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CFI 032/2014 The Dubai Financial Services Authority v ES Bankers (Dubai) Limited

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Claim No. CFI 032/2014

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 

IN THE MATTER OF THE DIFC REGULATORY LAW (NO. 1 OF 2004) 

IN THE MATTER OF THE DIFC INSOLVENCY LAW (NO. 3 OF 2009) 

BETWEEN 

THE DUBAI FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY

Claimant

and

 

ES BANKERS (DUBAI) LIMITED

Defendant


ORDER OF JUSTICE SIR DAVID STEEL


UPON reviewing Application Notice CFI-032-2014/20 dated 11 February 2016 and the supporting documents for remuneration and disbursements of the Joint Provisional Liquidators

AND UPON reading the submissions and evidence filed and recorded on the Court file

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

  1. The Joint Liquidators’ remuneration for the period 19 April 2015 to 18 October 2015 (the second six months of the liquidation) be fixed in the sum of USD 2,582,778.
  2. The Joint Liquidators be permitted to draw disbursements up to but not exceeding GBP 30,000 per month out of the liquidation estate until 31 December 2016, with liberty to apply if necessary for the continuance or variation of the order pursuant to paragraph 2 thereafter.
  3. Further or other relief with liberty to apply.
  4. The costs of and occasioned by this application be costs in the liquidation.

 

Issued by

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 29 February 2016

At: 4pm

The post CFI 032/2014 The Dubai Financial Services Authority v ES Bankers (Dubai) Limited appeared first on DIFC Courts.


CFI 014/2015 Orient Insurance Pjsc v (1) ABN Amro Bank N.V. (2) Bank of Baroda (3) CITI Bank N.A. (4) Credit Suisse AG (5) Emirates NBD Bank Pjsc (6) Mashreq Bank Pjsc (7) Noor Islamic Bank Pjsc (8) Glints Global General Trading LLC

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Claim No: CFI-014-2015

IN THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

 

ORIENT INSURANCE PJSC

Claimant

and

(1) ABN AMRO BANK N.V.

(2) BANK OF BARODA

(3) CITI BANK N.A.

(4) CREDIT SUISSE AG

(5) EMIRATES NBD BANK PJSC

(6) MASHREQ BANK PJSC

(7)NOOR ISLAMIC BANK PJSC

(8) GLINTS GLOBAL GENERAL TRADING LLC

Defendants


ORDER OF JUSTICE ROGER GILES


UPON reviewing the Eighth Defendant’s Appeal Notice dated 18 February 2016 seeking permission to appeal the Order of H.E. Justice Omar Al Muhairi dated 3 February 2016

AND UPON reading the submissions and evidence filed and recorded on the Court file

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Eighth Defendant is refused leave to Appeal against the Order of H.E. Justice Omar Al Muhairi dated 31 December 2015, pursuant to Rule 44.8(1) of the Rules of the DIFC Courts, on the basis that the Court considers that the appeal would have no real prospect of success.

 

Issued by:

Amna Al Owais

Deputy Registrar

Date of issue: 22 February 2016

Date of re-issue: 1 March 2016

At: 10am

SCHEDULE OF REASONS

 1. The application for permission to appeal in the appeal notice issued on 18 February 2016 is refused. Pursuant to RDC 44.14, these are my reasons for the refusal.

2. The so-called grounds of appeal are essentially a narrative reproducing the skeleton argument. The grounds are not stated with the necessary conciseness and clarity. I do not think it profitable to require that this be done, and act upon the narrative.

3. The principal ground of appeal is that the DIFC Courts do not have jurisdiction, and so the proceedings against the Eighth Defendant should have been dismissed, because Article 203(5) of the UAE Civil Procedure Code (“the Code”) provides that a party who has agreed to refer a dispute to arbitration may not file a suit before the courts. The conferral of jurisdiction on the DIFC Courts is not limited by that provision, see the analysis in Meydan Group LLC v Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd (CA-005-2014, 3 November 2014) at [18] – [27] concerning exemption from Federal Laws. If it matters, the laws conferring jurisdiction are within the applicable law stipulated in the policy. This ground does not have a real prospect of success.

4. Other grounds of appeal may be:

(i) That the DIFC Courts do not have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(A)(1) of the Judicial Authority Law, independently of regard to Article 205(5) of the Code, because the policy was signed outside the DIFC and the Claimant and some co-Defendants are from outside the DIFC. The First, Second and Fourth Defendants being licenced DIFC Establishments, that is sufficient for jurisdiction to hear and determine the action.

(ii) That the judge erred in “checking the merit of the case” in determining whether to stay or dismiss the claim against the Eighth Defendant pursuant to Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law. He did not. The merit of the case was not assessed and formed no part of the determination.

(iii) That the judge otherwise erred in determining to stay rather than dismiss the claim against the Eighth Defendant. No ground is shown for error in the determination.

5. None of these grounds, if indeed they are put forward, has a real prospect of success.

6. The final ground of appeal is that it was unjust to order the Eighth Defendant to pay the costs of the application. No ground is shown for error in the exercise of the discretion, and the ground does not have a real prospect of success.

The post CFI 014/2015 Orient Insurance Pjsc v (1) ABN Amro Bank N.V. (2) Bank of Baroda (3) CITI Bank N.A. (4) Credit Suisse AG (5) Emirates NBD Bank Pjsc (6) Mashreq Bank Pjsc (7) Noor Islamic Bank Pjsc (8) Glints Global General Trading LLC appeared first on DIFC Courts.

Fact Sheet 2016

CFI 013/2016 Oger Dubai LLC v Daman Real Estate Capital Partners Limited

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Claim No: CFI 013/2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE JUSTICE SIR RICHARD FIELD

BETWEEN

OGER DUBAI LLC

                                                                                                Claimant

and

 

DAMAN REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS LIMITED

                                                                                                Defendant

 

Hearing:            16 May 2016

Counsel:           Sean Brannigan QC instructed by Clyde & Co for the Claimant

David Allison QC instructed by Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP for the Defendant

Judgment:        16 June 2016


JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE SIR RICHARD FIELD


Summary of Judgment 

In this case, Justice Sir Richard Field orders that the Defendant be wound up in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 5 of the DIFC Insolvency Law and the Insolvency Regulations, with his winding up order being stayed for 7 days to give the Defendant the opportunity to apply to the Court of Appeal for a further stay pending appeal, if so advised.

The Claimant had lodged a petition to wind up the Defendant with the DIFC Courts on 18 April 2016. The Claimant had referred a dispute with the Defendant to arbitration. By an award (“Award”) dated 19 July 2015, a DIAC arbitral Tribunal had awarded the Claimant AED 964,906,637.25. On 29 July 2015 the Defendant applied to the Dubai Courts for an annulment of the award on various grounds including that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. On 13 August 2015 the Claimant issued a DIFC Courts claim form seeking recognition and enforcement of the Award.  On 26 September 2015, Sir John Chadwick (then DCJ), granted an ex parte freezing injunction over the Defendant’s assets. The Claimant’s recognition and enforcement application and its application to continue the ex parte freezing injunction granted by Sir John Chadwick were heard by Justice Sir David Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015. Justice Steel concluded that in light of the Defendant’s assurance that a decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance would be available in about three months, the right order to make was that on condition that security for the award inclusive of costs was posted within 21 days, the Claimant’s enforcement application would be adjourned for four months.

Justice Steel’s decision was embodied in an order of the Court issued on 30 December 2015 (the “Enforcement Order”) which provided that if the Defendant did not provide security in respect of satisfaction of the Award in the sum of USD 266,494,203 by 4pm on 29 December 2015 in a form reasonably acceptable to the Claimant, the Award would immediately thereafter and without further order of the Court be deemed and stand as recognised pursuant to Article 43 of the DIFC Arbitration Law. Justice Steel also continued the freezing injunction granted by DCJ Chadwick until further order of the Court.

On 27 January 2016, the Dubai Court of First Instance dismissed the Defendant’s annulment application on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain it. On 22 December 2016, the Defendant issued an appellant’s notice seeking permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and a stay of that Order. Following a hearing on 19 January 2016, H.E. Justice Omar Al Muhairi on 22 February 2016 dismissed both the application seeking permission to appeal and the stay application. On 3 March 2016, the Defendant issued an application pursuant to Rule 44.179 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts seeking permission to re-open Justice Omar’s dismissal of its applications for permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and for a stay of that order. The application was dismissed by the Chief Justice in a decision issued on 14 June 2016 on the grounds that the Defendant had failed to show that: (i) it was necessary to reopen Justice Omar’s order to avoid real injustice; and (ii) the circumstances were exceptional making it appropriate to reopen the appeal.

On 29 March 2016, the Claimant presented its winding-up petition against the Defendant, based on the Defendant’s inability to pay the Award debt, it having failed to pay that debt following two written demands for payment dated 3 August 2015 and 5 October 2015 and it having admitted through its Counsel in the hearing before Justice Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015 that it was not good for the money owed.

On 11 April 2016, Justice Steel made an interim ex parte order restraining the Claimant from proceeding with its winding-up petition and following an inter parties hearing on 15 April 2016, he made an order dated 20 April 2016 (the “Restraining Order”) restraining the Claimant from advertising a petition to wind up the Defendant until the hearing of the Claimant’s winding-up petition. After the hearing on 16 May 2016 of the Claimant’s petition to wind up the Defendant, on 8 June 2016 the Dubai Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendant’s appeal from the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance.

Sir Richard Field held that: the effect of the Enforcement Order is not that the Claimant has a right to a winding-up order on the basis of a final and indisputable judgment debt. Instead, the effect of that order is to allow the Claimant to have recourse to such means of execution as are available to enforce its judgment debt and the Claimant must take those means of execution as it finds them. Moreover, so closely are the Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law based on sections 122 and 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, the practice and procedure of the English courts on winding-up petitions should be broadly applied by the DIFC Courts. In his view, the effect of the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal, taken together with the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance is that the jurisdiction point can no longer be regarded as having a realistic prospect of success even if, which is far from clear to the Court, it is open to the Defendant to seek to appeal to the Court of Cassation. The evidence is that the Defendant is unable to pay its debts as they fall due and in those circumstances a winding-up, which by its nature will have regard to the interests of all of the Defendant’s creditors, seems to be an entirely appropriate means of execution. Furthermore, the concerns that led to the making of the freezing order and the evidence provided on disclosure made under that order that certain valuable villas in Dubai are held in the names of third parties, subject to letters of undertaking in favour of the Defendant, indicate that the sooner the present management of the Defendant is displaced in favour of a liquidator who will be an officer of the court, the better.

 This summary is not part of the Judgment and should not be cited as such 

ORDER

UPON considering the Claimant’s petition to wind up the Defendant dated 18 April 2016 and the Skeleton Arguments filed by both parties in respect thereof

AND UPON considering the Defendant’s applications for a stay or the adjournment of the Claimant’s said winding-up petition and for a stay of the order of Justice Sir David Steel dated 30 December 2015 and the Skeleton Arguments filed by both parties in respect thereof

AND UPON considering the orders of Justice Sir David Steel dated 30 December 2015 and 20 April 2016

AND UPON reading the evidence before the Court

AND UPON considering the documents on the Court File

AND UPON hearing Counsel for both the Claimant and the Defendant on 16 May 2016

AND PURSUANT TO Chapter 5 (Compulsory Winding Up) of DIFC Law No. 3 of 2009 (the “Insolvency Law”) and the DIFC Insolvency Regulations (the “Insolvency Regulations”)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Defendant shall be wound-up in accordance with the Insolvency Law and the Insolvency Regulations and for that purpose Mr Sajjid Haider shall be appointed Liquidator.

2. The Defendant’s applications to dismiss and/or stay and/or adjourn the Claimants’ winding-up petition are dismissed.

3. The Defendant’s application to stay the order of Justice Steel dated 30 December 2015 is dismissed.

4. The order made in paragraph 1 shall be stayed for 7 days from the issue of this order to allow the Defendant, if so advised, to apply to the Court of Appeal for a further stay pending an appeal to that court.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 16 June 2016

At: 3pm

JUDGMENT

Background

1.The Claimant referred a dispute with the Defendant to arbitration arising out of the termination by the Defendant of a building contract signed in 2008 which contained an arbitration clause requiring settlement of disputes to be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

2. By an (amended) award dated 19 July 2015 (the “Award”) a DIAC arbitral Tribunal — Mr Charles Manzoni QC SC, Mr Adrian Cole and Mr John Marrin QC (Chairman) — awarded the Claimant AED 964,906,637.25 (USD 262,559,629.18) made up of sums awarded by way of damages; fees and expenses of the Tribunal and DIAC administrative fees; and legal costs, with simple interest at the rate of EIBOR plus 3% p.a. on any sum unpaid 14 days after the date of the Award.

3. On 29 July 2015, the Defendant applied to the Dubai Courts for an annulment of the Award on various grounds including that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

4. The Dubai Chamber of Commerce (“DICC”) was established in 1975. The Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”) was established in 2004. The first set of DIAC Arbitration Rules was ratified and given effect to by Dubai Decree No.11 of 2007. In 2009, those Rules were superseded by a new set of Rules (the “DIAC Rules 2009”) as provided for in Decree No. 58 of 2009. Article 4 of that decree provided:

Rules and By-laws

Article 4.

 (a) The arbitration rules in force at the Centre shall apply to all disputes that are referred to the Centre even if the parties to a dispute agreed to apply the Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry Number (12) of 1994.

(b) The arbitration rules in force at the Centre shall apply to all disputes that are referred to the Centre even if the parties to a dispute agreed to apply the Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry No. (12) of 1994.”

5. The Defendant argued before the Tribunal that since the building contract was signed after Dubai Decree No. 11 of 2007 was enacted but before the enactment of Decree No. 58 of 2009, the DIAC Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute.

6. The Tribunal rejected this contention on the ground that Article 4 (a) not only transferred jurisdiction to the DIAC in cases where the contract provides for the DICC Rules to be applied, but operated retrospectively without falling foul of Article 112 of the UAE Constitution[1] in that it was necessary that it should take such effect and such effect was expressly stipulated.

7. In applying to the Dubai Courts for the annulment of the Award, the Defendant contended that the Tribunal had erred in construing Article 4(a) of Decree No 58 of 2009 retroactively so as to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. It is also maintained that: (i) the building contract had been signed without authority; (ii) expert witnesses had wrongly been excluded from the hearing when evidence from the factual witnesses was taken; (iii) a prior condition to arbitration had not been satisfied; and (iv) the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make the costs order it made in favour of the Claimant.

8. On 13 August 2015, the Claimant issued a Claim Form seeking recognition and enforcement of the Award.

9. On 26 September 2015, Sir John Chadwick DCJ, observing that the Defendant’s conduct “points strongly to the conclusion that it is willing to take whatever course seems to be likely to further its own interests without regard to the ordinary considerations of commercial morality or proper conduct of the arbitration proceedings…”, granted ex parte a freezing injunction over the Defendant’s assets.

10. The Claimant’s recognition and enforcement application and its application to continue the ex parte freezing injunction granted by Sir John Chadwick were heard by Justice Sir David Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015. In resisting the former application, the Defendant relied on the matters canvassed in its annulment application to the Dubai Courts.

11. As he did in A v B (ARB 005/2014), Justice Steel adopted the approach articulated by Gross J in IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corp [2005] EWHC 726 (Comm) when considering enforcement of an arbitral award under ss. 101 and 103 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996:

“…the Act does not furnish a threshold test in respect of the grant of an adjournment and the power to order the provision of security in the exercise of the court’s discretion under s.103(5). In my judgment, it would be wrong to read a fetter into this understandably wide discretion (echoing, as it does, Art. VI of the New York Convention). Ordinarily, a number of considerations are likely to be relevant: (i) whether the application before the court in the country of origin is brought bona fide and not simply by way of delaying tactics; (ii) whether the application before the court in the country of origin has at least a real (i.e., realistic) prospect of success … (iii) the extent of the delay occasioned by an adjournment and any resulting prejudice. Beyond such matters, it is probably unwise to generalise; all must depend on the circumstances of the individual case. As it seems to me, the right approach is that of a sliding scale, in any event embodied in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Soleh Boneh v Uganda Govt. [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 208 in the context of the question of security:

“….two important factors must be considered on such an application, although I do not mean to say that there may not be others. The first is the strength of the argument that the award is invalid, as perceived on a brief consideration by the Court which is asked to enforce the award while proceedings to set it aside are pending elsewhere. If the award is manifestly invalid, there should be an adjournment and no order for security; if it is manifestly valid, there should either be an order for immediate enforcement, or else an order for substantial security. In between there will be various degrees of plausibility in the argument for invalidity; and the Judge must be guided by his preliminary conclusion on the point.

