and

(2) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”

8. An application for immediate judgment may be based on a point of law, the evidence of which can reasonably be expected to be available at trial or the lack of it, or a combination of these (RDC 24.2).

9. The principles on which the Court acts are well established, and were recently restated by Simon J in JSC VTB Bank v Skurikhin [2014] EWHC 271 at [15] –

“The principles which apply have been set out in many cases, are summarised in the editorial comment in the White Book Part 1 at 24.2.3 and have been stated by Lewison J in Easyair Limited v. Opal Telecom Limited [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at [15], approved subsequently (among others) by Etherton LJ in A C Ward & Son v. Caitlin (Five) Limited [2009] EWCA Civ 1098 at [24].  For the purposes of the present application it is sufficient to enumerate 10 points.

(1) The Court must consider whether the defendant has a ‘realistic’ as opposed to a ‘fanciful’ prospect of success, see Swain v. Hillman [2001] 2 All ER 91, 92.  A claim is ‘fanciful’ if it is entirely without substance, see Lord Hope in Three Rivers  District Council v Bank of England [2001] UKHL 16 at [95).

(2) A ‘realistic’ prospect of success is one that carries some degree of conviction and not one that is merely arguable, see ED & F Man Liquid Products v. Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472.

(3) The court must avoid conducting a ‘mini-trial’ without disclosure and oral evidence: Swain v Hillman (above) at p.95.  As Lord Hope observed in the Three Rivers case, the object of the rule is to deal with cases that are not fit for trial at all.

(4) This does not mean that the Court must take everything that a party says in his witness statement at face value and without analysis.  In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions which are made, particularly if they are contradicted by contemporaneous documents, see ED & F Man Liquid Products v. Patel (above) at [10].  Contemporary activity or lack of activity may similarly cast doubt on the substance of factual assertions.

(5) However, the Court should avoid being drawn into an attempt to resolve those conflicts of fact which are normally resolved by a trial process, see Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v. Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 661, Mummery LJ at [17].

(6) In reaching its conclusion, the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No. 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550, [19].

(7) Allegations of fraud may pose particular problems in summary disposal, since they often depend, not simply on facts, but inferences which can properly be drawn from the relevant facts, the surrounding circumstances and a view of the state of mind of the participants, see for example JD Wetherspoon v Harris [2013] EWHC 1088 , Sir Terence Etherton Ch at [14 ].

(8)    …

(9) The overall burden of proof remains on the claimant, …to establish, if it can, the negative proposition that the defendant has no real prospect of success (in the sense mentioned above) and that there is no other reason for a trial, see Henderson J in Apovodedo v Collins [2008] EWHC 775 (Ch), at [32].

(10) So far as Part 24.2(b) is concerned, there will be a compelling reason for trial where ‘there are circumstances that ought to be investigated’, see Miles v Bull [1969] 1 QB 258 at 266A.  In that case Megarry J was satisfied that there were reasons for scrutinising what appeared on its face to be a legitimate transaction; see also Global Marine Drillships Limited v Landmark Solicitors LLP [2011] EWHC 2685 (Ch), Henderson J at [55]-[56].”

10. In Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 661 (“Doncaster”), cited in this passage, Mummery LJ, with whom Longmore LJ and Lewison J agreed, cautioned (at [17]) that a court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to the trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case.

11. In the present case there is the further consideration that the Claimant’s case is one of significant dishonesty on the Defendant’s part. That brings two matters.

12. First, while the standard of proof for the case remains the balance of probabilities, the seriousness of the allegations is a factor in deciding whether proof to that standard has been achieved. As was said in Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 at 586, the court will have in mind that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is to have occurred, and –

“…the inherent probability or improbability of an event is itself a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred.  The more improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence that it did occur before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be established.  Ungoed – Thomas J. expressed this neatly in In re Dellow’s Will Trusts [1964] 1 W.L.R. 451, 455: ‘The more serious the allegation the more cogent is the evidence required to overcome the unlikelihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it.’”

13. Secondly, in an application for immediate judgment the prospect of a finding of dishonesty can move the court to permit the proceedings to go to trial, notwithstanding the apparent strength of the claim and unlikelihood of a successful defence. But it depends on the circumstances. Immediate judgment may still be given, and has been given, in cases alleging dishonesty.  As Sir Igor Judge PQBD said in Wrexham Association Football Club Ltd v Crucialmove Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 237 at [58], one such case, the court may do so if satisfied that there is no real prospect of a successful defence, although –

“…it is…a factor constantly to be borne in mind, if and when…the reason for concluding summary judgment is appropriate is consequent on a disputed finding, adverse to the integrity of the unsuccessful party.”

Jurisdiction

14. The Defence included (paragraph 15) that this Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the claim. No application challenging jurisdiction has been made, and this appears to have been abandoned. For completeness, I am satisfied that there is jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(A)(1)(a) of the Judicial Authority Law, DIFC Law No. 12 of 2004, the Claimant being a DIFC Establishment. There may well be other grounds for jurisdiction, but that is sufficient.

The Defendant’s admissions and explanations

15. The Claimant is a company incorporated in the DIFC, carrying on the business of financial services, investment and wealth management. The Defendant was its Deputy Chief Executive from January 2008 until 12 or 14 March 2014. He admitted in his Defence that his contract of employment included express or implied terms that he would act honestly towards and in the best interest of the Claimant, and that he owed like fiduciary duties to it. It is not necessary to elaborate on these terms or duties: the misappropriation alleged by the Claimant would fall within them.

16. The misappropriation alleged can conveniently be considered in four groups of payments according to the purported payees, namely Millnet Limited (“Millnet”), the GPW Group (“GPW”), Lincoln Associates (“Lincoln”) and Mr David Murray (“Murray”). It is necessary, however, to consider the entire pattern of conduct, and this division is only for convenient exposition. On the Claimant’s case the GPW, Lincoln and Murray payments were on or justified by false invoices; the Millnet payments were by dishonest directions to pay.

17. It should be said at the outset that the Defendant admitted operating all the bank accounts into which the GPW, Lincoln and Murray money went, and admitted receipt of all that money and of the Millnet money as well. To clarify as to receipt of the money, the admissions were as to money paid into the accounts as alleged in the original Particulars of Claim. The amended Particulars of Claim added a number of invoices and payments to the same accounts, and receipt of the additional money must be in the same position.

18. The Defendant’s pleaded response, again to the original Particulars of Claim but necessarily extending to the additional invoices and payments, was that he did not create or cause to be created the false invoices. Save as to the Millnet money, however, he said that the payments were made to his account with his knowledge and the money received into the accounts was payment to him for expenses incurred in the course of his employment by the Claimant, for “commission/referral fees” due to him, or as salary for his role as Managing Director of a football club owned by the Claimant and expenses incurred in the course of that employment. The Millnet money was in a slightly different position. His pleaded response was that the payments were made to a friend’s bank account by genuine mistake, but in part for expenses incurred in the course of his employment by the Claimant.