The second point is that the Court must consider the ease or difficulty of enforcement of the award, and whether it will be rendered more difficult…if enforcement is delayed. If that is likely to occur, the case for security is stronger; if, on the other hand, there are and always will be insufficient assets within the jurisdiction, the case for security must necessarily be weakened.””

Per Staughton LJ, at p. 212. See too: Fouchard, at p.982; Dardana v Yukos [2002] EWCA Civ 543; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 326 (CA).

12. Justice Steel found that the only contention that had a realistic prospect of success within the Defendant’s annulment application was the jurisdiction point. All the other points were fanciful. In paragraphs 22, 45, 46 and 47 of his judgment delivered on 8 December 2015, he said:

“Not only was the [jurisdiction] point rejected by three respected and experienced arbitrators, Ms Nevin described it as “purely technical and without commercial merit” and that the only justification for raising it was the hope of creating delay and expense. I agree, and, indeed, as the Deputy Chief Justice said, it is entirely consistent with a general policy to frustrate the enforcement of the award by any means.”

“[The Tribunal’s conclusion on the jurisdiction issue] is in accordance with business common sense and in accordance with a purposive reading of the relevant articles and rules.”

“In reaching that conclusion, this distinguished and experienced Tribunal have embarked on a detailed analysis of the issues and the arguments. The Defendant merely proposes to rerun the very same arguments”

“….In the result, despite the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal appeared to have some difficulty in coming to a conclusion on the topic, I regard the prospects of success in pursuing this technical and unmeritorious challenge as, at best, only just overcoming the threshold requirement of having a realistic prospect of success.”

13. In paragraph 56 of his judgment, Justice Steel concluded that in light of the Defendant’s assurance that a decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance would be available in about three months, the right order to make was that on condition that security for the award inclusive of costs was posted within 21 days, the Claimant’s enforcement application would be adjourned for four months.

14. Justice Steel’s decision was embodied in an order of the Court issued on 30 December 2015 (the “Enforcement Order”) which provided that if the Defendant did not provide security in respect of satisfaction of the Award in the sum of USD 266,494,203 by 4pm on 29 December 2015 in a form reasonably acceptable to the Claimant, the Award would immediately thereafter and without further order of the Court be deemed and stand as recognised pursuant to Article 43 of the Arbitration Law and the Claimant shall be at liberty to enforce the Award in the same manner as a judgment or order of the Court pursuant to Article 42 of the Arbitration Law.

15. Justice Steel also continued the freezing injunction granted by DCJ Chadwick until further order of the Court.

16. On 27 January 2016, the Dubai Court of First Instance dismissed the Defendant’s annulment application on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain it.

17. On 22 December 2016, the Defendant issued an appellant’s notice seeking permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and a stay of that Order.

18. Following a hearing on 19 January 2016, H.E. Justice Omar Al Muhairi on 22 February 2016 dismissed both the application seeking permission to appeal and the stay application.

19. On 3 March 2016, the Defendant issued an application pursuant to Rule 44.179 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts seeking permission to re-open Justice Omar’s dismissal of its applications for permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and for a stay of that order. The application was dismissed by the Chief Justice in a decision issued on 14 June 2016 on the grounds that the Defendant had failed to show that: (i) it was necessary to reopen Justice Omar’s order to avoid real injustice; and (ii) the circumstances were exceptional making it appropriate to reopen the appeal.

20. On 29 March 2016, the Claimant presented its winding-up petition against the Defendant by way of a Part 8 Claim Form. The petition is based on the Defendant’s inability to pay the Award debt, it having failed to pay that debt following two written demands for payment dated 3 August 2015 and 5 October 2015 and it having admitted through its Counsel in the hearing before Justice Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015 that it was not good for the money owed.

21. On 11 April 2016, Justice Steel made an interim ex parte order restraining the Claimant from proceeding with its winding-up petition and following an inter parties hearing on 15 April 2016, he made an order dated 20 April 2016 (the “Restraining Order”) restraining the Claimant from advertising a petition to wind up the Defendant until the hearing of the Claimant’s winding-up petition.

22. After the hearing on 16 May 2016 of the Claimant’s petition to wind up the Defendant, on 8 June 2016 the Dubai Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendant’s appeal from the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance.

The relevant provisions of the DIFC Insolvency Law No. 3 of 2009 (the “Insolvency Law”)

23. Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law provide:

“50. Circumstances in which Company may be wound up by the Court

A Company may be wound up by the Court if:

(a) the Company has resolved that the Company be wound up by the Court;

(b) the Company is unable to pay its debts;

(c) at the time at which a moratorium for the Company under Article 9 comes to an end, no voluntary arrangement approved under Part 2 has effect in relation to the Company;

(d) the Court may make such an order pursuant to any provision of or under DIFC Law; or

(e) the Court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the Company should be wound

50. Definition of inability to pay debts

(1) A Company is deemed unable to pay its debts:

(a) if a creditor to whom the Company is indebted in a sum exceeding $2,000.00 then due has served on the Company a written demand requiring the Company to pay the sum so due and the Company has for 3 weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum or to agree terms in relation to its payment to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor; or

(b)  if execution or other process issued on a judgment, decree or order of any Court in favour of a creditor of the Company is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; or

(c) if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the Company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due.

(2) A Company is also deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the value of the Company’s current assets is less than the amount of its current liabilities, taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities.”

The parties’ rival contentions

The Claimant’s case

24. It was submitted on behalf of the Claimant that the Enforcement Order, coming into effect as it did following the Defendant’s failure to provide security in the sum of the Award, disentitled the Defendant from arguing that its annulment proceedings in the Dubai Courts precluded the Court from granting the winding-up petition. The effect of the Enforcement Order was that, within the jurisdiction of the DIFC, the resulting judgment debt was final and indisputable.

25. It followed that, since it was common ground that the Defendant could not pay its debts within the meaning and effect of Article 50 of the Insolvency Law, the winding-up petition should be granted.

The Defendant’s case

26. The Defendant argued that the Enforcement Order did not mandate the making of a winding-up order. The question was whether the Court, on the facts before it, should exercise its discretion under Article 50 of the Insolvency Law to order the Defendant’s winding-up.

27. In this connection, the practice and procedure of the English Courts on winding-up petitions was directly applicable in the DIFC Courts on the basis that Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law are based on sections 122 and 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. Under that practice and procedure, the Court will dismiss a winding-up petition where the debt is genuinely disputed on substantial grounds, viz grounds which are real as opposed to frivolous, that is to say they have a realistic prospect of success; see Turner v The Royal Bank of Scotland [2000] BPIR 683, Re Arena Corporation Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 371 (at [53]); Abbey National plc v JSF Finance and Currency Exchange Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 328 (at [46]) and Argentum Lex Wealth Management Ltd v Gianotti [2011] EWCA Civ 1341 (at [17]).

28. In this respect, winding-up stands on a footing different from other means of execution. Thus, where a judgment has been obtained and permission to appeal has been granted but there is no stay of execution pending appeal, execution other than by way of winding-up may be available, but not a winding-up order. This is because: (i) winding-up is a class remedy that is usually the death knell of the company; and (ii) winding-up proceedings are unsuited for determining any dispute about the existence of the debt.

29. The Defendant further submitted that the annulment proceedings in the Dubai Courts were based on grounds that were not frivolous but had a realistic prospect of success. This in effect was the conclusion of Justice Steel in deciding: (i) to stay the Claimant’s enforcement and recognition claim for four months on terms that the Defendant provided security in the sum of the Award; and (ii) granting the Restraining Order over to the hearing of the petition. The Dubai Court of First Instance’s decision to reject the annulment application on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the application was surprising and clearly incorrect. Dubai being the seat of the arbitration, the Dubai Courts plainly had jurisdiction as the appropriate supervisory court to determine the annulment jurisdiction issue.

30. If the Dubai Court of Appeal held that the Dubai Courts had no jurisdiction to review the question of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it was accepted that that would be a very relevant factor for the winding-up court when considering whether Justice Steel’s earlier finding that there was a realistic prospect of success remained a good one.

31. In the alternative, the Court should refuse to make a winding-up order on the ground that to do so would be oppressive and unfair given: (i) that the Defendant’s annulment case in the Dubai Courts has a real, as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success; and (ii) the continuation of the freezing injunction. Further, there were other means of execution open to the Claimant short of winding-up the Defendant.

Discussion and Decision

32. In my judgment, the effect of the Enforcement Order is not that the Claimant has a right to a winding-up order on the basis of a final and indisputable judgment debt. Instead, the effect of that order is to allow the Claimant to have recourse to such means of execution as are available to enforce its judgment debt and the Claimant must take those means of execution as it finds them. I am also of the opinion that, so closely are the Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law based on sections 122 and 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, the practice and procedure of the English courts on winding-up petitions should be broadly applied by the DIFC Courts.

33. The central question therefore is whether the Defendant’s challenge to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in the Dubai Courts has a realistic prospect of success. In my judgment, the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal upholding the Court of First Instance’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the Defendant’s application is a “game changer”. In his judgment given on 8 December 2015, Justice Steel regarded the Defendant’s prospects of success in pursuing this “technical and unmeritorious challenge” as, at best, only just overcoming the threshold requirement of having a realistic prospect of success. In my view, the effect of the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal, taken together with the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance is that the jurisdiction point can no longer be regarded as having a realistic prospect of success even if, which is far from clear to the Court, it is open to the Defendant to seek to appeal to the Court of Cassation.

34. I turn then to consider the Defendant’s case that to order a winding-up would be oppressive and unfair. I reject this contention. The evidence is that the Defendant is unable to pay its debts as they fall due and in those circumstances a winding-up, which by its nature will have regard to the interests of all of the Defendant’s creditors, seems to me to be an entirely appropriate means of execution. I also think that the concerns that led to the making of the freezing order and the evidence provided on disclosure made under that order that certain valuable villas in Dubai are held in the names of the third parties, subject to letters of undertaking in favour of the Defendant, indicate that the sooner the present management of the Defendant is displaced in favour of a liquidator who will be an officer of the court, the better.

35. I therefore propose to order that the Defendant be wound up in accordance with the requirements of the Insolvency Law and the Insolvency Regulations.

36. Finally, I consider it appropriate to stay the order winding up the Defendant for 7 days from the date of the order herein to give the Defendant the opportunity to apply to the Court of Appeal for a further stay pending appeal, if so advised. In all the circumstances of this case, there will be no extension of this 7 day period.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 16 June 2016

At: 3pm

The post CFI 013/2016 Oger Dubai LLC v Daman Real Estate Capital Partners Limited appeared first on DIFC Courts.

CFI 013/2016 Oger Dubai LLC v Daman Real Estate Capital Partners Limited

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Claim No:  CFI 013/2016

                                   

          THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

OGER DUBAI LLC

 

                                                                                                                                     Claimant

and

 

DAMAN REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS LIMITED

 

Defendant


ORDER OF JUSTICE SIR RICHARD FIELD


UPON reviewing the Judgment of Justice Sir Richard Field dated 16 June 2016 and the orders made therein

AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF making explicit what is implicit in the orders contained in the said Judgment

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Defendant immediately cease trading until further order, albeit that it is at liberty in the next 7 days to seek a further stay of the winding-up order from the Court of Appeal pending an appeal to that Court.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date: 16 June 2016

At: 4pm

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CFI 007/2016 Sky News Arabia FZ-LLC v Kassab Media FZ (LLC)

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Claim No: CFI-007-2016

 

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE  H.E. JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI

BETWEEN

 

SKY NEWS ARABIA FZ-LLC

                                                                                                                    Claimant / Respondent

and

KASSAB MEDIA FZ (LLC)

Defendant / Applicant 

                                                                                               

Hearing: 13 June 2016

Counsel: Sanjay Patel instructed by Clyde & Co for the Claimant.

Nizam Nseir assisted by Yulia Charniauskaya of Abdelrahman Almaazmi Advocates and Legal Consultants for the Defendant.

Judgment: 20 June 2016


JUDGMENT OF H.E. JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI


Summary of Judgment

This case arises out of the Claimant Company’s Claim (Claim Form No. CFI-007-2016) against the Defendant Company for breach of contract. In reply, the Defendant contested the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts to deal with the Claim and argued that the agreement between the parties formed a commercial agency relationship and, therefore, Federal Laws should apply and the Federal Court should hear the case. In response, the Claimant submitted two witness statements into evidence to support the arguments that the parties intended for the DIFC Courts to have jurisdiction, one being made by an employee of the Claimant and the other by one of the lawyers representing the Claimant in the proceedings. The Defendant subsequently made a second application to exclude the witness statements from evidence due to lack of independence, erroneous statements of truth and for advocating opinions rather than providing observations as witnesses.

The learned Judge first dealt with the evidence application, determining that the witness statement of the Claimant’s legal representative should be excluded pursuant to DIFC Courts’ Practice Direction 1 of 2016 which established a general rule that law firms should not file witness statements in their client’s proceedings unless the contents of the statement are formal, uncontroversial or used only to introduce documents. The witness statement of the Claimant’s employee was allowed into evidence.

The jurisdiction application was rejected and it was determined that although the DIFC Courts did not have original jurisdiction, the parties clearly ‘opted in’ to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts by virtue of Clause 38 of the agreement. Adopting the approach taken in Gavin v Gaynor 22 October 2016, the learned Judge found that any reference to the laws of the United Arab Emirates as applicable in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi must be a reference to UAE Laws applicable within the DIFC.

The Defendant submitted that even if the DIFC Courts decided that it did have jurisdiction to deal with this case, it should not exercise that jurisdiction and the case should instead be referred to the competent Federal Court. However, the learned judge commented that the DIFC Court is, in fact, the only Court competent to deal with this case as there is no registered agency contract with the commercial agents register and therefore, the nominated Federal Court would not accept the case in any event.

This summary is not part of the Judgment and should not be cited as such 

ORDER

UPON reviewing the Defendant’s Application Notices CFI-007-2016/1 and CFI-007-2016/2 dated 20 March 2016 and 10 April 2016, seeking an Order that the DIFC Courts do not have or shall not exercise jurisdiction to deal with the Claimant’s CFI-007-2016 application filed on 16 February 2016, and seeking an Order for the exclusion of evidence submitted by the Claimant in the form of witness statements by Ms. Susie Abdel-Nabi and Mr. Kelvin Barker, respectively (“the Applications”)

AND UPON reviewing all witness statements, correspondence and evidence on the Court file

AND UPON Hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Defendant at a hearing on 13 June 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Defendant’s Application Notice CFI-007-2016/2 to exclude the witness statement of Ms. Susie Abdel-Nabi is granted.

2. The Defendant’s Application Notice CFI-007-2016/2 to exclude the witness statement of Mr. Kelvin Barker is denied

3. The Defendant’s Application Notice CFI-007-2016/1 challenging the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts is denied.

4. Costs shall be awarded in the case.

 

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 20 June 2016

At:  1pm

 

JUDGMENT

Background

1.The Claimant is a company established under the laws of the Media Free Zone in Abu Dhabi, performing television production activities at its principal address in Abu Dhabi. The Defendant is a company established under the laws of the Dubai Media Free Zone, with its principal address in Dubai Media City, performing media business and representation activities.

2. This dispute arises out of an agreement for the supply of advertising and sponsorship sales representation entered into by the parties on 1 July 2013 and effective until 31 December 2018 (the “Agreement”).