19. More generally as to the false invoices, the Defendant said in paragraph 14 of the Defence –

“The Claimant engaged in regular practices of false invoicing and false accounting from late 2012 to 2014. The reason for doing so was in order to hide from the Bahrain Board [the Board of the Claimant’s parent company] and the CBB [the Central Bank of Bahrain] their involvement in specific projects, the source of their funding, and non-legitimate payments being made by the Claimant to various third parties. Further, this practice was designed to manipulate quarterly and other financial results of the listed parent company, GFH BSC. For the avoidance of doubt, the Defendant denies having ever created invoices, or caused invoices to be created, as alleged in the Particulars of Claim.”

The Millnet Money

20. Millnet provided services to the Claimant. It submitted invoices giving bank details for a Lloyds Bank branch. But, as I have mentioned, the Claimant’s claim in this instance did not involve false invoices.

21. Three emails were sent from the Defendant’s email box to the Claimant’s London solicitors, who held money on its behalf. They purported to have been sent by the Defendant.

22. The first email, on 26 July 2013, asked that GBP 47,600 be paid to a bank account described as –

“Millnet Limited

Natwest Bank PLC

153 Putney High Street

Putney

SW15 1RX

Sort Code: 60-17-11

Account: xxxxxx12

Reference / Project Rafael / Project Juliana Data room fees”

Another email a short time later corrected the amount to “57k”.

23. The second and third emails, on 1 August and 6 September 2013, asked that GBP 41,600 and GBP 38,200 respectively be paid to the same bank account, with slightly different references.

24. The solicitors paid the money as requested. In fact, the Natwest account was not a Millnet account, but an account in the name of a friend of the Defendant, Mr Rafael Utiyama. The Defendant nonetheless received the money by transfer from Mr Utiyama. He said in his Defence that the emails were drafted by staff on his behalf, that they were a genuine mistake, and that the GBP 57,000 was payment for expenses in relation to an apartment in London incurred in the course of his employment and the other two amounts would have been picked up in a reconciliation process for expenses within the Claimant.

25. This explanation is scarcely credible. It is odd that staff would draft emails sent from the Defendant’s email box, but the difficulty goes much further. Why would staff mistakenly insert a Natwest account of the Defendant’s friend in all three emails, stating it as a Millnet account and giving details as if in payment for Millnet’s services? The asserted practice of false invoicing cannot apply, nor that of false accounting if (as the Defendant said) it was a genuine mistake. If it was a genuine mistake, how can it now be ascribed in part to expenses? Further, and putting aside the first payment said to have been for expenses, the other payments would not have been thrown up in a reconciliation process for expenses. It would have been necessary for the Defendant to volunteer the mistake, which plainly he did not do.

The GPW Money

26. Companies in the GPW group provided services to the Claimant, invoicing it with bank details of accounts with HSBC. Fourteen other invoices were created, purportedly from GPW but in fact bogus, bearing dates 27 December 2012 to 30 November 2013 for a total sum of GBP 847,467.22, each with bank details of an account with Cooperative Bank in Manchester stated to be in the name of GPW & Co Limited. The Cooperative Bank account was in fact an account in the name of and operated by the Defendant.

27. The invoices were approved for payment within the Claimant, some with a stamp bearing the Defendant’s name, one bearing his apparent signature, and some without endorsement. Over the period 20 August 2013 to 18 December 2013 a total sum of GBP 848,320.70 was paid by the Claimant into the Cooperative Bank account.  The money was paid in two ways.

28. On dates in August to November 2013, emails from the Defendant requested the London solicitors to pay sums from money held by them in a total amount of GBP 480,569.23. The first email for two of the invoiced amounts gave the details of the Cooperative Bank account, including that it was an account in the name of GPW Limited. The solicitors asked for invoices, and copies of the two bogus invoices dated in February and July 2013 were sent by the Defendant. Another email attached a copy of a third bogus invoice and asked for payment. Another email asked for payment of a further invoiced amount, giving the same details of the Cooperative Bank, and when the solicitors asked for invoices the Defendant sent a copy of one of the bogus invoices. The last payment requests were by emails attaching copies of the bogus invoices. The solicitors paid the money as requested.

29. The Defendant admitted receiving this money. (For complete accuracy, the Defence referred to five amounts, the sixth being added in the amended Particulars of Claim. The sixth amount was plainly also received).  He said in the Defence that the amounts were payments for “commission/referral fees” owed to him. The payment of “commission/referral fees” rested upon what the Defendant alleged was an agreement between the Claimant and his company Seven Dash Limited (“Seven Dash”) entitling it to fees for referral of investors to the Claimant, it being further alleged that in or around November 2013 Seven Dash had assigned its right to the fees to the Defendant.

30. The existence of this agreement was disputed and doubtful, but even if it existed the Defendant’s explanation for the payments suffers in its credibility. It is not an attractive explanation, involving as it must that the Deputy Chief Executive of the Defendant knowingly used false invoices to cause the money to be paid, himself complicit in what he asserted was a practice of false invoicing to deceive the parent company and the Bahrain regulatory authorities. Nor does it attract belief. If the Defendant was entitled to referral fees, why the elaborate use of false invoices? Why pay relatively small amounts in dribs and drabs when the Defendant alleged that his entitlement was to over GBP 4 million? It does not make sense.  The Defendant’s own use of the false invoices is particularly telling.

31. The remaining GPW money was paid directly by the Claimant to the Cooperative Bank account, pursuant to payment authorisations most of which bore the apparent signature of the Defendant. The Defence did not proffer a reason for its payment into his account.

The Lincoln Money

32. Lincoln also provided services to the Claimant. Its invoices for the services gave details of a bank account with an HSBC branch, including an account number. Thirty-one further invoices were created bearing dates from 27 December 2012 to 31 December 2013, purportedly from Lincoln but again bogus. They were for total sums of USD 50,000 and AED 8,735,344. They bore bank details of an account with another HSBC branch in the name of Lincoln giving two account numbers different from those in the genuine invoices. In fact, these accounts were in the name of and operated by the Defendant.

33. Each of the bogus invoices was approved for payment with a stamp bearing the Defendant’s name and in some cases also bearing his apparent signature. Over the period 8 June 2013 to 13 January 2014 a total of USD 50,000 and AED 8,735,340 was paid by the Claimant into the two bank accounts. The payments were usually of a single invoiced amount and sometimes of a combined amount, and were not uniformly proximate to the invoice date.