3. The Claimant filed Claim Form No. CFI-007-2016 on 16 February 2016, asserting that the Defendant failed to meet its obligations under the terms of the Agreement on several occasions, constituting a material breach of the Agreement and entitling the Claimant to terminate it (the “Claim”). The Claimant gave notice of termination, whereby the Agreement would terminate on 11 February 2016 if the material breach had not been remedied by such date. The Claimant thereafter confirmed to the Defendant in writing that termination was effective on 11 February 2016 and demanded the outstanding payments to be made within 14 days. It is the Claimant’s case that no remedy or payment was received and the Claimant therefore seeks a declaration from the DIFC Courts that the Agreement was terminated effectively on 11 February 2016.

4. The Defendant subsequently applied to this Court on 20 March 2016 [CFI-007-2016/1], contesting the Courts’ jurisdiction and seeking an Order that:

(1) The DIFC Courts do not have jurisdiction to try the Claimant’s claim; or

(2) Should the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to try the claim, they shall not exercise jurisdiction and shall not hear the case (the “Jurisdiction Application”).

5. The Claimant’s response to the Defendant’s Jurisdiction Application was contained within the witness statements of Ms. Susie Abdel-Nabi and Mr. Kelvin Barker and the Defendant applied to this Court on 10 April 2016 [CFI-007-2016/2] to exclude the evidence of these witnesses (the “Evidence Application”).

6. The submissions of both parties were heard before this Court on 13 June 2016, I will address each application in turn.

Evidence Application

Defendant submissions

7. The Defendant sought to exclude the witness statements filed by the Claimant, on the grounds that:

(1) They do not comply with the mandatory formal requirements set out in the relevant evidence law, Rules of the DIFC Courts and Civil Procedure Rules of England and Wales and are therefore inadmissible;

(2) The witness statement of Ms. Abdel-Nabi lacks legitimacy;

(3) The witness statement of Mr. Barker contains inadmissible parts which should be struck out by the Court if not found inadmissible in full.

8. In particular, the Defendant submitted that the witness statements were not in the witnesses’ own words, engaged in advocating an opinion rather than making observations and that the statements of truth were not in the proper form.

9. With respect to Ms. Abdel-Nabi’s witness statement, the Defendant submitted that as she was one of the lawyers involved in the proceedings on behalf of the Claimant she was not able to maintain professional independence in her statement and it should be disregarded by the Court. Practice Direction 1 of 2016 was cited in support of the exclusion of Ms. Abdel-Nabi’s witness statement from evidence as it precludes law firms representing a party in DIFC Courts proceedings from permitting lawyers employed by them to file witness statements in such proceedings unless the contents of that statement are formal and uncontroversial.

Claimant submissions

10. The Claimant submitted that the use of such statements in this manner was common practice and certainly not out of the ordinary. Originally the Jurisdiction Application was to be dealt with without a hearing which is why the Claimant felt it necessary to enter the witness statements into evidence. It was accepted that the statements of truth in each witness statement were slightly erroneous in that they referred to the ‘Claimant’ rather than the individuals but it was asserted that this alone should not cause the statements to be invalid or inadmissible.

Analysis

11. Practice Direction 1 of 2016 (PD 1/2016) sets out the practitioners’ duties to the Court in light of the Mandatory Code of Conduct for Legal Practitioners in the DIFC Courts. PD 1/2016 provides:

“2.1 As a general rule, law firms which are representing a party through Part I of the Register of Practitioners in proceedings before the DIFC Courts should not permit lawyers who are employed by them (“lawyers”) to file witness statements in such proceedings unless:

(1) The contents of that statement are formal or uncontroversial; or

(2) The witness statement has been submitted solely for the purposes of introducing documents, without any factual evidence being given with regard to the merits of the case…

3. Where any lawyer files a factual witness statement which does not conform with 2.1 above, the Court may discount the evidentiary weight of that witness statement for lack of first-hand knowledge.

4. Where a lawyer purports to give an expert opinion in support of the case of his/her firm’s client’s case, the Court will consider that opinion to constitute part of Counsel’s arguments and may likewise discount the opinion as expert evidence for lack of independence. However, the Court may still take the opinion into account in arriving at its decision, but relying on that opinion only as a submission.”

12. It is clear in my opinion that Ms. Susie Abdel-Nabi’s witness statement falls into the remit of PD 1/2016 and as it is not submitted solely for the purpose of introducing documents, nor are its contents formal or controversial, I feel it appropriate to discount this witness statement in the circumstances. However, I reserve the right to take the opinions contained within Ms. Abdel-Nabi’s witness statement into account pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Practice Direction.

13. Kelvin Barker is the Head of Legal of the Claimant and I find no legal grounds to exclude his evidence from these proceedings. His statement goes towards providing insight into his personal knowledge of events surrounding the Agreement and is accepted into evidence.

Jurisdiction Application

14. Clause 38.1 of the Agreement sets out that it is to be governed by the laws of the UAE, with the DIFC Courts having exclusive jurisdiction:

“This Agreement and any issues or disputes arising out of or in connection with it (whether contractual or non-contractual, such as claims in tort, breach of statute or regulation, or otherwise) will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United Arab Emirates as applicable in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts.”

Defendant submissions

15. The Defendant first seeks to establish that the DIFC Courts do not have original jurisdiction in this case; the Agreement was not concluded, finalised or performed within the DIFC, nor does the Claim arise out of or relate to any incident or transaction performed within the DIFC. As the Claim does not fall into any of the jurisdictional gateways specified in Article 5A(1) of Dubai Law No.12 of 2004, as amended, there can be no exclusive or original jurisdiction in this case; there is only the potential for optional jurisdiction pursuant to the parties’ agreement, under Article 31(5) of the Civil Procedures Law.

16. The Defendant submits that although parties may agree on the jurisdiction of a specific court, ‘the validity of such jurisdiction agreement/clause is subject to limitations by the mandatory requirements of the jurisdiction rules primarily applicable to a certain type of dispute/case and regulating the original case jurisdiction’. It is the Defendant’s case that, as the Agreement created a principal-agent relationship between the parties, clause 38 is void, pursuant to Article 226 of the Commercial Transactions Law, Federal Law No. 18 of 1993, which provides:

“As an exception to the rules of jurisdiction provided for in the Civil Procedure Code, the Court within which jurisdiction lies the place of implementation of the contract, shall be competent to look into any conflicts arising from the contracts proxy contract.”

17. It is asserted that this Article applies in the circumstances as the Defendant was appointed under the Agreement as an exclusive media representative / agent of the Claimant in the UAE and other territories, carrying out its proxy and managing its commercial agency independently. Accordingly and pursuant to Article 226 of the Commercial Transactions Law, as the Agreement was implemented by the Defendant within the jurisdiction of the UAE Federal Court of First Instance, it is the Federal Court which is competent to try the Claim arising out of the Agreement.

18. The Defendant submits that Article 226 of the Commercial Transactions Law sets out a mandatory rule providing an exception and superseding the general jurisdiction rule of Article 31 of the Civil Procedures Law. In light of this, it is contended that Clause 38 of the Agreement must be void and of no effect and therefore, the DIFC Courts have no jurisdiction to try the Claim.

19. The Defendant suggests that even if the DIFC Courts do have jurisdiction to deal with the Claim they should not exercise jurisdiction and should not hear the case pursuant to Article 3 of the Commercial Agency Law, Federal Law No. 18 of 1981, as amended, which regulates commercial agencies within the state. It is argued that Article 3 prohibits the hearing of any claim arising out of a commercial agency agreement which is not carried out by UAE Nationals registered for that purpose.

Claimant submissions

20. The Claimant submits that the Jurisdiction Application is without merit and should be rejected in full, as the parties expressly agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts in Clause 38 of the Agreement, which the Claimant says should be found to be an effective jurisdiction clause.

21. Pursuant to the Article 5A(2) of the Judicial Authority Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, as amended, the Claimant submits that the parties effectively opted into the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts.

22. The DIFC Court of Appeal case of Investment Group Private Limited v Standard Chartered Bank CA-004-2015 was cited in support of the Claimant’s submission that Federal civil and commercial laws do not apply within the DIFC. It was also suggested that the approach taken in Gavin v Gaynor 22 October 2015 should be adopted in the circumstances, whereby any reference to the governing law being that of the UAE should be deemed to be a reference only to UAE laws applicable in the DIFC. The case of National Bonds Corporation PJSC v (1) Taaleem PJSC (2) Deyaar Development PJSC CA-001-2011 was cited in support of the contention that onshore law should not be applicable in an offshore jurisdiction such as the DIFC.

Analysis

23. Article (5)2 of the Judicial Authority Law provides:

“The Court of First Instance may hear and determine any civil or commercial claims or actions where the parties agree in writing to file such claim or action with it whether before or after the dispute arises, provided that such agreement is made pursuant to specific, clear and express provisions.”

24. I am satisfied that although the DIFC Courts do not have original jurisdiction in this case, the conditions for opting into the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction have been satisfied; Clause 38 demonstrates that the parties agreed to be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts in specific, clear and express terms.

25. I am also satisfied that the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction is determined solely by the Judicial Authority Law, as established in the case of Investment Group Private Limited v Standard Chartered Bank CA-004-2015, which has been relied upon by the Claimant in its submissions. In that case the implications of Federal Law 8 were considered, Article 3(2) of which states:

“These Zones and Financial Activities are subject to all provisions of Federal Law with the exception of Federal civil and commercial laws.”

26. It was determined that as Federal Law 8 provides for the express disapplication of UAE civil and commercial laws to free zones it was therefore unnecessary to resolve the parties’ disagreements regarding provisions of Federal Law and each Emirate’s jurisdictional limits. Although that case can be distinguished from the present one as it involved original jurisdiction rather than opt-in, I feel it appropriate to apply the same principle to the current circumstances.

27. I also adopt the approach taken in Gavin v Gaynor, 22 October 2016 by H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani:

“Since this Court has found that the contract or the transaction has crossed the line and become subject to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts, any reference to UAE Law must be a reference to UAE Laws applicable within the DIFC”

28. Accordingly, as this Court has found that the Agreement has successfully opted into and is subject to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts, any reference to the laws of the United Arab Emirates as applicable in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi must be a reference to UAE Laws applicable within the DIFC. During the course of the hearing the parties accepted that the Federal Laws applicable in Abu Dhabi would appear to be the same Federal Laws applicable across the whole of the UAE and therefore, in the circumstances, the Agreement’s reference to ‘the laws of the United Arab Emirates as applicable in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi’ is considered to be a reference to the laws of the UAE generally, as applicable within the DIFC.

29. For the sake of argument, even if the UAE Commercial Agency Law was to apply in this case, as it is a non-DIFC law it would have been for an expert to determine whether in the circumstances, this case is within its remit. The Defendant has failed to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy this Court that UAE Commercial Agency Law should apply.

30. The Federal Supreme Court made interesting observations regarding the Commercial Agency Law in its judgment issued on 16 June 1996 in Case No. 357/15. It commented that if an agency agreement is not registered with the commercial agents register it will not be deemed valid and therefore, will not be heard pursuant to Article 3 of the Commercial Agency Law. Accordingly, even if UAE Law was to govern the Agreement, the Defendant has failed to prove that there was any registered commercial agency contract and accordingly, the case cannot go to the nominated Federal Court.

31. The Defendant submits that if this Court finds it has jurisdiction to deal with this case, it should not exercise that jurisdiction and the case should instead be referred to the competent Federal Court. However, in light of the above I find that the DIFC Courts, are in fact, the only Court competent to deal with this case as there is no registered agency contract.

Conclusion

32. The witness statement of Ms. Susie Abdel-Nabi is rejected pursuant to PD 1/2016.

33. The witness statement of Mr. Kelvin Barker is accepted into evidence.

34. The DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to deal with the Claimant’s case, applying UAE Laws as applicable within the DIFC.

35. Costs shall be awarded in the case.

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Gottlieb LLC v Graca

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Claim No: XXXX

 

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai 

 

IN THE SMALL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

BEFORE SCT JUDGE NATASHA BAKIRCI

 

BETWEEN 

GOTTLIEB LLC  

Claimant 

and

 

GRACA 

Defendant 

 

Hearing:          1 May 2016

Judgment:       26 May 2016


JUDGMENT OF SCT JUDGE NATASHA BAKIRCI


UPON hearing the Claimant’s representative and the Defendant

AND UPON reading the submissions and evidence filed and recorded on the Court file

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Claimant may retain AED 1,405.75 of the Defendant’s security deposit in respect of repairs.

2. The Claimant must return AED 5,094.25 of the Defendant’s security deposit to the Defendant.

3. The Claimant’s claim regarding overstay is granted in the amount of AED 5,072. The Defendant may pay this amount or have it deducted from his security deposit.

4. The parties shall bear their own costs.

THE REASONS

Parties

5. The Claimant, Gottlieb is a landlord renting apartments in the Building in the DIFC.

6. The Defendant, Graca, was a tenant of Unit 1211 of the Building.

Background and the Preceding History

7. The parties entered into a Tenancy Agreement for the period of 2 March 2015 until 1 March 2016. The landlord is listed as Gottlieb with the Managing Agent listed as SAM LLC, acting as agents for Gottlieb PJSC. The Tenant is listed as Graca. The rental amount is listed as AED 132,600 with a security deposit of AED 6,500.

8. As the expiration of the Tenancy Agreement neared, there was a dispute about the move-out inspection, security deposit and return of the keys and security card. The Defendant retained the keys and access card to the apartment as the Claimant did not agree to inspect the property according to his terms (see paragraph 9 below) and informed him that he would likely be charged for repainting.

9. On 29 February 2016, the Defendant sent an email to the Claimant’s Managing Agent, SAM LLC, stating that he was ready to complete his move-out process but wanted to receive his security deposit back at the time of the inspection. The Defendant also mentions in this email that the Managing Agent already inspected the apartment on a preliminary basis. He rejected any charge for repainting and stated that he would keep possession of the property and leave the utility accounts unpaid if the Managing Agent refused to comply with his terms.

10. The Managing Agent responded on 1 March 2016 and there was a series of back and forth emails between the Defendant and the Claimant’s Managing Agent regarding the move-out procedure. In this exchange, the Claimant’s managing agent informed the Defendant that he would be responsible for overstay rent if he retained possession of the apartment beyond his lease term, which expired on 1 March 2016. In an email dated 2 March 2016, the Managing Agent informed the Defendant that the landlord was filing a case in the DIFC Courts and that official communication would follow shortly.

11. There was no further communication submitted to the SCT Registry until 10 March 2016 at which time the Managing Agent sent the Defendant a notice of breach of contract for illegally occupying the apartment beyond the expired lease term.

12. The Defendant then continued to email the Claimant’s Managing Agent from 15 March until 20 March 2016 attempting to resolve the dispute. The Defendant asked for a contact person at the Claimant’s office to speak with about the dispute. The Managing Agent informed the Defendant via email on 15 March and 20 March 2016 that the landlord was initiating a legal case in the DIFC Courts to resolve the dispute.

13. The Claimant filed a claim with the DIFC Courts’ Small Claims Tribunal on 5 April 2016 seeking AED 10,898.63 in overstay rent for the period until 31 March 2016, settlement of maintenance costs to be deducted from the Defendant’s security deposit, eviction of the Defendant, and settlement of all utility bills. The Defendant responded, admitting the claim for eviction and settlement of the utility bills and defending against the overstay rent and maintenance claims.

14. The parties attended a Consultation before Judicial Officer Maha Al Mehairi on 14 April 2016. The parties were unable to reach a settlement at the Consultation and did not reach a settlement in the weeks after the Consultation, although the Defendant did turn over the keys and access card and the Claimant was able to do a full inspection.

15. Upon inspection, the Claimant provided the SCT Registry with a snag report and with quotations for the damage to be repaired in the apartment. The submissions totalled AED 6,703.50 for repairs as against the Defendant’s AED 6,500 security deposit. The Claimant agreed to cover the costs equivalent to AED 3,365 of the snag report repairs. The Claimant therefore amended the claim form to seek AED 3,339.50 from the Defendant for repairs to the apartment and to seek an additional AED 5,086.03 for overstay for the period of 1 April 2016 until 14 April 2016, adding to the AED 10,898.63 already claimed. The total amended claim amount was AED 19,323.16.

16. As there was no settlement, a hearing was scheduled before me, SCT Judge Natasha Bakirci, on 1 May 2016. I heard the submissions of both parties and directed them to attempt to settle the dispute after the hearing. The Claimant provided an updated inspection report to the SCT Registry and the Defendant on 3 May 2016. The Defendant provided his response to the Amended Claim Form along with evidence of his contentious relationship with the Claimant to the SCT Registry on 8 May 2016. The Claimant was provided with the Defendant’s response to the Amended Claim Form on 18 May 2016.

17. As the parties were unable to settle the dispute, I render the following judgment as to the issues in the case.

Particulars and Defence

18. The Claimant argues that the Defendant was informed that he would be charged overstay if he failed to turn over the apartment on time, pursuant to Clause 8.1.2 of the Tenancy Agreement. The Defendant did not provide the Claimant with the keys and access card to the Unit until 14 April 2016 and thus, should be required to pay overstay rent for the period from 2 March 2016 until 14 April 2016 as the Claimant could not access the apartment during this time.

19. The Claimant further argues that the Defendant is responsible for all of the alleged damage repairs in the apartment, including the AED 1,200 charge for painting. The Claimant relies on Clause 8, which details the procedure to be followed upon a tenant moving out, including that the Unit should be returned “in the same condition that it was received.”

20. The Claimant has provided a snag report, including photographs, attempting to detail the damage that must be repaired in the Unit. The Claimant has also provided the move-in report, detailing the condition of the apartment upon the Defendant moving in and detailed quotations of the price of the repairs to be done. The Claimant has submitted that it will cover the cost of the door and tile repair in the amount of AED 3,365.

21. The Defendant initially argued that the main source of the dispute was the indication from the Managing Agent that he would be charged for repainting upon move-out. He determined that based on the condition of the walls, they would need to be repainted before a new tenant moved in but maintained that such repainting should be covered by the Claimant as “reasonable wear and tear” as indicated in Clause 8.1.2 of the Tenancy Agreement. He argued that he should not be held responsible for such maintenance, but only for the repair required to fix damage beyond “reasonable wear and tear.”

22. The Defendant further argues that the inclusion in Clause 6.2.3 of the requirement that the tenant “Re-paint and clean the Unit(s)” if the tenant terminates the Tenancy Agreement early supports his argument that repainting is not covered under Clause 8.1.2. He argues that inclusion of repainting in one clause and not the other must be intentional in a sophisticated and lengthy Tenancy Agreement.

23. Finally, the Defendant argues that, according to relevant regulations and precedents in the UK, interior paint has an estimated useful life of two years and he has lived in this apartment for two years. Thus, the Claimant should be required to cover this charge as part of “reasonable wear and tear.”

24. As to the claim for overstay rent, the Defendant argues that he had no choice but to retain the keys and access card to retain his full rights to his security deposit. The Claimant indicated no willingness to settle the dispute over whether repainting was included in “reasonable wear and tear” or not. The Defendant further argues that due to a number of issues throughout his tenancy, he had no reason to expect good faith behaviour on the part of the Claimant. Thus, he retained the keys and access card in an attempt to retain his rights but did not remain in the apartment beyond the expiration of his Tenancy Agreement. Furthermore, he claims that once legal proceedings had been initiated, no further overstay for the Unit should be charged.

25. In further communications with the SCT Registry, both the Claimant and the Defendant reiterated their arguments. After the Consultation, the Defendant released the keys and access card and the Claimant performed an inspection. The Claimant then amended its Claim Form to reflect the updated maintenance charges and additional overstay rent.

26. The Defendant argued that the increase in the claim amount as to the overstay rent was punitive and unnecessary. The Defendant asserts that the Claimant initiated legal proceedings regarding the Unit and needs to wait until resolution of the case, thus additional overstay rent is not fair. Furthermore, as the Defendant claims that he did move out by 1 March 2016, the Unit was empty and available for use since that time.

27. Once the snag report and repair quotations were provided, the Defendant provided specific responses to some of the charges including the ceiling repair, tile repair, cabinet and panel repair and hose repair. Furthermore, the Defendant questions the accuracy of the move-in report due to its poor viewing quality and the fact that a damaged ceiling panel was still marked as in “good” condition. The Claimant provided a more detailed report after the hearing to which the Defendant provided additional arguments, which will be discussed below.

Finding

28. First and foremost, the relevant Tenancy Agreement states at Clause 9.1 that the “Agreement shall be governed by the prevailing law of the DIFC, United Arab Emirates” and that upon failure to resolve any disputes connected to the Tenancy Agreement, the “dispute shall be referred to the DIFC Courts.” Therefore, it is clear and undisputed that the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction to decide this matter. As the claim value is less than AED 500,000, this claim is properly before the Small Claims Tribunal of the DIFC Courts.

29. As to the Claimant’s request that the Defendant vacate the apartment and settle all utility bills, the Defendant admitted the claim and has vacated and settled all utility bills. The Claimant has not contested the Defendant’s performance on these issues and thus the claims for vacating the apartment and settling the utility bills are no longer at issue in the case. It is undisputed that the Defendant did, in fact, vacate the property at the expiration of his Tenancy Agreement. The dispute remains over his failure to return the keys and access card and the security deposit charges.

30. Thus, the main questions to be resolved in this case are twofold. First, there is the dispute over the Defendant’s security deposit and the repairs which can and cannot be deducted against his deposit. Second, there is the issue of overstay rent and whether the Defendant should be required to reimburse the Claimant for overstay.

A. The Defendant’s Security Deposit and the Claimant’s Claims for Repairs

31. As regards the first issue, upon inspection, the Claimant amended the Claim Form to reflect their claim of AED 3,338.50 against the Defendant for repairs to the apartment. This claim was based on a number of quotations showing AED 550 for appliance repair, AED 1,200 for repainting, and AED 1,588.50 for other repairs detailed in a repair quotation. The Claimant agreed to waive an additional AED 3,190 for repair of two doors and AED 175 for repair of a tile in the bedroom. The Defendant continues to adamantly contest the charges for repainting and emphasised that he should only be charged for damage beyond “reasonable wear and tear.”

32. As the Defendant points out, the relevant Tenancy Agreement states in Clause 8.1.2 that “[i]f the Unit(s) is not returned to the Landlord in the same condition that it was received by the Tenant on the Commencement Date, including the garden and landscaping, save and except for reasonable wear and tear, the Managing Agent and/or Landlord has the right to deduct the necessary amount from the Security Deposit and as provided under clause 8.1.4 to return the Unit(s) to its initial condition.”

33. There is therefore no dispute that the Claimant is able, under the terms of the Tenancy Agreement, to deduct appropriate repairs from the Defendant’s security deposit. The dispute remains over what qualifies as “reasonable wear and tear.” Repairs of what would amount to “reasonable wear and tear” are meant to be covered by the Landlord under the terms of the Tenancy Agreement and the Landlord is specifically disallowed from making deductions against the security deposit to repair “reasonable wear and tear.”

34. Thus, the Court is tasked with reviewing the evidence provided to determine whether the charges being made against the security deposit are repairs that lie within or outside of “reasonable wear and tear.” The Claimant, as the applicant in this case, bears the burden of proving that each repair is within its right to deduct. This means that the Claimant must both prove that the item is damaged, requiring repair, and that the damage lies outside of “reasonable wear and tear.” It is for the Court to assess whether the Claimant has met this burden of proof on each deduction from the security deposit.

35. The charges that the Claimant seeks to deduct from the Defendant’s security deposit comprise three items. There is the charge of AED 550 for the appliance repair, the charge of AED 1,200 for repainting and the charge of AED 1,588.50 for other snag repairs. The Court will take each of these items in turn.

1) Appliance Repair

36. The Claimant submitted pictures of a cracked washing machine door and an askew freezer shelf along with a quotation for repair reflecting a cost of AED 550 to repair the washing machine, repair the “freezer flap” and cover a service fee. It is reasonable to conclude that a cracked washing machine door is outside of the realm of “reasonable wear and tear.” As for the AED 75 charge towards repair of the “freezer flap,” the pictures provided of the freezer shelf depict that the shelf is not in place and AED 75 is a reasonable enough charge to either repair or replace the shelf and thus can be deducted against the security deposit. Thus the full AED 550 charge is properly deducted against the Defendant’s security deposit including the service fee required to conduct the repair.

2) Repainting Charges

37. As regards the repainting charges, the Defendant argues that repainting the entire apartment amounts to repairing “reasonable wear and tear” as it is to be expected after a tenancy period that there will be some scuffs and marks on the walls. The quotation provided by the Claimant regarding the painting charges states that it will cost AED 1,200 for “Supply and applying of white emulsion water paint.” The quotation does not indicate which areas will be painted or how many coats of paint. The Claimant has not provided pictures or other evidence to indicate that the walls are in such bad repair as to require repainting the entire apartment. Rather, the Claimant only provided one picture of some holes in one area of the wall.

38. The Claimant has also stated that the apartment was left “very shabby, and with several holes and scratches etc., which has resulted in need for repainting” and that the apartment was left with “shabby walls, scratches & smudges.” These statements, without further pictures or further confirmation of what repair must be done beyond “reasonable wear and tear” do not meet the standard of proof required and therefore the Claimant cannot deduct the full repainting charges against the Defendant’s security deposit. Instead, the Court deems it appropriate to deduct AED 200 for repair of the holes in the portion of the wall indicated in the snag report provided after the hearing.

3) Remaining Repairs

39. As for the remaining individual charges on the snag report, there are a number which have not been substantiated by the Claimant. As previously mentioned, the Claimant bears the burden of proof to show that any deductions against the Defendant’s security deposit are for repair of damage beyond “reasonable wear and tear.”

40. The Claimant has provided two versions of a snag report with a number of pictures of damage, without further explanation as to what each picture reflects. The Claimant further provided a quotation of the work allegedly to be done, without any attempt to connect the claimed repair costs with the pictures of alleged damage. Thus, the Court has attempted, through careful review of the pictures in the snag report and the listed repairs on the quotation provided, to find substantiation for each repair claimed.

41. The two charges entitled “Supply and replacement of Hand shattaf set grohe” and “Supply and replacement of shower hose 5feet” are not acceptable for deduction from the Defendant’s security deposit for two reasons. First, the pictures provided show no obvious damage or reason for replacement. Furthermore, unless there is evidence of neglect or misuse on the part of the tenant, replacement of these plumbing fixtures would be required as part of “reasonable wear and tear.”

42. Furthermore, the two charges entitled “Supply and applying of white paint fen mastic emulsion water paint touch up ceiling bathroom” and “Repairing of ceiling gypsm cracks with applying putty bathroom area” are also not acceptable for deduction from the Defendant’s security deposit. This is because ceiling damage, unless the Claimant can show otherwise, is unlikely to be caused by tenant neglect or misuse. Furthermore, the Defendant points to the move-in report which reflects additional ceiling damage and alleges that he sought repair of ceiling damage during his tenancy. It follows that this damage is most likely due to “reasonable wear and tear.”

43. The picture reflecting “Supply and replacement of Bathtub overflow stopper normal,” shows that the stopper is missing and thus this is an appropriate charge outside of the realm of “reasonable wear and tear”. The picture reflecting “Supply and replacement of kitchen sink waste coupling,” shows that the waste basket is detached from the wall and lid. While the Defendant claimed that this was “reasonable wear and tear” and that he attempted to have this fixed, the disrepair shown could be considered to be beyond “reasonable wear and tear” and thus this is an appropriate charge. Finally, the picture of “Supply and replacement of shower glass rubber bidding with necessary fittings,” shows that the rubber binding is hanging off the shower door. While the Defendant contests this is “reasonable wear and tear”, the extent of the damage is beyond what is “reasonable wear and tear” and thus this is an appropriate charge.

44. This leaves two charges, “Supply and replacement of kitchen cupboard door with necessary fittings” and “Supply and fixing of matching bottom wooden skirting for kitchen cupboards.” The Claimant has provided pictures showing this damage, especially with regard to the wooden skirting damage which shows damage beyond “reasonable wear and tear.”

45. As for the replacement of a kitchen cupboard, the only seemingly relevant pictures are the picture in the third row and third column or the fourth row and third column of the original snag report but it is not clear that the damage depicted is in fact a kitchen cupboard door or that the repair requires replacement fittings. As these pictures depict some damage that is beyond “reasonable wear and tear” but the Claimant has not documented the damage enough to show that the listed repair was in fact necessary, the Court finds it reasonable to split the cost and allow half of the line item to be deducted from the security deposit.

46. In total, it is appropriate for the Claimant to deduct a total of AED 1405.75 from the Claimant’s security deposit of AED 6,500. This deduction includes AED 550 for appliance repair, AED 200 for wall and paint repair and AED 655.75 for items 3, 6, 8, 9, and one half of item 7 of the quotation provided by the Claimant. Thus, the Claimant is responsible to return AED 5,094.25 to the Defendant to reimburse his security deposit.

B. The Defendant’s claim for overstay rent

47. Moving on to the claim for overstay rent, the parties are in stark disagreement. Based on submission of final utility bills and the statements of the Defendant, it is not in dispute that the Defendant did in fact vacate the apartment by the expiration of his Tenancy Agreement. The dispute is over his failure to provide the landlord with his keys and access card in order that they perform an inspection to assess damage and charges against the security deposit.

48. The Claimant argues that by retaining the access card and keys to the Unit, the Defendant overstayed beyond the expiration of his Tenancy Agreement and thus should be responsible for overstay rent until the point at which he returned the keys and access card on 14 April 2016. The Claimant contends that they were unable to make use of this apartment during this time due to the Defendant’s actions.

49. It is clear that the Defendant was not in his right to retain the keys and access card to the apartment beyond the expiration of the Tenancy Agreement. The Defendant admits as such in his response to the Amended Claim Form. He contends that he had no choice but to do so in order to retain his legal rights to his security deposit. He knew that if the Claimant insisted in charging him for repainting, he would have no recourse to defend his rights as he contends he did not have the funds to initiate a court case himself. Finally, the Defendant reiterates that he vacated the property a few days prior to the expiration of the Tenancy Agreement and therefore did not actually overstay.

50. There are a number of Clauses in the Tenancy Agreement that are relevant to this dispute about overstay rent and return of the access card and keys:

a. Clause 8.1.1 provides that “[p]ro-rata rent shall be charged to the Tenant for any delay to the final inspection date.”

b. Clause 3.37 states that the Landlord undertakes to “[r]eturn all keys, access cards, remote controls etc to the Managing Agent upon termination or Expiration of the Tenancy Agreement. In the event Tenant fails to comply with this clause, such amounts necessary to replace the above items shall be deducted from the Security Deposit without further notice.”

c. Clause 3.13 states that the tenant shall “[n]ot change the locks. The loss of any or all keys, security passes and remotes shall be reported to security staff immediately and to the Managing Agent in writing. The charges of replacement of keys, security passes and remotes will be borne by the Tenant.”

51. Additionally, it is important to note that the Tenancy Agreement at issue here is governed by DIFC Law and therefore subject to the DIFC Contract Law, DIFC Law No. 6 of 2004 (“the DIFC Contract Law”). Section 117 of the DIFC Contract law provides as follows:

“117. Mitigation of harm (1) The non-performing party is not liable for harm suffered by the aggrieved party to the extent that the harm could have been reduced by the latter party’s taking reasonable steps. (2) The aggrieved party is entitled to recover any expenses reasonably incurred in attempting to reduce the harm.”

52. Taking the DIFC Contract law and the Tenancy Agreement together, it is quite clear that the Claimant had the right to re-enter the apartment upon expiration of the Tenancy Agreement in order to change the locks, pursuant to Clause 3.37 of the Agreement. In fact, under the DIFC Contract Law, the Claimant should re-enter in order to mitigate their damages.