34. The Defendant admitted receiving the payments alleged in the original Particulars of Claim, and that must extend to the like payments added in the amended Particulars of Claim. He said in the Defence that the earlier payments were for expenses incurred during his employment and the later payments were for “commission/referral fees”. It may be assumed that he would explain the payments added in the Amended Particulars of Claim in a similar manner.

35. Again, this is scarcely credible. The Defendant denied that he created or caused to be created the false invoices, and alleged that someone else within the Claimant must have used his stamp or forged his signature on the invoices. He denied that he authorised the payments. Yet he received and kept the money, and gave specific reasons for each of the payments in the original Particulars of Claim. Quite apart from the all but terminal doubt cast upon his asserted ignorance by his use of the bogus invoices in relation to the GPW payments, there would have had to have been ongoing conduct by others within the Claimant, unknown to him, in order to deliver the benefits of expenses and commissions by false means; yet he knew what he received and why.  Again, why the elaborate use of false invoices to pay fees to which he was entitled in dribs and drabs? And it may be added that from the third witness statement of Mr Patel the expenses which the Defendant asserts were satisfied by Millnet and Lincoln money were far in excess of any likely entitlement to expenses.

The Murray Money

36. Murray is a member of Fountain Court Chambers. He provided legal services to the Claimant, for which fee notes were provided. Thirty-three other fee notes were created, purportedly from Fountain Court Chambers on behalf of Murray and addressed to the Defendant. They were bogus fee notes. Their dates ranged from 24 December 2012 to 24 December 2013 and they totalled GBP 1,410,773.

37. The fee notes were approved for payment by a stamp and/or apparent signature of the Defendant. Payment to a bank account in the name of Murray with the Cooperative Bank in London, the account stated on the bogus fee notes, was authorised by the Defendant’s apparent signature. Over the period 17 January 2013 to 22 December 2013 a total of GBP 1,054,673 was paid to the Cooperative Bank account. There was not always correlation of amounts of the payments with the amounts of the fee notes, but each was purportedly a payment to Murray at his Cooperative Bank account and most could be related to a fee note.  In fact, the account was in the name of and operated by the Defendant.

38. The Defendant denied creating or causing the creation of the bogus fee notes, but admitted receiving most of the money paid on those fee notes as listed in the original Particulars of Claim. A small number of fee notes were added in the Amended Particulars of Claim, and they must be in the same position. The Defendant said in the Defence that the payments “represent salary for his role as Managing Director of LUFC and expense payments incurred during the course of that employment”.

39. The Claimant owned the Leeds United Football Club (“the Club”). A letter agreement dated 28 August 2013 recorded the Defendant’s employment by the Club from 20 November 2012 as Non-Executive Director and from 1 July 2013 as Executive Director and Managing Director. His salary was 500 Bahrain Dinar per day for each day in which he carried out his duties in the UK, subject to review, and he was entitled to reimbursement of expenses. The Defendant’s salary as Managing Director of the Club was payable by the Club, and he did not receive a separate salary from the Claimant referable to his Club employment.

40. The bulk of the Murray money was paid after 1 August 2013, some GBP 977,478. Even if the Claimant were responsible for payment of salary and expenses that is well in excess of any likely entitlement to salary and expenses for the period. But the Claimant was not responsible for that payment. As before, on the Defendant’s case the bogus fee notes were created by someone else within the Claimant. It is not clear whether he says that payment was authorised by someone else, the denial in the Defence being of authorisation knowing of falsity, but he identified precise reasons for receiving and keeping the money and this cannot reasonably stand with someone else’s creation, unknown to him, of the false fee notes.  Once more, the Defendant’s explanation is scarcely credible.

Immediate Judgment

41. I have referred to apparent signatures of the Defendant. A handwriting expert cited in his Defence concluded in a preliminary report that there had been some transposition of the Defendant’s signature from other documents. The report accepted that there may have been some genuine signatures of the Defendant, but the expert was not in a position to be conclusive beyond what I have mentioned. The report was not clear as to the particular documents concerned.  The Claimant did not have expert handwriting evidence.  It was content not to contend that the Defendant had himself signed approvals or authorisations: but, it said, it remained that the Defendant procured those events.  I do not think the expert’s report is of great weight in deciding whether there should be immediate judgment.

42. The Defendant admits or, so far as he does not do so I find, that he received the Millnet, GPW, Lincoln and Murray money. The money was paid to his bank accounts under false representations that they were the accounts of those purported payees.

43. It is necessary to consider all the conduct in the preceding account together, as each part may shed light on the other and the combination may have a force which the individual elements do not have. The payment of GPW money by the solicitors was by overt use by the Defendant of the false invoices, which tells strongly against any asserted ignorance of falsification of invoices or fee notes containing the false representations, and for the reasons earlier set out the Defendant’s explanations for the payments lack credibility.  The evolution of his Defence as recounted in Mr Patel’s witness statement provides some additional support for considering the explanations as a concoction. Having well in mind that it involves a finding of dishonesty on the Defendant’s part, I am satisfied on the materials before me that he has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim.

44. Particularly when the Defendant has not participated in the hearing, I must consider whether other evidence may be available at trial which would put matters in a different light; or, as was indicated by Mummery LJ in Doncaster, whether a fuller investigation of the facts might alter the evidence and the outcome of the case.

45. The Claimant’s evidence has been full and detailed. It does not seem to me that the Defendant’s position is at all likely to be better at a trial. He received the payments in circumstances strongly telling of misappropriation, and his explanations’ lack of credibility is such that they are not likely to be better made out or received at trial. While I would be of this view in any event, I come to it more comfortably when the Defendant has not by evidence or submissions enlarged on or sought to support his position in this application. For similar reasons, I do not think the application for immediate judgment should be refused because my reasons involved a finding of dishonesty.

46. I do not think there is any other compelling reason why the case should be disposed of at trial. On the contrary, the Claimant has been delayed in obtaining a hearing of the application and, having concluded that the Defendant has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending its claim, I should give effect to that conclusion by ordering immediate judgment.

Relief

47. In the Claim Form and the Amended Particulars of Claim the Claimant sought wider relief, but confined its claim in this application to a declaration that the Millnet, GPW, Lincoln and Murray money was held on trust for it and judgment for the money. It is entitled to that relief.