53. Still, it is not clear whether the Claimant believed the Defendant to have vacated the Unit, and just retain the keys and access card. From the correspondence provided to the SCT, the Defendant states that he will “keep possession of the property” and “retain possession of the property” in emails dated 29 February 2016 and 1 March 2016 respectively. The breach letter provided by the Claimant’s Managing Agent to the Defendant on 10 March 2016 also reflects the impression that the Defendant was “illegally occupy[ing] the Unit.”

54. It is not until 15 March 2016, via email, that the Defendant informs the Claimant’s Managing Agent that he has ensured completion of the move-out procedure and settled all utility accounts prior to the expiration of the Tenancy Agreement. He informs that the move-out procedure was otherwise complete as of two weeks ago.

55. Thus, until 15 March 2016, Clause 8.1.1 of the Tenancy Agreement may validly apply as the Defendant was delaying a final inspection by retaining the keys and access card and giving the impression that he was occupying the Unit beyond the expiration of his Tenancy Agreement.

56. Taking all of these facts into account and making reference to the terms of the Tenancy Agreement and the DIFC Contract Law, it is reasonable to charge the Defendant for overstay up until 15 March 2016 and no later. There are evidentiary factors pulling in both directions considering that the Claimant reasonably believed the Defendant to be occupying the Unit until 15 March 2016 and therefore it could not reasonably be expected that the Claimant would re-enter the Unit, change the locks, and mitigate their damages until this time. On 15 March 2016, it would have been reasonable to incur that expense and charge it to the Defendant, pursuant to Section 117 of the DIFC Contract Law. In fact, the Claimant should have taken that action in order to avoid further damages.

57. Still, it is relevant that the Claimant’s Managing Agent, acting for the Claimant, continued to tell the Defendant that the Claimant was filing a DIFC Courts case as early as 2 March 2016. From this first mention, there was over a month’s delay on the Claimant’s part in filing this claim. These statements misled the Defendant into expecting resolution of the matter much quicker than actually occurred. Of course, the Defendant could have brought his own case to speed up the process but the ensuing delay should not be held against him.

58. The overstay rental amount for the fourteen days including 2 March 2016 until 15 March 2016 is calculated as AED 5,072. The Defendant can pay this amount to the Claimant or have it deducted from his security deposit.

59. Each party shall bear their own costs.

 

Issued by:

Maha Al Mehairi

Judicial Officer

Date of issue: 26 May 2016

At: 4 pm

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CFI 002/2016 Das Real Estate Owned and represented by Mussabeh Salem Mussabeh Humaid Al Muhairi v National Bank of Abu Dhabi Pjsc

$
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Claim No: CFI-002-2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

 

DAS REAL ESTATE OWNED AND REPRESENTED BY MUSSABEH SALEM MUSSABEH HUMAID AL MUHAIRI

Claimant

and

 

NATIONAL BANK OF ABU DHABI PJSC

Defendant


 ORDER OF H.E. JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI


UPON reviewing the Court file

AND UPON reviewing the Case Management Bundle

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendant at a Case Management Conference on 14 June 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED BY CONSENT THAT:

Defendant’s Factual Witnesses

1.The Defendant shall provide the names of those factual witnesses it intends to call to give oral evidence at trial, or otherwise to explain why it is unable to do so, no later than 4pm on 5 July 2016.

Claimant’s Application

2. The Claimant shall file and serve any application that certain issues of liability be determined by way of preliminary hearing by no later than 4pm on 12 July 2016.

3. The Defendant shall respond to any application made by the Claimant that certain issues of liability be determined by way of preliminary hearing within the following 28 days and in any event by no later than 4pm on 9 August 2016.

4. The Claimant shall reply to any response submitted by the Defendant to any application made by the Claimant that certain issues of liability be determined by way of preliminary hearing within the following 14 days and in any event by no later than 4pm on 23 August 2016.

5. A hearing of any application made by the Claimant that certain issues of liability be determined by way of preliminary hearing shall be listed as soon as practicable thereafter.

Agreed List of Issues

6. Adjacent to each paragraph of each witness statement, reply witness statement (if any), expert report, supplementary expert report, joint expert report and skeleton argument and written opening statement shall be inserted the issue or issues to which that paragraph relates as numbered in the Agreed List of Issues, in order for the Court to understand to which of the agreed issues that paragraph relates.

Production of Documents

7. Standard production of documents shall be made by each party on or before 4pm on 26 July 2016. [RDC 28.6]

8. The Parties shall file and serve any Request to Produce on or before 4pm on 9 August 2016. [RDC 28.16]

9. Objections to Requests to Produce (if any) shall be filed and served by the Parties within 14 days thereafter and in any event by no later than 4pm on 23 August 2016. [RDC 28. 26]

10. Where there are no objections to a particular Request contained in a Request to Produce, the Parties shall produce documents responsive to that request within 14 days from the date of the Request to Produce and in any event by no later than 4pm on 6 September 2016. [RDC 28.20]

11. Where objections to any Requests to Produce have been made, the Court shall determine those objections and shall make any disclosure order within the following 14 days and in any event by no later than 4pm on 6 September 2016. [RDC 28.38]

12. The Parties shall comply with the terms of any disclosure order within 28 days thereafter and in any event by no later than 4pm on 4 October 2016. [RDC 28.42]

Witness Statements

13. Signed statements of witnesses of fact, and hearsay notices where required by RDC 29.2 and 29.103 to 29.105 inclusive shall be filed and served by the Parties by the later of 4pm on 13 December 2016 or 10 weeks following the close of the disclosure stage.

14. Any witness statement in reply shall be filed and served by the later of 4pm on 10 January 2017 or 4 weeks following the exchange of witness statements.

15. Unless otherwise ordered, witness statements shall stand as evidence in chief of the witness at trial.

Expert Reports

16. The Claimant shall file and serve any Expert Report(s) [RDC Part 31] in respect of the following issues by the later of 4pm on 31 January 2017 or 3 weeks following the close of witness evidence:

(a) delay to the Works and Project completion;

(b) additional funding required to complete the Project (paragraph 49 Particulars of Claim); and

(c) valuation of (i) the Claimant’s lost value of the Project (paragraph 60.1 Particulars of Claim); and (ii) the Claimant’s sale costs (paragraph 60.2 Particulars of Claim).

17. The Defendant shall file and serve any Expert Report(s) in respect of those same issues by the later of 4pm on 14 February 2017 or 2 weeks following service of the Claimant’s Expert Report(s).

18. Supplemental Expert Reports shall be filed and served by the later of 4pm on 7 March 2017 or 3 weeks following service of the Defendant’s Expert Report(s).

19. The Expert(s) appointed in respect of each issue shall meet together by the later of 4pm on 21 March 2017 or 2 weeks following service of the Supplemental Expert Reports.

20. Joint expert reports setting out areas of agreement and disagreement shall be filed and served by the later of 4pm on 4 April 2017 or 2 weeks following the last of the meetings between the experts referred to in paragraph 19

Pre-Trial Review

21. A pre-trial review shall be listed to take place on 30 May 2017 after the close of expert evidence referred to in paragraph 20 above. [RDC 26.76 and 26.77 – PTR normally takes place between 8 and 14 weeks before trial date]

Trial Bundles

22. Agreed trial bundles shall be completed in accordance with Part 35 of the RDC and lodged by no later than 2 weeks before trial. [RDC 35.34]

Reading List

23. A single reading list approved by all parties’ legal representatives for trial shall be lodged with the Registry by no later than 2 days before fixed trial date, together with an estimate of time required for reading. [RDC 35.51]

Skeleton Argument, Opening Statements and Chronology

24. Skeleton Arguments and Written Opening Statements shall be served on all other parties and lodged with the Court by no later than 1pm five clear days before the start of trial for the Claimant and by no later than 1pm two clear days before the start of trial for the Defendant. [RDC 35.62]

25. The Parties shall prepare and file a Chronology of significant events cross-referenced to significant documents, pleadings and witness statements to be agreed, insofar as possible, by no later than 1 week before trial. [RDC 35.64]

Trial

26. The trial of this matter shall commence on 9 July 2017 with an estimated duration of 5-10 days.

27. Costs in the case.

28. Liberty to apply.

 

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of issue: 22 June 2016

At: 2pm

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CFI 022/2015 (1) Hisham Akram Mohamed Sayed Ahmed (2) Mohamed Akram Mohamed Sayed Ahmed Eid (3) Samia Saad Elshazly (4) Tarek Mohamed Medhat Abdelhady Abdelrahman v (1) Aladdin Hassouna Saba (2) Mohamed Hazem Barakat (also known as Hazem Barakat) (3) Wael Mohamed Sayed El Mahgary

$
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Claim No: CFI 022/2015

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

(1) HISHAM AKRAM MOHAMED SAYED AHMED

(2) MOHAMED AKRAM MOHAMED SAYED AHMED EID

(3) SAMIA SAAD ELSHAZLY

(4) TAREK MOHAMED MEDHAT ABDELHADY ABDELRAHMAN

                                                                                          Claimants

and

(1) ALADDIN HASSOUNA SABA

(2) MOHAMED HAZEM BARAKAT (ALSO KNOWN AS HAZEM BARAKAT)

(3) WAEL MOHAMED SAYED EL MAHGARY

Defendants


  ORDER OF REGISTRAR MARK BEER


UPON reviewing the Claimants’ Application Notice CFI-022-2015/3 dated 21 June 2016 seeking permission to extend the deadline by which the Claim Form must be served and permission to amend the Claim Form

AND UPON reviewing the Second Witness Statement of Mark O’Flynn dated 20 June 2016

AND UPON reviewing the Order of Judicial Officer Nassir Al Nasser dated 21 December 2015 granting a 6 month extension to serve the Claim Form on the Defendants

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Claimants be granted permission to amend the address for the Third Defendant in the Amended Claim Form.

2. The Claimants be granted a further 6 month extension of time to serve the Amended Claim Form issued on 8 July 2015 on the Third Defendant in Egypt or elsewhere.

3. The Amended Claim Form shall be served by no later than Sunday 8 January 2017, unless extended by a further order.

4. There be no order as to costs.

 

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of issue: 22 June 2016

At: 2pm

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CFI 022/2015 (1) Hisham Akram Mohamed Sayed Ahmed (2) Mohamed Akram Mohamed Sayed Ahmed Eid (3) Samia Saad Elshazly (4) Tarek Mohamed Medhat Abdelhady Abdelrahman and (1) Aladdin Hassouna Saba (2) Mohamed Hazem Barakat (also known as Hazem Barakat) (3) Wael Mohamed Sayed El Mahgary v (1) Horwath MAK Limited (DIFC Registered No. 0230) (2) Saad Maniar

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Claim No: CFI 022/2015

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

(1) HISHAM AKRAM MOHAMED SAYED AHMED

(2) MOHAMED AKRAM MOHAMED SAYED AHMED EID

(3) SAMIA SAAD ELSHAZLY

(4) TAREK MOHAMED MEDHAT ABDELHADY ABDELRAHMAN

                                                                                          Claimants

and

 

(1) ALADDIN HASSOUNA SABA

(2) MOHAMED HAZEM BARAKAT (ALSO KNOWN AS HAZEM BARAKAT)

(3) WAEL MOHAMED SAYED EL MAHGARY

Defendants

and

 

(1) HORWATH MAK LIMITED (DIFC Registered No. 0230)

(2) SAAD MANIAR

Non Party Respondents


 DISCLOSURE ORDER OF REGISTRAR MARK BEER


UPON reviewing the Claimants’ Application Notice CFI-022-2015/2 dated 8 May 2016 seeking production of certain documents by non-parties (the “Application”)

AND UPON reviewing the First Witness Statement of Adrian Chadwick dated 2 May 2016 in support of the Application and the First Witness Statement of Saad Maniar dated 19 May 2016 in reply to the Application

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimants and Counsel for the Non Party Respondents at on 21 June 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.Each of the Non Party Respondents shall produce within 7 days to the Claimants’ lawyers, Hadef & Partners LLC, and to the lawyers representing the First and Second Defendants, Amereller Legal Consultants, the following documents or classes of documents relating to Beltone Partners Holding Limited (the “Company”) which are in their possession, custody or control:

(a) Copies of all the documents which were attached to the letter sent by Horwath Mak Limited to the DIFC Registrar of Companies dated 19 January 2011;

(b) All other Directors’ Report, Auditors Report and Audited Financial Statements issued in respect of the Company;

(c) All accounts and financial records of the Company, whether or not audited;

(d) All documents and/or correspondence relating to and/or concerning the identification of the Company’s assets and the distribution of the assets including the proceeds of any sale of the assets;

(e) All documents and/or correspondence concerning or evidencing the Directors’ and/or the Shareholders’ approval of the distribution of the Company’s assets.

2. Each of the Non Party Respondents shall when producing the documents mentioned in paragraph 1 above:

(i) specify the documents or classes of documents which are no longer in their possession, custody or control and shall indicate what has happened to such documents; and

(ii) specify the documents or classes of documents in respect of which he claims a right or duty to withhold production.

3. The Claimants shall pay the Non Party Respondents their costs of the Application and of complying with any order made on the Application, which costs have been immediately assessed at USD 8,000, within 14 days of the date of this Order.

 

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of issue: 22 June 2016

At: 3pm

The post CFI 022/2015 (1) Hisham Akram Mohamed Sayed Ahmed (2) Mohamed Akram Mohamed Sayed Ahmed Eid (3) Samia Saad Elshazly (4) Tarek Mohamed Medhat Abdelhady Abdelrahman and (1) Aladdin Hassouna Saba (2) Mohamed Hazem Barakat (also known as Hazem Barakat) (3) Wael Mohamed Sayed El Mahgary v (1) Horwath MAK Limited (DIFC Registered No. 0230) (2) Saad Maniar appeared first on DIFC Courts.

Gavin v Gaynor

$
0
0

Claim No. XXX

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN

GAVIN

Claimant/ Appellant

and

 

GAYNOR

Defendant/ Respondent


ORDER OF CHIEF JUSTICE MICHAEL HWANG


UPON reviewing the Claimant’s Appeal Notice, grounds of appeal, skeleton argument and supporting documents dated 1 May 2016

AND UPON reviewing the relevant documents in the case file

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Claimant is granted leave to appeal against the Order of H.E. Justice Ali Al Madhani dated 3 April 2016 pursuant to Rule 44.8 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts on the grounds that the Claimant has a real prospect of success and/or the subject matter is one of public importance.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 13 June 2016

At: 2pm

The post Gavin v Gaynor appeared first on DIFC Courts.

CFI 013/2016 Oger Dubai llc v DAMAN Real Estate Capital Partners Limited

$
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0

Claim No: CFI 013/2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE JUSTICE SIR RICHARD FIELD 

BETWEEN

OGER DUBAI LLC

                                                                                                Claimant

and

 

DAMAN REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS LIMITED

                                                                                                Defendant

Hearing:            16 May 2016

Counsel:           Sean Brannigan QC instructed by Clyde & Co for the Claimant

David Allison QC instructed by Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP for the Defendant

Judgment:        16 June 2016


AMENDED JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE SIR RICHARD FIELD


Summary of Judgment 

In this case, Justice Sir Richard Field orders that the Defendant be wound up in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 5 of the DIFC Insolvency Law and the Insolvency Regulations, with his winding up order being stayed for 7 days to give the Defendant the opportunity to apply to the Court of Appeal for a further stay pending appeal, if so advised.

The Claimant had lodged a petition to wind up the Defendant with the DIFC Courts on 18 April 2016. The Claimant had referred a dispute with the Defendant to arbitration. By an award (“Award”) dated 19 July 2015, a DIAC arbitral Tribunal had awarded the Claimant AED 964,906,637.25. On 29 July 2015 the Defendant applied to the Dubai Courts for an annulment of the award on various grounds including that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. On 13 August 2015 the Claimant issued a DIFC Courts claim form seeking recognition and enforcement of the Award.  On 26 September 2015, Sir John Chadwick (then DCJ), granted an ex parte freezing injunction over the Defendant’s assets. The Claimant’s recognition and enforcement application and its application to continue the ex parte freezing injunction granted by Sir John Chadwick were heard by Justice Sir David Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015. Justice Steel concluded that in light of the Defendant’s assurance that a decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance would be available in about three months, the right order to make was that on condition that security for the award inclusive of costs was posted within 21 days, the Claimant’s enforcement application would be adjourned for four months.

Justice Steel’s decision was embodied in an order of the Court issued on 30 December 2015 (the “Enforcement Order”) which provided that if the Defendant did not provide security in respect of satisfaction of the Award in the sum of USD 266,494,203 by 4pm on 29 December 2015 in a form reasonably acceptable to the Claimant, the Award would immediately thereafter and without further order of the Court be deemed and stand as recognised pursuant to Article 43 of the DIFC Arbitration Law. Justice Steel also continued the freezing injunction granted by DCJ Chadwick until further order of the Court.

On 27 January 2016, the Dubai Court of First Instance dismissed the Defendant’s annulment application on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain it. On 22 December 2015, the Defendant issued an appellant’s notice seeking permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and a stay of that Order. Following a hearing on 19 January 2016, H.E. Justice Omar Al Muhairi on 22 February 2016 dismissed both the application seeking permission to appeal and the stay application. On 3 March 2016, the Defendant issued an application pursuant to Rule 44.179 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts seeking permission to re-open Justice Omar’s dismissal of its applications for permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and for a stay of that order. The application was dismissed by the Chief Justice in a decision issued on 14 June 2016 on the grounds that the Defendant had failed to show that: (i) it was necessary to reopen Justice Omar’s order to avoid real injustice; and (ii) the circumstances were exceptional making it appropriate to reopen the appeal.

On 29 March 2016, the Claimant presented its winding-up petition against the Defendant, based on the Defendant’s inability to pay the Award debt, it having failed to pay that debt following two written demands for payment dated 3 August 2015 and 5 October 2015 and it having admitted through its Counsel in the hearing before Justice Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015 that it was not good for the money owed.

On 11 April 2016, Justice Steel made an interim ex parte order restraining the Claimant from proceeding with its winding-up petition and following an inter parties hearing on 15 April 2016, he made an order dated 20 April 2016 (the “Restraining Order”) restraining the Claimant from advertising a petition to wind up the Defendant until the hearing of the Claimant’s winding-up petition. After the hearing on 16 May 2016 of the Claimant’s petition to wind up the Defendant, on 8 June 2016 the Dubai Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendant’s appeal from the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance.

Sir Richard Field held that: the effect of the Enforcement Order is not that the Claimant has a right to a winding-up order on the basis of a final and indisputable judgment debt. Instead, the effect of that order is to allow the Claimant to have recourse to such means of execution as are available to enforce its judgment debt and the Claimant must take those means of execution as it finds them. Moreover, so closely are the Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law based on sections 122 and 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, the practice and procedure of the English courts on winding-up petitions should be broadly applied by the DIFC Courts. In his view, the effect of the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal, taken together with the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance is that the jurisdiction point can no longer be regarded as having a realistic prospect of success even if, which is far from clear to the Court, it is open to the Defendant to seek to appeal to the Court of Cassation. The evidence is that the Defendant is unable to pay its debts as they fall due and in those circumstances a winding-up, which by its nature will have regard to the interests of all of the Defendant’s creditors, seems to be an entirely appropriate means of execution. Furthermore, the concerns that led to the making of the freezing order and the evidence provided on disclosure made under that order that certain valuable villas in Dubai are held in the names of third parties, subject to letters of undertaking in favour of the Defendant, indicate that the sooner the present management of the Defendant is displaced in favour of a liquidator who will be an officer of the court, the better.

This summary is not part of the Judgment and should not be cited as such 

ORDER

UPON considering the Claimant’s petition to wind up the Defendant dated 18 April 2016 and the Skeleton Arguments filed by both parties in respect thereof

AND UPON considering the Defendant’s applications for a stay or the adjournment of the Claimant’s said winding-up petition and for a stay of the order of Justice Sir David Steel dated 30 December 2015 and the Skeleton Arguments filed by both parties in respect thereof

AND UPON considering the orders of Justice Sir David Steel dated 30 December 2015 and 20 April 2016

AND UPON reading the evidence before the Court

AND UPON considering the documents on the Court File

AND UPON hearing Counsel for both the Claimant and the Defendant on 16 May 2016

AND PURSUANT TO Chapter 5 (Compulsory Winding Up) of DIFC Law No. 3 of 2009 (the “Insolvency Law”) and the DIFC Insolvency Regulations (the “Insolvency Regulations”)

PURSUANT TO Rule 36.40 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts, paragraphs 1 and 17 of this Judgment are amended as reflected by the strikethrough and the underline

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

  1. The Defendant shall be wound-up in accordance with the Insolvency Law and the Insolvency Regulations and for that purpose Mr Shahab Bilal Sajjad Haider shall be appointed Liquidator.
  2. The Defendant’s applications to dismiss and/or stay and/or adjourn the Claimants’ winding-up petition are dismissed.
  3. The Defendant’s application to stay the order of Justice Steel dated 30 December 2015 is dismissed.
  4. The order made in paragraph 1 shall be stayed for 7 days from the issue of this order to allow the Defendant, if so advised, to apply to the Court of Appeal for a further stay pending an appeal to that court.
  5. The amendments made herein to the original Judgment and Order do not affect the validity or the effectiveness of that Judgment and Order or the subsequent Order requiring the Defendant to cease trading as from the date and time of their issue on 16 June 2016.

 

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 16 June 2016

Date of Re-issue: 23 June 2016

At: 12pm

JUDGMENT

Background

1.The Claimant referred a dispute with the Defendant to arbitration arising out of the termination by the Defendant of a building contract signed in 2008 which contained an arbitration clause requiring settlement of disputes to be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

2. By an (amended) award dated 19 July 2015 (the “Award”) a DIAC arbitral Tribunal — Mr Charles Manzoni QC SC, Mr Adrian Cole and Mr John Marrin QC (Chairman) — awarded the Claimant AED 964,906,637.25 (USD 262,559,629.18) made up of sums awarded by way of damages; fees and expenses of the Tribunal and DIAC administrative fees; and legal costs, with simple interest at the rate of EIBOR plus 3% p.a. on any sum unpaid 14 days after the date of the Award.

3. On 29 July 2015, the Defendant applied to the Dubai Courts for an annulment of the Award on various grounds including that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

4. The Dubai Chamber of Commerce (“DICC”) was established in 1975. The Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”) was established in 2004. The first set of DIAC Arbitration Rules was ratified and given effect to by Dubai Decree No.11 of 2007. In 2009, those Rules were superseded by a new set of Rules (the “DIAC Rules 2009”) as provided for in Decree No. 58 of 2009. Article 4 of that decree provided:

Rules and By-laws

Article 4.

 (a) The arbitration rules in force at the Centre shall apply to all disputes that are referred to the Centre even if the parties to a dispute agreed to apply the Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry Number (12) of 1994.

(b) The arbitration rules in force at the Centre shall apply to all disputes that are referred to the Centre even if the parties to a dispute agreed to apply the Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry No. (12) of 1994.”

5. The Defendant argued before the Tribunal that since the building contract was signed after Dubai Decree No. 11 of 2007 was enacted but before the enactment of Decree No. 58 of 2009, the DIAC Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute.

6. The Tribunal rejected this contention on the ground that Article 4 (a) not only transferred jurisdiction to the DIAC in cases where the contract provides for the DICC Rules to be applied, but operated retrospectively without falling foul of Article 112 of the UAE Constitution[1] in that it was necessary that it should take such effect and such effect was expressly stipulated.

7. In applying to the Dubai Courts for the annulment of the Award, the Defendant contended that the Tribunal had erred in construing Article 4(a) of Decree No 58 of 2009 retroactively so as to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. It is also maintained that: (i) the building contract had been signed without authority; (ii) expert witnesses had wrongly been excluded from the hearing when evidence from the factual witnesses was taken; (iii) a prior condition to arbitration had not been satisfied; and (iv) the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make the costs order it made in favour of the Claimant.

8. On 13 August 2015, the Claimant issued a Claim Form seeking recognition and enforcement of the Award.

9. On 26 September 2015, Sir John Chadwick DCJ, observing that the Defendant’s conduct “points strongly to the conclusion that it is willing to take whatever course seems to be likely to further its own interests without regard to the ordinary considerations of commercial morality or proper conduct of the arbitration proceedings…”, granted ex parte a freezing injunction over the Defendant’s assets.

10. The Claimant’s recognition and enforcement application and its application to continue the ex parte freezing injunction granted by Sir John Chadwick were heard by Justice Sir David Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015. In resisting the former application, the Defendant relied on the matters canvassed in its annulment application to the Dubai Courts.

11. As he did in A v B (ARB 005/2014), Justice Steel adopted the approach articulated by Gross J in IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corp [2005] EWHC 726 (Comm) when considering enforcement of an arbitral award under ss. 101 and 103 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996:

“…the Act does not furnish a threshold test in respect of the grant of an adjournment and the power to order the provision of security in the exercise of the court’s discretion under s.103(5). In my judgment, it would be wrong to read a fetter into this understandably wide discretion (echoing, as it does, Art. VI of the New York Convention). Ordinarily, a number of considerations are likely to be relevant: (i) whether the application before the court in the country of origin is brought bona fide and not simply by way of delaying tactics; (ii) whether the application before the court in the country of origin has at least a real (i.e., realistic) prospect of success … (iii) the extent of the delay occasioned by an adjournment and any resulting prejudice. Beyond such matters, it is probably unwise to generalise; all must depend on the circumstances of the individual case. As it seems to me, the right approach is that of a sliding scale, in any event embodied in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Soleh Boneh v Uganda Govt. [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 208 in the context of the question of security:

“….two important factors must be considered on such an application, although I do not mean to say that there may not be others. The first is the strength of the argument that the award is invalid, as perceived on a brief consideration by the Court which is asked to enforce the award while proceedings to set it aside are pending elsewhere. If the award is manifestly invalid, there should be an adjournment and no order for security; if it is manifestly valid, there should either be an order for immediate enforcement, or else an order for substantial security. In between there will be various degrees of plausibility in the argument for invalidity; and the Judge must be guided by his preliminary conclusion on the point.

The second point is that the Court must consider the ease or difficulty of enforcement of the award, and whether it will be rendered more difficult…if enforcement is delayed. If that is likely to occur, the case for security is stronger; if, on the other hand, there are and always will be insufficient assets within the jurisdiction, the case for security must necessarily be weakened.””

Per Staughton LJ, at p. 212. See too: Fouchard, at p.982; Dardana v Yukos [2002] EWCA Civ 543; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 326 (CA).

12. Justice Steel found that the only contention that had a realistic prospect of success within the Defendant’s annulment application was the jurisdiction point. All the other points were fanciful. In paragraphs 22, 45, 46 and 47 of his judgment delivered on 8 December 2015, he said:

“Not only was the [jurisdiction] point rejected by three respected and experienced arbitrators, Ms Nevin described it as “purely technical and without commercial merit” and that the only justification for raising it was the hope of creating delay and expense. I agree, and, indeed, as the Deputy Chief Justice said, it is entirely consistent with a general policy to frustrate the enforcement of the award by any means.”

“[The Tribunal’s conclusion on the jurisdiction issue] is in accordance with business common sense and in accordance with a purposive reading of the relevant articles and rules.”

“In reaching that conclusion, this distinguished and experienced Tribunal have embarked on a detailed analysis of the issues and the arguments. The Defendant merely proposes to rerun the very same arguments”

“….In the result, despite the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal appeared to have some difficulty in coming to a conclusion on the topic, I regard the prospects of success in pursuing this technical and unmeritorious challenge as, at best, only just overcoming the threshold requirement of having a realistic prospect of success.”

13. In paragraph 56 of his judgment, Justice Steel concluded that in light of the Defendant’s assurance that a decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance would be available in about three months, the right order to make was that on condition that security for the award inclusive of costs was posted within 21 days, the Claimant’s enforcement application would be adjourned for four months.

14. Justice Steel’s decision was embodied in an order of the Court issued on 30 December 2015 (the “Enforcement Order”) which provided that if the Defendant did not provide security in respect of satisfaction of the Award in the sum of USD 266,494,203 by 4pm on 29 December 2015 in a form reasonably acceptable to the Claimant, the Award would immediately thereafter and without further order of the Court be deemed and stand as recognised pursuant to Article 43 of the Arbitration Law and the Claimant shall be at liberty to enforce the Award in the same manner as a judgment or order of the Court pursuant to Article 42 of the Arbitration Law.

15. Justice Steel also continued the freezing injunction granted by DCJ Chadwick until further order of the Court.

16. On 27 January 2016, the Dubai Court of First Instance dismissed the Defendant’s annulment application on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain it.

17. On 22 December 2015, the Defendant issued an appellant’s notice seeking permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and a stay of that Order.

18. Following a hearing on 19 January 2016, H.E. Justice Omar Al Muhairi on 22 February 2016 dismissed both the application seeking permission to appeal and the stay application.

19. On 3 March 2016, the Defendant issued an application pursuant to Rule 44.179 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts seeking permission to re-open Justice Omar’s dismissal of its applications for permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and for a stay of that order. The application was dismissed by the Chief Justice in a decision issued on 14 June 2016 on the grounds that the Defendant had failed to show that: (i) it was necessary to reopen Justice Omar’s order to avoid real injustice; and (ii) the circumstances were exceptional making it appropriate to reopen the appeal.

20. On 29 March 2016, the Claimant presented its winding-up petition against the Defendant by way of a Part 8 Claim Form. The petition is based on the Defendant’s inability to pay the Award debt, it having failed to pay that debt following two written demands for payment dated 3 August 2015 and 5 October 2015 and it having admitted through its Counsel in the hearing before Justice Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015 that it was not good for the money owed.

21. On 11 April 2016, Justice Steel made an interim ex parte order restraining the Claimant from proceeding with its winding-up petition and following an inter parties hearing on 15 April 2016, he made an order dated 20 April 2016 (the “Restraining Order”) restraining the Claimant from advertising a petition to wind up the Defendant until the hearing of the Claimant’s winding-up petition.

22. After the hearing on 16 May 2016 of the Claimant’s petition to wind up the Defendant, on 8 June 2016 the Dubai Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendant’s appeal from the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance.

The relevant provisions of the DIFC Insolvency Law No. 3 of 2009 (the “Insolvency Law”)

23. Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law provide:

“50. Circumstances in which Company may be wound up by the Court

A Company may be wound up by the Court if:

(a) the Company has resolved that the Company be wound up by the Court;

(b) the Company is unable to pay its debts;

(c) at the time at which a moratorium for the Company under Article 9 comes to an end, no voluntary arrangement approved under Part 2 has effect in relation to the Company;

(d) the Court may make such an order pursuant to any provision of or under DIFC Law; or

(e) the Court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the Company should be wound

  1. Definition of inability to pay debts

(1) A Company is deemed unable to pay its debts:

(a) if a creditor to whom the Company is indebted in a sum exceeding $2,000.00 then due has served on the Company a written demand requiring the Company to pay the sum so due and the Company has for 3 weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum or to agree terms in relation to its payment to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor; or

(b)  if execution or other process issued on a judgment, decree or order of any Court in favour of a creditor of the Company is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; or

(c) if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the Company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due.

(2) A Company is also deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the value of the Company’s current assets is less than the amount of its current liabilities, taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities.”

The parties’ rival contentions

The Claimant’s case

24. It was submitted on behalf of the Claimant that the Enforcement Order, coming into effect as it did following the Defendant’s failure to provide security in the sum of the Award, disentitled the Defendant from arguing that its annulment proceedings in the Dubai Courts precluded the Court from granting the winding-up petition. The effect of the Enforcement Order was that, within the jurisdiction of the DIFC, the resulting judgment debt was final and indisputable.