48. I direct that the Claimant bring in draft orders.

Issued by:

Mark Beer

Registrar

Date of Issue: 10 November 2016

At: 1pm

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Claim No: CFI-020-2014

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE JUSTICE ROGER GILES

BETWEEN

GFH CAPITAL LIMITED

Claimant

and

DAVID LAWRENCE HAIGH

Defendant

 ORDER WITH REASONS OF JUSTICE ROGER GILES

UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant at the hearing of Application Notice CFI-020-2014/3 dated 17 March 2015 for immediate judgment on 17 October 2016

AND UPON rendering judgment orally on 18 October 2016 and directing the Claimant to bring in draft orders

AND UPON reviewing the Claimant’s draft order dated 18 October 2016 and the submissions on indemnity costs dated 23 October 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Application for immediate judgment be allowed.

2. Judgment be entered for the Claimant in the amounts of AED 8,735,340, USD 50,000 and GBP 2,039,793.70, plus simple interest from 28 May 2014, accruing at the rate of EIBOR (three month rate) + 1 per cent.

3. Save where the subject of previous costs orders, which remain in force, the Defendant shall pay the Claimant’s costs of the proceedings on the indemnity basis, to be assessed if not agreed.

Issued by:

Mark Beer

Registrar

Date of issue: 10 November 2016

At: 1pm

REASONS:

1.At the conclusion of my reasons delivered orally on 18 October 2016, I directed that the Claimant bring in draft orders. The Claimant had asked for indemnity costs, and I also sought submissions in support of that request.

2. The Court has a discretion as to costs (RDC 38.6). Practice Direction No 5 of 2014 records factors taken into consideration in determining, in the exercise of the discretion, whether costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis rather than the standard basis.  They are –

“(i) circumstances where the facts of the case and/or the conduct of the paying party are/is such as to take the situation away from the norm; for example where the Court has found deliberate misconduct in breach of a direction of the Court or unreasonable conduct to a high degree in connection with the litigation; or

(ii) otherwise inappropriate conduct in its wider sense in relation to a paying party’s pre-litigation dealings with the receiving party, or in relation to the commencement or conduct of the litigation itself; or

(iii) where the Court considers the paying party’s conduct to be an abuse of process.”

3. These factors reflect the established approach under English law, see for example the summary by Gloster J in Euroption Strategic Fund Ltd v Skandinavska Enskilda Banken AB [2012] EWHC 749 (Comm) at [11] – [14]. In particular, where a claim is successfully brought on the basis of the defendant’s fraud, the fraudulent conduct need not of itself warrant indemnity costs but is something which may be taken into account.

4. I consider that indemnity costs should be ordered in the present case.

5. On my conclusions in the application for immediate judgment, the Defendant acted dishonestly in misappropriating money from the Claimant. But more than that, he sought to defend the claim against him with explanations which I considered to be lacking in credibility and a concoction.  In the course of the proceedings the Defendant brought applications and appeals with marked paucity of success and diversionary and collateral proceedings, while not engaging with the application for immediate judgement made in March 2015.  In my opinion, his dishonest conduct and his conduct in relation to the claim brought against him was inappropriate and unreasonable, to the level of taking the case out of the norm and warranting an order for costs on the indemnity basis.

6. I therefore make the following orders:

(1) The money judgment will carry interest at the post-judgment rate provided by DIFC Courts Practice Direction No. 1 of 2009 from the date of commencement of the proceedings.

(2) The application for immediate judgment be allowed.

(3) That the sums of AED 8,735,340, USD 50,000 and GBP 2,039,793.70 when received by the Defendant were held by him on trust for the Claimant.

(4) Judgment for the Claimant in the amounts of AED 8,735,340, USD 50,000 and GBP 2,039,793.70, plus simple interest from 28 May 2014, accruing at the rate 1 percent over the Emirates Inter bank Offered Rate (EIBOR) per annum.

(5) Save where the subject of previous costs orders, which remain in force, the Defendant shall to pay the Claimant’s costs of the proceedings on the indemnity basis, to be assessed if not agreed.

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Claim No:  CFI 016/2016

          THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

RASMALA INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS LIMITED

                                                                                                                                   Claimant

and

AMER SAAD FAWZI AL KHAYYAT

Defendant

 CONSENT ORDER

UPON the Claimant and the Defendant agreeing to the terms set out hereto

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED BY CONSENT THAT:

1.The Order of Justice Sir Richard Field dated 16 May 2016 against the Defendant is varied for the sole purpose of allowing the Parties to complete the transactions documented in the Framework Agreement dated on or around 19 October 2016 (the “Framework Agreement”) between the Defendant, the Claimant (now known as Rasmala Holdings Limited, “Rasmala”) and Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle and the related Escrow Agreement dated on or around the same date. In this respect alone, the Defendant shall be allowed to whether by himself, for and on behalf of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle, any of its shareholders or otherwise howsoever (1) redeem his or any other shareholder’s shares in Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle, a company incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands; and (2) sell or otherwise dispose of all or any of the shares held by Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle in Madaares PJSC (a private joint stock company incorporated under the laws of the UAE) to Mr. Ahmad Saad Fawzi Al Khayyat and/or Al Mal Capital PSC and/or to any person nominated pursuant to clause 2.10 of the Framework Agreement by: (i) Rasmala; or (ii) any other shareholder of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle (provided that the requirements of clause 2.10 are satisfied), whether on his own behalf, for and on behalf of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle or any shareholder of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle or otherwise (and whether in his role as director and/or shareholder of Madaares Sell-Down Vehicle or otherwise) in each case subject to and in accordance with the terms of the Framework Agreement in each case subject to and in accordance with the terms of the Framework Agreement.

2. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date:10 November 2016

At: 1pm

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Claim No. CFI-024-2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE JUSTICE ROGER GILES

BETWEEN

(1) EBI SA, FRANCE

(2) ECOBANK NIGERIA LIMITED

(3) ECOBANK SENEGAL

Claimants

and

(1) LAL MAHAL DMCC

(2) LITTLE ROSE GENERAL TRADING LLC

(3) PREM CHAND GARG

Defendants

Hearing: 20 October 2016

Counsel: Hisham ElSheikh (Adel Mohamed Al Qasemi Advocates & Legal Consultants) for the Claimants

Jayakrishnan Parvthik (Al Nassar Advocates & Legal Consultants) for the Defendants

Judgment:  14 November 2016

JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE ROGER GILES

Transcribed from the oral judgment delivered on 20 October 2016, revised and approved by the judge.

ORDER

UPON reviewing the Default Judgment of the Registrar dated 16 August 2016 (the “Default Judgment”)

AND UPON reviewing the Defendants’ applications dated 6 September 2016 to set aside the Default Judgment

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendant on 20 October 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Default Judgment dated 16 August 2016 be varied by:

(a) substituting for the figure of USD 2,000,000 in legal fees the figure of AED 627,750, which includes the sum of USD 130,000 as the Court fee;

(b) setting aside the judgment so far as the Second and Third Defendants were ordered to pay USD 111,650,189.44 to the Second Claimant;

(c) deleting order 3, namely the Order that the Defendants’ obligations are joint and several.

2. Subject to paragraph 3 below, the Default Judgment be set aside so far as the Third Defendant was ordered to pay the sums in paragraph 2 thereof.

3. Paragraph 2 is made on the condition that the Third Defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of this Court but may not otherwise file a defence to the claims against him.

4. Costs of the applications to set aside the Default Judgment are to be paid by the Defendants to the Claimants, to be assessed by the Registrar if not agreed.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 14 November 2016

At: 3pm

JUDGMENT

1.This is an application to set aside a default judgment. The Claim Form was filed on 22 June 2016.  There are three Claimants and three Defendants.  The claims are for money due from a borrower and from guarantors.  The claims are rather confusingly set out in the Claim Form, and amount to the following seven claims:

 (1) by the First Claimant, described as EBI SA, France ( “EBI”), against the Second Defendant, Little Rose General Trading LLC (“Little Rose”), as borrower, for  USD 9,512,400;

(2) by EBI against the Third Defendant, Prem Chand Garg (“Prem”) as guarantor, amount not specified;

(3)by EBI against the First Defendant, Lal Mahal DMCC (“Lal Mahal” ) as guarantor, for USD 9,512,400;

(4) by the Second Claimant Ecobank Nigeria Ltd (“Ecobank Nigeria”) against Lal Mahal as guarantor, for  USD 111,650,189.44;

(5) by the Third Claimant, described as Ecobank Senegal, against Little Rose as guarantor, for USD 13,717,801;

(6) by Ecobank Senegal against Lal Mahal as guarantor, for USD 13,717,801; and

(7) by Ecobank Senegal against Prem as guarantor, amount not specified.

2. Adding the missing amounts, the claims may be otherwise expressed as claims:

(a)by EBI against each of Little Rose, Lal Mahal and Prem, for USD 9,512,400;

(b) by Ecobank Nigeria against Lal Mahal for USD 111,650,189.44; and

(c) by Ecobank Senegal against Little Rose, Lal Mahal and Prem, for USD 13,717,801.

3. The Particulars of Claim ended –

 “The Plaintiffs are claiming the repayment of the total amount of $134,295,390.44 in Default plus 15% Default Interest per Annum plus USD 2,000,000 (Legal Fees)”.

4. According to the certificate of service in the court file, the Claim Form was served on 23 June 2016. No acknowledgement of service was filed within the relevant time.

5. The default judgment was issued on 16 August 2016. It was relevantly stated that –

“2. The Defendants are ordered to pay, within 14 days of the date of this Order:

(a) USD 9,512,400 to the First Claimant;

(b) USD 111,065,189.44 to the Second Claimant;

(c) USD 13,717,801 to the Third Claimant;

(d) USD 2,000,000 in legal fees to the Claimants; and

(e) Interest at the rate of 15% annually on USD 134,295,390.44, being the sum of the amounts listed in paragraphs 2(a) to 2(c) above, compounded monthly as follows:

(i) USD 1,655,696.59 for the month of June 2016

(ii) USD 1,731,979.60 for the month of July 2016

(iii) USD 56,582.08 as a daily rate for the month of August 2016.

3. The Defendants’ obligations are joint and several.”

6. It will be seen that the claims against Prem were quantified, and that the judgment included USD 2 million for legal fees being the amount stated in the Particulars of Claim. It will be seen also that, although the claim for USD 111,650,189.44 was by Ecobank Nigeria against Lal Mahal alone, the judgment for Ecobank Nigeria for that amount was against all three of Little Rose, Lal Mahal and Prem.  I will return to these two matters, neither of which was raised by the Defendants.

7. Applications by each Defendant to set aside the default judgment were filed in early September 2016. They stated as the grounds –

“(1) The Defendant could not appear in time and submit the defense [sic] since the investor was out of the country due to some personal, unavoidable reasons.

(2) In addition to that, we would like to enlighten the Honourable Court that we are challenging the jurisdiction of this DIFC Court to entertain the said litigation, especially considering the fact that the parties have categorically surrendered to the jurisdiction of Nigerian Courts, as per Article 22 of the Loan Agreement which is the base document.

(3) Further, we have also raised contentions of non-joinder of necessary parties, and mis-joinder of unnecessary parties to the proceedings.

(4) It is also highly pertinent to note that the Claimant No.2 has already moved a litigation for the same relief in the agreed court of jurisdiction and the matter is still pending before that court, and Claimant No.2 has wilfully concealed this important aspect”.

8. The applications were accompanied by a “Sworn Affidavit/Defendants’ statement of Defense”, a strange document with some resemblance to a pleaded Defence in the form of an affidavit of Mr Saurabh Rastogi. Mr Rastogi said that he was an employee and Power of Attorney holder of all the Defendants, and “an individual very close to Mr Prem Garg and his businesses for the past six (6) years [and] conversant with the facts of the case”.

General

9. Under Rule 14.2 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”), the default judgment may be set aside on such conditions as the Court sees fit, or may be varied, if –

“(1) the defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim; or

 (2) it appears to the Court that there is some other good reason why;

(a) the judgment should be set aside or varied; or

(b) the defendant should be allowed to defend the claim.”

The Court must have regard to whether the person seeking to set aside the judgment made an application to do so promptly (RDC 14.3).  An application must be supported by evidence (RDC 14.4).

10. The affidavit of Mr Rastogi gave no explanation for the Defendant’s failure to file an acknowledgement of service, and there was no evidence through it or otherwise to support the reason asserted in the applications, namely that the investor was out of the country due to some personal unavoidable circumstances.

11. The defences as appearing from the application and the affidavit may be summarised under the following heads –

(1) lack of jurisdiction;

(2) non-joinder and mis-joinder of parties;

(3) although not enunciated in this way, abuse of process by duplication of existing litigation or some form of lis alibi pendens;

(4) the documents on which the Claimants relied were not binding on the Defendants;

(5) perhaps, breach of a facility letter by Ecobank Nigeria.

            I will take each in turn.

Lack of jurisdiction

12. The Defendants submitted that the “basic documents” were a loan facility dated 23 May 2014 and a loan agreement dated 29 May 2014; that the latter provided that it should be “subject to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian Courts”; and therefore the Nigerian courts alone had jurisdiction over the claims. At one point in the affidavit, it was said that by entering into the loan agreement Ecobank Nigeria had “wilfully surrendered to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian Courts”.