25. It followed that, since it was common ground that the Defendant could not pay its debts within the meaning and effect of Article 50 of the Insolvency Law, the winding-up petition should be granted.

The Defendant’s case

26. The Defendant argued that the Enforcement Order did not mandate the making of a winding-up order. The question was whether the Court, on the facts before it, should exercise its discretion under Article 50 of the Insolvency Law to order the Defendant’s winding-up.

27. In this connection, the practice and procedure of the English Courts on winding-up petitions was directly applicable in the DIFC Courts on the basis that Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law are based on sections 122 and 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. Under that practice and procedure, the Court will dismiss a winding-up petition where the debt is genuinely disputed on substantial grounds, viz grounds which are real as opposed to frivolous, that is to say they have a realistic prospect of success; see Turner v The Royal Bank of Scotland [2000] BPIR 683, Re Arena Corporation Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 371 (at [53]); Abbey National plc v JSF Finance and Currency Exchange Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 328 (at [46]) and Argentum Lex Wealth Management Ltd v Gianotti [2011] EWCA Civ 1341 (at [17]).

28. In this respect, winding-up stands on a footing different from other means of execution. Thus, where a judgment has been obtained and permission to appeal has been granted but there is no stay of execution pending appeal, execution other than by way of winding-up may be available, but not a winding-up order. This is because: (i) winding-up is a class remedy that is usually the death knell of the company; and (ii) winding-up proceedings are unsuited for determining any dispute about the existence of the debt.

29. The Defendant further submitted that the annulment proceedings in the Dubai Courts were based on grounds that were not frivolous but had a realistic prospect of success. This in effect was the conclusion of Justice Steel in deciding: (i) to stay the Claimant’s enforcement and recognition claim for four months on terms that the Defendant provided security in the sum of the Award; and (ii) granting the Restraining Order over to the hearing of the petition. The Dubai Court of First Instance’s decision to reject the annulment application on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the application was surprising and clearly incorrect. Dubai being the seat of the arbitration, the Dubai Courts plainly had jurisdiction as the appropriate supervisory court to determine the annulment jurisdiction issue.

30. If the Dubai Court of Appeal held that the Dubai Courts had no jurisdiction to review the question of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it was accepted that that would be a very relevant factor for the winding-up court when considering whether Justice Steel’s earlier finding that there was a realistic prospect of success remained a good one.

31. In the alternative, the Court should refuse to make a winding-up order on the ground that to do so would be oppressive and unfair given: (i) that the Defendant’s annulment case in the Dubai Courts has a real, as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success; and (ii) the continuation of the freezing injunction. Further, there were other means of execution open to the Claimant short of winding-up the Defendant.

Discussion and Decision

32. In my judgment, the effect of the Enforcement Order is not that the Claimant has a right to a winding-up order on the basis of a final and indisputable judgment debt. Instead, the effect of that order is to allow the Claimant to have recourse to such means of execution as are available to enforce its judgment debt and the Claimant must take those means of execution as it finds them. I am also of the opinion that, so closely are the Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law based on sections 122 and 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, the practice and procedure of the English courts on winding-up petitions should be broadly applied by the DIFC Courts.

33. The central question therefore is whether the Defendant’s challenge to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in the Dubai Courts has a realistic prospect of success. In my judgment, the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal upholding the Court of First Instance’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the Defendant’s application is a “game changer”. In his judgment given on 8 December 2015, Justice Steel regarded the Defendant’s prospects of success in pursuing this “technical and unmeritorious challenge” as, at best, only just overcoming the threshold requirement of having a realistic prospect of success. In my view, the effect the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal, taken together with the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance is that the jurisdiction point can no longer be regarded as having a realistic prospect of success even if, which is far from clear to the Court, it is open to the Defendant to seek to appeal to the Court of Cassation.

34. I turn then to consider the Defendant’s case that to order a winding-up would be oppressive and unfair. I reject this contention. The evidence is that the Defendant is unable to pay its debts as they fall due and in those circumstances a winding-up, which by its nature will have regard to the interests of all of the Defendant’s creditors, seems to me to be an entirely appropriate means of execution. I also think that the concerns that led to the making of the freezing order and the evidence provided on disclosure made under that order that certain valuable villas in Dubai are held in the names of the third parties, subject to letters of undertaking in favour of the Defendant, indicate that the sooner the present management of the Defendant is displaced in favour of a liquidator who will be an officer of the court, the better.

35. I therefore propose to order that the Defendant be wound up in accordance with the requirements of the Insolvency Law and the Insolvency Regulations.

36. Finally, I consider it appropriate to stay the order winding up the Defendant for 7 days from the date of the order herein to give the Defendant the opportunity to apply to the Court of Appeal for a further stay pending appeal, if so advised. In all the circumstances of this case, there will be no extension of this 7 day period.

 

The post CFI 013/2016 Oger Dubai llc v DAMAN Real Estate Capital Partners Limited appeared first on DIFC Courts.

Gilmore Associates Limited v Giulia Limited

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Claim No: xxxx

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

IN THE SMALL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

BEFORE H.E. JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI

BETWEEN

Gilmore Associates Limited 

Claimant

 

and

 

Giulia Limited 

 

Defendant

Hearing:          18 April 2016

Judgment:       31 May 2016


JUDGMENT OF H.E. JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI


UPON hearing the Claimant and the Defendant

AND UPON reading the submissions and evidence filed and recorded on the Court file

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Defendant pay the Claimant AED 119,728.53 in full and final resolution of the claim.

2. Each party shall bear its own costs.

THE REASONS

Parties

3. The Claimant is Gilmore Associates Limited (the “Claimant”), a company providing consulting services.

4. The Defendant is Giulia Limited (the “Defendant”), a company that hired the Claimant’s services.

Background and the Preceding History

5. The parties entered into two Consultancy Agreements, dated 22 June 2014 and 17 August 2014, which detailed the provision of certain services to be provided by the Claimant to the Defendant.

6. The First Consultancy Agreement, dated 22 June 2014, was signed by the parties on 23 July 2014 and provided for certain professional services for three projects (Project 1, Project 2 and Project 3).

7. The Second Consultancy Agreement, dated 17 August 2014, was signed on 4 September 2014 and provided for the same listed professional services for the Project 2 project but listed a different cost for the various services.

8. There was some disagreement between the parties as to the payment of some invoices pursuant to the Consultancy Agreements, with the Claimant contending that invoices remained unpaid for a number of months. The Claimant then demanded payment of the outstanding amounts by 17 September 2015 or else it would temporarily suspend services.

9. The Defendant did not pay the alleged outstanding amounts and instead made arrangement for replacement services. The Defendant issued a “Notice of Termination” letter on 29 September 2015. The Defendant did not subsequently make any additional payments to the Claimant.

9. On 5 January 2016, the Claimant filed a case with the DIFC Courts in the Small Claims Tribunal alleging the below summarised claims.

10. No settlement was reached by the parties at the end of the Consultation. The parties were given additional time to discuss settlement and failed to reach an agreement. Consequently, the case was sent for adjudication. On 18 April 2016 I heard submissions from the Claimant and the Defendant at a hearing and directed the parties to provide further written submissions.

11. On 21 April 2016, the Claimant filed additional submissions for consideration of the Court. The Claimant served those submissions on the Defendant on 24 April 2016. On 27 April 2016, the Defendant filed additional submissions and served the same on the Claimant. Following this final submission, the Claimant requested that the Court throw out the Defendant’s final submission due to lateness and for including an unauthorised counterclaim.

12. The case was then reserved for Judgment based upon the parties’ submissions at the hearing and their later paper submissions.

Particulars and Defence

A. The Claimant’s Initial Submission

14. The Claimant initially argued in the Claim Form that the Defendant owed the Claimant payment of an outstanding amount of AED 158,274.09 pursuant to the revised proposal ref. xxxx, Giulia email ref. 23 April 2015 at 17:28, proposal ref. xxxx and invoices numbered 6988, 7002, 7003, 7018 and 7037.

B. The Defendant’s Initial Submission

15. The Defendant responded, defending against all of the claim. While the Defendant agreed that it employed the Claimant to provide professional Quality Surveying services, it argued that there were a number of problems with the services provided by the Claimant, specifically with continuity of service and the level of expertise of the staff provided. Furthermore there was dispute as to the rate increases above the amounts originally agreed upon.

16. The Defendant argued that the Claimant became aware of discrepancies in the accounting in mid-2015 and requested that the Defendant stop payments until the problems could be resolved and adjusted invoices could be provided. This effort resulted in a Credit Note being issued in June 2015, but the Defendant alleges that this credit was insufficient to cover the amount overpaid.

17. The Defendant highlighted its efforts to resolve the issues amicably with the Claimant, including issues about the quality of service, hours and amounts invoiced. The Defendant acknowledges that the Claimant generally had the same attitude, at least until 15 September 2015 when the Claimant issued a demand for payment of AED 80,851.01 within two days.

18. The Defendant argues that it tried to resolve the dispute but the Claimant ignored attempts at resolution and instead stopped providing the services it had contractually agreed to provide. The Defendant alleges that this stoppage was a breach of the contract between the parties. The Claimant ceased providing services immediately and did not wait one month as required by the contract and the Defendant claims that it was forced to make other arrangements to cover the services that the Claimant ceased providing at a significant additional cost.

19.The Defendant provided a Final Account Statement detailing the amounts invoiced by the Claimant, the amounts allegedly over-invoiced by the Claimant, payments already made by the Defendant and adjustments for costs incurred by the Defendant. According to the Defendant’s Final Account Statement, the Defendant owed a total of AED 855,297.76 to the Claimant, the Defendant paid a total of AED 835,151.82 to the Claimant, and thus, the Defendant still owed to the Claimant an amount totalling AED 20,145.95.

20. The Defendant highlights that the Claimant has not made any adjustment to its claims for the reduced level of service provided, the time wasted in handing over the project to new staff, and the risk and costs incurred by the failure to provide sufficient notice for the stoppage of work. The Defendant reserves its right to claim the additional costs of employing new consultants at higher rates.

C. The Claimant’s Post-Hearing Submission

21. After the hearing, the parties provided additional submissions to summarise their arguments. The Claimant filed a document entitled “Statement of Claim” with a number of attachments and the Defendant filed their “Answer and Defence to the Statement of Claim” with two attachments.

22. The Statement of Claim outlines the Claimant’s arguments with regard to the allegedly unpaid invoices. The Claimant points to non-payment of several invoices as the source of dispute, triggering the Claimant to issue a demand for payment by 17 September 2015. The Claimant summarises that the Defendant made no attempt at payment pursuant to the demand letter and this forced the Claimant to suspend their services. The Defendant then issued a Notice of Termination on 29 September 2016 which indicated the Defendant’s intention to retroactively review the previously issued invoices over the last 12 months to make reductions. The Claimant contends that this was a violation of the Consultancy Agreements.

23. The Claimant details the history of the two Consultancy Agreements, highlighting the increased fees charged in the second agreement. They contend that the First Consultancy Agreement was entered into for the supply of “Contract Administration Support Services” regarding the Project 1, 2 & 3 projects. The Claimant contends that the First Consultancy Agreement was not intended to cover additional and more complex claims management services although such language was included in the agreement. The First Consultancy agreement included a contract fee of AED 60,000 per month calculated pursuant to 195 hours of work by a “Senior Contracts Administrator” at the cost of AED 307.69 per hour.

24. The Claimant contends that the Second Consultancy Agreement, which applied to the Project 2 project in Abu Dhabi, included provisions for both “Contract Administration Support Services” and additionally was intended to cover claims management. Although the language was the same as the First Consultancy Agreement, this different intention was evidenced by the inclusion of specific rates for claims work. The monthly retainer payment under the Second Consultancy Agreement was AED 90,000. The payment breakdown included rates and hours for “Contract Admin” work and higher rates for “Claims Prep” work.

25. The Claimant argues that after the second Consultancy Agreement was executed, both parties acknowledged that the new rates for the claims preparation work would apply through the end of the year, although the Claimant would continue to charge the original rate for services on the Project 1 project as detailed in the First Consultancy Agreement until the end of 2014.

26. The Claimant contends that there was an understanding that the rates would increase in the New Year 2015, as the rates listed in the First and Second Consultancy Agreements were up for renewal at this time. The contracts state that the fees are “subject to an internal review and possible increase for the period January 1st 2015 and annually thereafter.”

27. The Claimant argues that the parties sought to agree on new rates to be applied in 2015 but the negotiations were difficult and prolonged. Therefore, there was no valid agreement as to the rates in 2015. The Claimant confirms that it proceeded to charge the higher rates already listed in the Second Consultancy Agreement for the period from January 2015 until April 2015. On 23 April 2015, the parties finally reached an agreement on the rates to be charged. This included “Contract Admin Work” at the original rate plus 10% and “EOT Work” on an hourly basis based on the prices listed in the Second Consultancy Agreement.

28. The Claimant admits that the rates charged from January 2015 until March 2015 were higher than the rates eventually agreed between the parties and thus, there was a discrepancy in the accounts which required the Claimant to issue a credit note and revised accounting statements. According to the Claimant, the overpayment in the account was AED 35,926.04 by the end of March 2015.

29. The Claimant contends that once the overpayment was recognised, it acted properly by informing the Defendant to stop payments until the issue was resolved and the credit note was issued. The Claimant argues that due to the large amount of work being performed at this time, the overpayment was reduced to AED 3,529.65 by the end of June 2015 and by the end of July 2015, the Defendant owed the Claimant a total of AED 129,196. Thus, the Claimant argues, the overpayment was reduced due to credit notes, work performed and reduced invoices during this time.

30. Based on this history, the Claimant contends that the Defendant was aware of the amounts it owed the Claimant and was not withholding payments from May 2015 to September 2015 based on the direction of the Claimant. Instead, by 15 September 2015, the Defendant had an outstanding balance of AED 124,935.63 with AED 80,851.01 being long overdue. The Claimant acknowledges that in early September, the Defendant did pay two overdue invoices in the total amount of AED 65,000. The Claimant argues that this shows that the Defendant knew about the overdue invoices and was capable of paying them.

31. Thus, the Claimant argues that it was in its legal right to suspend its services for non-payment of invoices especially based on the UAE Civil Transactions Law, Article 247 which allows for either party to abstain from performing their obligations if the other contracting party fails to perform their obligations. The Claimant contends that it was not required to provide a certain notice period under UAE law or under the Consultancy Agreements. Thus there is no valid claim that the Claimant failed to provide some required notice of its intention to suspend services.

32. After the Claimant demanded payment on 15 September 2015, the Defendant responded on 17 September 2015 seeking clarification of the Claimant’s intent to suspend services so the Defendant could make other arrangements. The Claimant took this notice as a threat to terminate the contract.

33. On 29 September 2015, the Defendant sent a letter containing notice, pursuant to Clause 2.9 of the Agreements that the services and Consultancy Agreements would be terminated. The Claimant replied on 6 October 2015 that it had not breached the Agreement and was willing to participate in settlement discussions.

34. The Defendant replied on 27 October 2015. The Claimant contends that this reply was disingenuous and that the Defendant clearly wished to terminate the contract. The Claimant confirms that it was the Defendant who terminated the Agreements by issuing notice and triggering Clause 2.9 of the Agreements.

35. As the Claimant contends that the Defendant was the one to terminate the contract, the Claimant also argues that it is nonsensical for the party to terminate an agreement to then claim for the expenses caused by the same termination. The Claimant argues that none of these costs relevant to the termination are recoverable under the contract.

36. In sum, the Claimant contends that it had binding Consultancy Agreements with the Defendant, the Defendant breached those agreements by failing to pay the amounts due and that the Claimant therefore had a legal right to suspend service for non-payment. The Claimant alleges that the Defendant then terminated the Agreements without paying the outstanding amounts due. In total, the Claimant claims that the Defendant owes AED 158,274.09 as detailed in Appendix – A of the Claimant’s post-hearing submission. The Claimant also seeks reimbursement of legal costs in the amount of AED 64,000 and interest on the late payments.