13. There are two difficulties with this submission. The first pervaded the other defences.

14. The loan agreement was between Ecobank Nigeria and Agrico AGB Ltd (“Agrico”), and provided for the loan to Agrico of money which was the subject of the facility letter. But the Claimants sued on quite different documents.  The claim against Little Rose as borrower was founded on a document described as a “Facility Schedule” dated 20 March 2015 in which it accepted the position of borrower, and the claims against it as guarantor on one or more of three letters of guarantee.  The claim against Lal Mahal was founded on a deed of guarantee and indemnity dated 14 May 2014.  The claim against Prem was founded on a guarantee and indemnity dated 7 April 2015.  The jurisdiction clause in the loan agreement in no way governed suing those Defendants on those documents, and any surrendering to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian courts was only in relation to the loan agreement.  In any event, the agreement to the jurisdiction of the Nigerian courts did not exclude the jurisdiction of another court if that jurisdiction otherwise existed.

15. That is not the end of the matter. The Court must be satisfied of its jurisdiction if there is not submission to it by participation in the proceedings.  Jurisdiction having been questioned, although on misconceived grounds, I enquired of Mr ElSheikh for the Claimants in order to ascertain the source of jurisdiction.  When the Defendants did not challenge jurisdiction beyond the submission to which I have referred, if there is an apparent basis for jurisdiction I should accept that the default judgment was given within jurisdiction.  Save in one respect, I see no occasion to conclude that it was not.

16. Mr ElSheikh informed me, no doubt on instructions, that the Facility Schedule was executed by Little Rose in and to be carried out within the DIFC. The letters of guarantee stated that any dispute will be “subject to the jurisdiction of the Court [sic] of Dubai, UAE”, a phrase which can readily extend to this Court as a Dubai court and the Defendants did not raise a deficiency in that respect. The deed of indemnity and guarantee provided specifically in cl 19.1 that the courts of the Dubai International Financial Centre should have exclusive jurisdiction over any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with it.  There is, however, a difficulty in the guarantee and indemnity executed by Prem.

17. That guarantee and indemnity provided in cl 21 that it was governed by French law and for submission to the jurisdiction and competence of the French courts and tribunals. It added, “But with full liberty for you to resort to the courts of any other country where jurisdiction may exist or be established”.  That left it necessary that the jurisdiction of this Court exist or be established; that is, that the claim against Prem fall within Article 5 (A) (1) or (2) of the Judicial Authority Law, DIFC Law No 12 of 2004.

18. Mr ElSheikh submitted that it fell within sub-Article (2), which provides that the Court may hear and determine a claim “where the parties agree in writing to file such claim or action with it…provided that such agreement is made pursuant to specific, clear and express provisions”. It was submitted that cl 21 of the guarantee and indemnity was such an agreement in writing, and it was said in support of that submission that there was a nexus with Dubai in a number of respects.

19. I am unable to see that the matters said to provide a nexus assist. It does not seem to me that cl 21 is an agreement to file a claim or action with this Court, certainly not a specific, clear and express provision to that end.  In my view there is a real doubt whether this Court had jurisdiction in relation to the claim against Prem, and that is not something which can be overlooked because the Court should not allow a judgment to stand if it did not have jurisdiction to order the judgment.  I consider that Prem should be able to mount a challenge to jurisdiction.

Mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties

20. The Defendants submitted that EBI and Ecobank Senegal had “never been a party to any of the agreements and so could not sue”, and that Ecobank Nigeria had failed to join the principal debtor, so the claim was bad. The first of these submissions appears to have been founded on the loan agreement as the document on which Claimants sued.  As explained above, it was not, and there was no mis-joinder.  It is not necessary to join the principal debtor in a claim against a guarantor.  There is nothing in this defence.  

Abuse of process and/or lis alibi pendens

21. The Defendants submitted that Ecobank Nigeria had sued “for the same relief” in Nigeria, and that Agrico, Lal Mahal and Prem had brought proceedings in Nigeria, and obtained ex parte an interlocutory order to maintain the status quo pending a hearing on notice.

22. The evidence was scanty. Ecobank Nigeria applied in Nigeria for a freezing order against Prem and for leave to serve process on him out of the jurisdiction.  The application for a freezing order was withdrawn and the leave was granted.  However, the claim against Prem in the proceedings was not disclosed in the evidence.  The interlocutory order was in proceedings brought against a different party, Ecobank Plc.  It was obtained in June 2015, and the current position was not disclosed.

23. There is nothing in this submission, which in any event would not provide a defence but, if anything, found an application for a stay of proceedings. The other Claimants did not sue at all in Nigeria.  Whatever Ecobank Nigeria was doing, it was not shown that the relief it sought had anything to do with the relief it obtained in this Court.  Ecobank Plc is not a Claimant.  Any wider disputes linking the Claimant’s claims in these proceedings with the Nigerian proceedings was not explained.

Documents not binding

24. This was explained in the affidavit of Mr Rastogi –

“The Defendants being separate corporate, legal entities, they express their will through resolutions, and these resolutions are to be attested by the concerned authorities, as to my knowledge as on date there exists not even a single document which has been attested by the appropriate authorities, and thereby there exists no documents to Bind Defendant No.1 and 3.  Further, the alleged personal guarantee alleged to be executed by the Defendant No.3 is not seen attested by a notary public, and it is pertinent to note that it undated [sic].  It is highly important to note that neither the Loan Agreement Facility Letter was signed by any of these alleged guarantors”.

25. The need for attestation by concerned authorities, in order that the documents on which the Claimants sued be binding, was not explained. The fact that the loan agreement and the facility letter were not signed by the guarantors is of no consequence.  As put in the affidavit, this is of no substance.

26. In submissions, Mr Jayakrishnan for the Defendants put the matter slightly differently. The facility letter provided that Ecobank Nigeria would make available up to USD 140 million to Agrico.  It stated a number of conditions precedent to drawdown, including that the bank should have received a notarised corporate guarantee of Lal Mahal and a notarised board resolution also of Lal Mahal.  There was no evidence, but implicit in the submission was that no such documents had been received.

27. Apart from the lack of evidence, how deficiency in this respect negated the documents on which the Claimants sued was not explained. The fact, if it be the fact, that the Lal Mahal deed of guarantee and indemnity was not notarised and no notarised board resolution of Lal Mahal was provided to the bank before drawdown was not shown to affect the validity of the deed of guarantee and indemnity.

Breach of facility letter

28. It is not clear to me that this was proposed as a defence, or that Mr Jayakrishnan took it up. It may be an earlier expression of the submission last mentioned.

29. Mr Rastogi said in the affidavit –

“Certain parameters and requirements were highlighted in the loan facility letter… which was considered as mandatory requirements to be fulfilled as a condition precedent to disperse the loan.  Bit [sic] but is highly surprising and suspicious to note that these mandatory requirements were waived by the concerned official of the Claimant No.2, and the amount was dispersed without fulfilling any of the mandatory requirements”.

30. So far as this was intended to go further than the submission last mentioned, any breach of the facility letter does not diminish the claim upon Little Rose as borrower. It was not explained how the asserted waiver affected the claims against the guarantors, specifically the claim against Lal Mahal.

Conclusion

31. I do not think that the Defendants have a real prospect of successfully defending the claims. The jurisdictional doubt as to the claim against Prem, as a matter going to jurisdiction, appears to me to provide a good reason why the judgment against Prem should be set aside and he should be allowed to defend, but only by a challenge to jurisdiction.

32. I return to the matters of USD 2 million for legal fees and the judgment for Ecobank Nigeria against all three of Little Rose, Lal Mahal and Prem.

33. The claimable costs are those of bringing the claims and prosecuting than to the point of obtaining judgment. They could not conceivably be USD 2 million.  Mr ElSheikh was either unable or unwilling to suggest an appropriate figure; he suggested USD 1 million, which is scarcely more acceptable.  I propose to set aside the judgment in so far as it included USD 2 million for legal fees, and to substitute it in that respect with AED 150,000.

34. The Claimants properly accepted that there had been error in the default judgment in favour of Ecobank Nigeria, and that the error should be corrected by setting aside that judgment and substituting a judgment only against Lal Mahal.

Addendum

35. When giving the preceding reasons ex tempore, I omitted to explain why I did not accept a further submission made by the Defendants. I do so by this addendum when correcting the transcript of my reasons.

36. The submission was an apparent afterthought, made in submissions in reply. It went only to the claims against Little Rose as guarantor, and was that the letters of guarantee were limited in time.

37. The last of the letters, dated 27 July 2015, included a paragraph –

“This Guarantee is valid until 31st December 2015 and automatically and fully extinguished if this date [sic] no request for payment has reached us.  After which it will no longer be called for any reason what so ever.”

38. The earlier letters had like paragraphs, in one case adding “by swift authenticated message” after “reached us”, and gave dates of 31 May 2015 and 31 July 2015.

39. There was no evidence of requests for payment made to Little Rose. Without evidence that payment was requested only after 31 December 2015, an available defence was not demonstrated.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 14 November 2016

At: 3pm

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Claim No: ARB 003/2013

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

BANYAN TREE CORPORATE PTE LTD

(Formerly known as Banyan Tree Hotels & Resorts Pte Ltd)

                                                                                          Claimant

and

MEYDAN GROUP LLC

Defendant

  ORDER OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE SIR DAVID STEEL

UPON reviewing the Claimant’s Application Notice ARB 003-2013/6 dated 18 August 2016 seeking that the Order of the Deputy Chief Justice Sir David Steel dated 10 August 2016 (the “Order”) be varified and clarified

AND UPON reviewing the parties’ responses as recorded on the Court file

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The reference to ARB-003-2015/5 in the Order shall be amended to read ARB-003-2013/5.

• KWM ceased to act as the legal representative of the Defendant in the ARB-003-2013 proceedings with effect from the date on which an alternative address for service was provided by the Defendant, being 10 August 2016, pursuant to RDC 37.13.

Issued by:

Mark Beer

Registrar

Date of issue: 15 November 2016

At: 10am

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Claim No. CFI 027/2014

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

LEGATUM LIMITED

Claimant

and

ARIF SALIM

Defendant

ORDER OF THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR NATASHA BAKIRCI

UPON the Defendant filing an Application Notice CFI-027-2014/10 dated 16 November 2016 seeking the anonymisation of his identity by the use of a pseudonym in all DIFC Courts Judgments and Orders relating to Claim No. CFI-027-2014

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Defendant’s application be granted.

2. The parties’ names in the Court records be redacted pursuant to Practice Direction No. 3 of 2014 and Practice Direction No. 3 of 2016 in all copies of the judgment including those on the DIFC Courts website.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date: 16 November 2016

At: 4pm

The post CFI 027/2014 Legatum Limited v Arif Salim appeared first on DIFC Courts.

Claim No: CFI-032-2014

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

IN THE MATTER OF ES BANKERS (DUBAI) LIMITED

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE REGULATORY LAW DIFC LAW NO 1 OF 2004

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW DIFC LAW NO 3 OF 2009

BETWEEN

COMMTEL HOLDING (BVI) INC

The First Applicant

RUNNINGWOODS FZE

The Second Applicant

CARLOS ALBERTO MONTEIRO RODRIGUES DE OLIVEIRA;
DAMAJOMADA LIMITED
HARMON INVESTMENTS LIMITED
HERMES DEVELOPMENTS LIMITED
KLENZ INCORPORATION LIMITED
LO-PROFILE INVESTMENT LIMITED
NEWLIFE 2013 RAKFZC LIMITED
PALATINE PROPERTIES LIMITED
PHILIPPE GINSBERG
TALAMOK OVERSEAS S.A. LIMITED
TEDESCHIA CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES LIMITED
TUNAY BUSINESS LIMITED

The Third Group of Applicants

and

ES BANKERS (DUBAI) LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)

Respondent

CONSENT ORDER

UPON the parties advising the Court that they have agreed terms of settlement in relation to the following Application Notices filed by the Applicants (the “Applications”):

• Commtel Holding (BVI) Inc: CFI-032-2014/6;
• Runningwoods FZE: CFI-032-2014/19;
• Damajomada Limited: CFI-032-2014/16;
• Harmon Investments Limited: CFI-032-2014/17;
• Hermes Developments Limited: CFI-032-2014/14;
• Klenz Incorporation Limited: CFI-032-2014/5;
• Klenz Incorporation Limited: CFI-032-2014/9;
• Lo-Profile Investment Limited: CFI-032-2014/8;
• Newlife 2013 RAKFZC Limited: CFI-032-2014/13;
• Palatine Properties Limited: CFI-032-2014/10;
• Philippe Ginsberg: CFI-032-2014/11;
• Talamok Overseas S.A. Limited and Carlos Alberto Monteiro Rodrigues De Oliveira: CFI-032-2014/15;
• Tedeschia Construction Enterprises Limited: CFI-032-2014/12; and
• Tunay Business Limited: CFI-032-2014/7

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED BY CONSENT THAT:

1. The Applications be withdrawn.
2. Further proceedings in relation to the Applications be stayed, except for the purpose of carrying into effect the terms of this Order and the terms of settlement agreed between the parties.
3. Liberty to apply in order to carry such terms into effect.
4. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Issued by:

Amna Al Owais

Deputy Registrar

Date of issue: 21 November 2016

At: 2pm

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Claim No: CFI-014-2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

(1) MR RAFED ABDEL MOHSEN BADER AL KHORAFI

(2) MRS AMRAH ALI ABDEL LATIF AL HAMAD

(3) MRS ALIA MOHAMMED SULAIMAN AL RIFAI

Claimants

and

(1) BANK SARASIN ALPEN (ME) LIMITED

(2) BANK J. SAFRA SARASIN (FORMERLY BANK SARASIN & CO) 

Defendants

 CONSENT ORDER

UPON reviewing the Claimant’s Amended Part 7 Claim Form filed 6 April 2016, amended on 7 April 2016 (the “Claim Form”)

AND UPON reading the Claimant’s Application Notice CFI-014-2016/4 dated 21 November 2016 (the “Application”) seeking an extension of time for service of the Particulars of Claim on the Second Defendant until 9 January 2017 and for the consequential extension of time for the Second Defendant to serve a Defence to 6 March 2017

AND UPON the consent of the Second Defendant being obtained to the orders sought

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED BY CONSENT THAT:

1. Pursuant to Rule 7.31(2) of the Rules of the DIFC Courts (“RDC”), time for service of the Particulars of Claim on the Second Defendant shall be extended until 4pm on Monday 9 January 2017.
2. Pursuant to RDC 16.11, the time for the filing of the Defence by the Second Defendant in this matter shall be extended to 4pm on Monday 6 March 2017.
3. There be no order as to costs.

Issued by:

Amna Al Owais

Deputy Registrar

Date of issue: 21 November 2016

At: 3pm

The post CFI 014/2016 (1) Mr Rafed Abdel Mohsen Bader Al Khorafi (2) Mrs Amrah Ali Abdel Latif Al Hamad (3) Mrs Alia Mohammed Sulaiman Al Rifai v (1) Bank Sarasin Alpen (ME) Limited (2) Bank J. Safra Sarasin appeared first on DIFC Courts.

Claim No. CFI 016/2015

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE H.E. JUSTICE ALI AL MADHANI

BETWEEN

(1) MOHAMMAD ABU ALHAJ

(2) ABU ALHAJ HOLDING

Claimants

and

(1) SHEIK SULTAN KHALIFA SULTAN AL NEHAYAN IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF GOLD HOLDING LTD

(2) SHEIK SULTAN KHALIFA SULTAN AL NEHAYAN

Defendants

ORDER OF H.E. JUSTICE ALI AL MADHANI

UPON hearing the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendant at a Pre-Trial Review on 21 November 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Claimant shall submit any witness statements of fact to be relied upon at trial by no later than 4pm on Wednesday 23 November 2016.

2. The Defendant shall submit any witness statements in reply by no later than 4pm on Monday 28 November 2016.

3. The Defendant shall prepare trial bundles, the cost of which shall be covered by the Claimant, to be filed and served by no later than 2pm on Sunday 4 December 2016.

4. Both the Claimant and Defendant shall file and serve skeleton arguments by no later than 2pm on Sunday 4 December 2016.

5. The trial shall be listed for two days to commence at 10am on Monday 5 December 2016.

Issued by:

Amna Al Owais

Deputy Registrar

Date of Issue: 21 November 2016

At: 10am

The post CFI 016/2015 (1) Mohammad Abu AlHaj (2) ABU AlHaj Holding v (1) Sheik Sultan Khalifa Sultan Al Nehayan in his Capacity as Director of Gold Holding Ltd (2) Sheik Sultan Khalifa Sultan Al Nehayan appeared first on DIFC Courts.

Claim No. CFI-024-2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

(1) EBI SA, FRANCE

(2) ECOBANK NIGERIA LIMITED

(3) ECOBANK SENEGAL 

Claimants

and

(1) LAL MAHAL DMCC

(2) LITTLE ROSE GENERAL TRADING LLC

(3) PREM CHAND GARG 

Defendants

ORDER WITH REASONS OF JUSTICE SIR JEREMY COOKE

UPON reading the Appeal Notices of the First and Second Defendants and skeleton arguments dated 6 November 2016 on paper (the “Applications”)

AND UPON reviewing the Judgment of Justice Roger Giles handed down on 20 October 2016 and considering the applications of both Defendants for permission to appeal on paper

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The First and Second Defendants are refused permission to appeal.

2. The Applications are totally without merit and the First and Second Defendants may not request the reconsideration of their applications at a hearing.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 23 November 2016

At: 9am

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

1. There is no prospect of success on any appeal and there is no compelling reason why any appeal should be heard.

2. Justice Giles rightly held that the claims were founded not on the Facility Letter of 23 May 2014 or the Loan Agreement of 29 May 2014 between Ecobank Nigeria Limited and Agrico AGBE Ltd but on separate instruments agreed between the Claimants and each of the Defendants. The claim against the Second Defendant as borrower (not guarantor) was founded on a Facility schedule dated 20 March 2015 and the claim against it as guarantor was founded on one or more of three letters of guarantee, whilst the claim against the First Defendant was founded on a deed of guarantee and indemnity dated 14 May 2014. The jurisdiction agreement in the Agreement between the Second Claimant and Agrico AGBE Ltd is therefore irrelevant, as is the litigation which is being carried on in Nigeria between those parties. No evidence was produced to show any wider dispute which linked the claims with the Nigerian proceedings. Justice Giles determined the issue of jurisdiction by reference to the relevant documents and held that there was an arguable case for a stay of the claim against the Third Defendant.

3. The learned judge determined that the absence of evidence of notarised board resolutions of the First and Second Defendants was not shown to affect the validity of the instruments on which liability rested, whether or not the provision of such was a precondition to drawdown of the loan which could be waived by the lender. Nothing has been produced to the Court to show that the learned judge was wrong in reaching that conclusion. Justice Giles proceeded correctly on the evidence before him.

4. Justice Giles carefully examined the claims set out in the claim form and the basis for each of them, dealing with each claim against each Defendant separately. He also varied the terms of the judgment to benefit the Defendants in two respects in relation to points which the Defendants had not taken (paragraphs 6, 32 and 34 of the Judgment). He set aside judgment in default where it had been entered erroneously against the Second and Third Defendants for a sum not claimed as well as ruling against joint and several liability.

5. There is consequently no basis for any appeal and no other considerations which constitute a reason why any appeal should be heard.

The post CFI 024/2016 (1) EBI SA, France (2) Ecobank Nigeria Limited (3) Ecobank Senegal v (1) Lal Mahal DMCC (2) Little Rose General Trading LLC (3) Prem Chand Garg appeared first on DIFC Courts.