D. The Defendant’s Post-Hearing Submission

37. The Defendant submitted its Answer and Defence to the Statement of Claim on 27 April 2016. In the submission, the Defendant admits to entering into two Consultancy Agreements with the Claimant.

38. The Defendant claims that from August 2014 there were many discrepancies in the invoices received from the Claimant which the Defendant brought to the Claimant’s attention. The Defendant points out that they continued to make payments during this time, although the accounts were incorrect.

39. The Defendant contends that the Claimant suspended work in bad faith when the Defendant was willing to come to a settlement and had just made a payment of AED 65,000 showing their willingness to continue the relationship.

40. The Defendant claims that it had no choice but to terminate the services of the Claimant, giving consideration to the Claimant’s continuing actions and the Defendant’s responsibilities to its clients. Upon termination of the Agreements, the Defendant contends that it was already reviewing the work done and invoices issued by the Claimant.

41. The Defendant encourages the Court to refer to the Consultancy Agreements when identifying the scope of work agreed upon, rather than deferring to the Claimant’s submissions. Further, the Defendant contends that the Second Consultancy Agreement was meant to provide an additional Consultant to assist on one project. It was not meant that the original Consultant would be charged at a new rate. This is evidenced in invoices issued after the Second Consultancy Agreement, where the original Consultant was still charged at the original rate. Therefore, it seems that the Defendant has amended the invoiced amounts to reflect that any work done by the original consultant, Mr CR, be charged at the original rate of 195 hours for AED 60,000 as reflected in Appendix – AR.

42. The Defendant claims that it was not aware of any internal discussion in the Claimant’s company regarding any intention to charge at a lower rate after the Second Consultancy Agreement was signed to give the Defendant the benefit of the lower rate. Furthermore, the Defendant argues that it had not agreed upon any increased rates at the end of 2014.

43. With regard to Clause 2.1 of the First Consultancy Agreement and Clause 2 of the Second Consultancy Agreement stating that increases in rates may apply at the end of 2014, the Defendant contends that the Claimant could have offered increased rates, but it was at the Defendant’s discretion to accept those increased rates.

44. The Defendant goes on to state that the Claimant sought to increase the rates by an unreasonable amount. The inability to agree on new rates was due to the Claimant’s unreasonable offers. Had the Claimant offered reasonable rates, the parties would have agreed on new rates much sooner than 26 April 2015. The Defendant points out that the Claimant could have terminated the agreement if the increased rates discussion was taking too long.

45. The Defendant argues that in the absence of new, agreed upon rates, the value of the work done must be assessed based on the existing agreements. Any payments made during the beginning of 2015 do not show an acceptance of the incorrect rates being charged.

46. The Defendant argues that the increased invoicing issued by the Claimant from January to March 2015 was intentional and untrustworthy. The Defendant paid the invoices trusting the amounts, not accepting the increase.

47. The Defendant argues that it is established that the Claimant over invoiced and have refused to adhere to the provisions of the Consultancy Agreements. The Claimant admitted to over invoicing and sought a stoppage of payments to remedy this error and thus the Defendant feels the remaining invoices are just as unsubstantiated.

48. The Defendant argues that the 23 April 2015 agreement for new rates was actually finalised on 26 April 2015[1] and that the terms of this agreement were still governed by the First Consultancy Agreement. The Defendant goes on to state that the amounts listed in the Claimant’s Submissions are unsubstantiated and not agreed upon by the Defendant.

49. The Defendant highlights that it made payments continuously to the Claimant until asked to stop due to over invoicing. The Defendant states that there was considerable uncertainty in the accounts and thus the figures presented in the Claimant’s Submission are contested. The Defendant submitted its own summary of invoices and payments at Appendix – AR of its post-hearing submission. This Appendix detailed a current credit owed of AED 164,919 as against any amounts due. While Appendix – AR is not very clearly explained, it seems that the Defendant has reduced the rates charged for any done by Senior Contract Administrator Mr CR to the original rate of 195 hours for AED 60,000, regardless of the project billed or the date of the work invoiced.

50. The Defendant argues that there were no amounts due and payable to the Claimant and thus the action of suspending works was without reason and contrary to the terms of the Agreements. Instead, the Defendant made a payment of AED 65,000 in good faith, not knowing the actual amounts due. The Claimant then demanded payment dishonestly and threatened to suspend services. The Defendant argues that it had no choice but to terminate the Agreements as it had commitments to clients that it needed to meet.

51. In conclusion, the Defendant alleges that the Claimant’s submission is misleading. The Defendant asks that the Claimant pay AED 100,000 as compensation to Giulia Limited for filing frivolous litigation.

52. Finally, the Claimant requested that the Court throw out the Defendant’s final submission for lateness and for including an unauthorised counterclaim.

53. The dispute was then reserved for judgment based on the hearing and subsequent submissions from the parties.

Finding

A. Jurisdiction and Applicable Law

54. Both of the Consultancy Agreements detail in the section entitled “General Terms & Conditions” that “[s]hould amicable settlement discussions not be successful or the period expires the Parties agree to refer any dispute or difference arising out of or in connection with this Consultancy Contract, including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the Dubai International Financial Centre and where financially appropriate the Small Claims Tribunal.” Thus, the parties have opted-in to DIFC Courts jurisdiction and are properly before the Small Claims Tribunal based on the amount of the disputed claim.

55. The parties are in agreement that they entered into two valid Consultancy Agreement contracts. The dispute arises over the entitlement to increase or reduce the fees owed under the Consultancy Agreements, the history of payments between the parties, and the legal right to suspend the services or terminate the contracts.

56. As the parties did not specify what law would apply to their Consultancy Agreements but did specify that the DIFC Courts would have exclusive jurisdiction, it is appropriate for the Court to apply DIFC law to the dispute at hand, rather than UAE law, which has not been agreed upon by the parties. Therefore, the DIFC Contract Law, DIFC Law No. 6 of 2004 (“DIFC Contract Law”) shall apply to this dispute. I will therefore take these issues in the order they occurred, with due reference to the DIFC Contracts Law.

B. General Court Findings as to the Financial Summaries

57. Generally, I have undertaken a detailed review of the summaries, invoices and time sheets provided to the Court in order to understand the history of invoices, payments and the resulting dispute. Much of this detailed review is reflected in the analysis below, especially as to the adjusted rates to be charged in 2015 and the inconsistencies and errors found in the invoicing as compared to the time sheets provided. I have worked with what was provided by the parties.

58. Based on my careful review of the documents, the total amount originally invoiced by the Claimant was AED 1,048,917.15[2]. The Claimant subsequently adjusted some invoices such that the total amount invoiced was actually AED 993,426.22. Based on the agreed total of payments from the Defendant of AED 835,151.82, this leaves a disputed and allegedly unpaid amount of AED 158,274.40[3].

59. The Defendant contests this amount, providing further reductions to invoices in their Appendix – AR. These reductions total AED 164,916.00 that the Defendant argues should be reduced from the invoiced amount, although it is important to note that this amount does not include the amounts already reduced by the Claimant. Therefore, the Defendant claims they owe a total of AED 879,775 as reflected on page 7 of Appendix – AR. Based on their agreed payment history of AED 835,151.82 the Defendant would owe a further AED 44,623.18 (calculated as the undisputed amount paid of AED 835,151.81 subtracted from the Defendant’s alleged total invoice amount of AED 879,775).

60. Therefore, the difference between the parties’ claimed amounts owed is AED 113,651.22: the difference between the Claimant’s claimed amount owed of AED 158,274.40 and the Defendant’s concession of AED 44,623.18.

61. The Court has made further adjustments to the amount owed as detailed below based on the outcome of the relevant legal issues.

C. Entitlement to Increase Fees

62. As for the entitlement to increased fees under the Consultancy Agreement, it is undisputed that both Consultancy Agreements included the relevant language that “[t]he lump sum monthly retainer fee is fixed for the period of December 31st Thereafter it is subject to our internal review and possible increase for the period January 1st 2015 and annually thereafter.” It is clear from the wording of the agreements that the parties were due to negotiate potentially increased fees as of January 2015 but there was no requirement to do so. Furthermore, although not explicitly stated, the implication is that the parties would agree to the new rates; the Claimant was not entitled to set them unilaterally. Thus, the parties had to agree on the fees and it was incorrect for the Claimant to pre-emptively charge increased fees before an agreement was reached.

63. The parties did agree on new fees to apply to the Consultancy Agreements moving forward. It is disputed when this new agreement was actually made and for what period it applies. The Claimant contends that the new rate agreement was made via email on 23 April 2015 and should apply for the entire of 2015 and thus it adjusted the accounts to address this change such that there is still an underpayment of AED 158,274.09 on the books. The new rates were to mirror the old rates for Contract Administration Work, plus an additional 10% and charged EOT work on an hourly basis. The Defendant contests this, stating that the email of 23 April 2015 was purely an offer from the Claimant and the actual agreement was made on 26 April 2015 via email from the Defendant confirming acceptance of the new terms.

64. Regardless of the date of agreement for the new payment terms, the real dispute remains over whether those new terms applied to the entirety of 2015 or only for those works performed after the new rates were agreed upon. The Claimant argues for the entire year, having allegedly adjusted their early-2015 invoices to reflect the new amounts. The Defendant argues that in the absence of a new agreement, the additional work done in early-2015 would need to be charged based on the existing agreements.

65. As the parties were not in agreement until at least 23 April 2015 as to the new rates to charge for services provided, it is only appropriate that the Claimant charge at the previously agreed upon rates up until that point. The Claimant cannot charge the new, increased rates for January 2015 until April 2015 unless the Defendant agrees to such a charge and the Defendant has not agreed. The Claimant was free to terminate the agreement based on the Consultancy Agreements if the agreed upon rates were too low for the services provided.

66. Based on this finding, the Invoices numbered 6884, 6888, 6903, 6904, 6914 and 6915 for work performed in January 2015 until March 2015 must be further adjusted to reflect the original agreed upon rates.

Invoice Number

Date Project[4] Amount Originally Invoiced Claimant’s Adjusted Amount

Court’s Further Adjustment

6884 2/8/2015  

P1

AED 30,140.50 AED 16,669.23 AED 16,692.31
6888 2/11/2015 P2 AED 59,427.89 AED 61,044.23 AED 51,507.69
6903 3/10/2015 P1 AED 61,945.00 AED 36,215.38 AED 34,307.69
6904 3/10/2015 P2 AED 15,332.52 AED 17,378.08 AED 13,892.31
6914 4/2/2015 P1 AED 49,725.00 AED 28,261.54 AED 27,538.46
6915 4/2/2015 P2 AED 8,377.60 AED 9,887.50 AED 7,717.95
    TOTALS: AED 224,946.89 AED 169,455.96 AED 151,656.41

67. The above chart shows the need to further adjust these relevant invoices down to a total of AED 151,656.41, serving to reduce the Claimant’s claim by AED 17,799.55 from AED 158,274.40 to AED 140,474.85.

68. Next, I must determine when the new rates actually came into effect. The Claimant argues that the new rates applied from 23 April 2015 while the Claimant argues that the agreement was actually made on 26 April 2015. The email of 23 April 2015 from the Defendant to the Claimant upon which the Claimant relies states a proposed rate scheme and then continues “[i]f this is agreeable, I will review the hourly rates . . .” The use of the term “if this is agreeable” implies that the Claimant is asked to accept the offer contained in the email for proposed rates. The 26 April 2015 email from the Claimant to the Defendant upon which the Defendant relies confirms the rates proposed by the Defendant. Thus, the offer for new rates was properly accepted on 26 April 2016 and from that date moving forward it was appropriate for the Claimant to bill the Defendant at the new rates.

69. Based on this determination, there may be an additional calculation that must occur for Invoices 6947, 6948 and 6949 which include work done both before and after the new rates were agreed upon in April 2015. Upon review, Invoice 6947 is likely for work done on 29 April 2015 and therefore the new rates are properly applied to this invoice and no change is necessary.

70. Skipping to Invoice 6949, this invoice is for 0.75 hours under the Lump Sum time from Mr TA and 92.5 hours under the Lump Sum time from Mr CR for work performed in April 2015 on the Project 2. According to the time sheets corresponding to this invoice, the 0.75 hours billed from Mr A were worked after 26 April 2015 and are therefore correctly charged at the new rates. 66.5 of the 92.5 hours worked by Mr R were from before 26 April 2015 while 28 hours were worked on 26 April 2016 onwards. This brings light to the fact that on this particular invoice, the Claimant seems to have undercharged the Defendant by 2 hours as Mr R’s total hours for the relevant time sheets is 94.5 as compared to the 92.5 hours billed. This 94.5 hours does include 5.5 hours billed for EoT time all worked after 26 April 2015, which therefore shouldn’t be added to this particular invoice for Lump Sum Contracts work. This means that the Claimant actually overcharged by 3.5 hours, taking into account the 2 hours seemingly undercharged. Therefore, this invoice must be recalculated based on the original rates as to a total of 66.5 hours of Mr R’s time and further reduced by removing 3.5 hours incorrectly invoiced at the new rates. This results in a new invoice amount of AED 29,353.85, which includes AED 600 for Mr A’s time, 66.5 hours of Mr R’s time at the original rate of AED 60,000 for 195 hours and 22.5 hours of Mr R’s time at the new rate of AED 66,000 for 195 hours. This calculation differs slightly from the Defendant’s submission which recalculates this invoice using the original rate for all of Mr R’s work, but comes to a similar amount. This recalculation requires a reduction of AED 3,230.78 with the original invoice charging AED 31,910.40. This takes the total owed by the Defendant down to AED 137,244.07.

71. Invoice 6948 provides some further problems. This Invoice is for 1.25 hours of EoT/Cost Claim time from Trevor Anscombe and 29.5 hours of EoT/Cost Claim time from Mr C, Mr R. This Invoice is for work performed from January 2015 through April 2015 on the Project 2. According to the time sheets corresponding to this Invoice, the 1.25 hours billed from Mr Anscombe were worked before 26 April 2015. 24 of the 29.5 hours worked by Mr R were from before 26 April 2015 while 5.5 hours were worked on 26 April 2016 onwards. These 5.5 hours include the 3.5 hours incorrectly billed in Invoice 6949. Therefore, this Invoice must be recalculated based on the original rates as to a total of 25.25 hours. Upon further review of this particular Invoice, it seems that all of the hours billed for Mr.R, except for the 5.5 from after 26 April 2015 were already billed to the Defendant on previous Invoices including the same work descriptions and work dates (see work details for invoices 6884, 6903, 6914 and 6949 as compared to the work details for invoice 6948).

Date

Description from time sheet for Invoice 6948

Previous Description from time sheets for Invoices 6884, 6903, 6914, and 6949

01/04/2015 Meet with QS and planner to discuss impacting the new programme for the works with delay notices. Review impacted programme with planner, assist in drafting delay event record table and how the cover notice should read. Should receive AFC progress for December tomorrow, impacted programme will be sent over to check. Meet with QS and planner to discuss impacting the new programme for the works with delay notices

Review impacted programme with planner, assist in drafting delay event record table and how the cover notice should read

Should receive AFC progress for December tomorrow, impacted programme will be sent over to check.

01/22/2015 Review impacted programme with planner, draft cover notice and submit. Review inpacted programme with planner, draft cover notice and submit [sic]
02/04/2015 Draft response to Impacted Programme letter received from AFC. Draft response to Impacted Programme letter received from AFC
02/05/2015 Response to impacted programme drafted and sent. Resppnse to impacted programme drafted and sent [sic]
02/19/2015 Review impacted programme for end January, extension to completion dates and impacts of each event. Draft cover letter for impacted programme. Review impacted programme for end January, extension to completion dates and impacts of each event

Draft cover letter for impacted programme

03/09/2015 Meeting with AFC in regards to mitigating employer delays and possible costs which would be incurred. Review impacted programme up to end February 2015, draft cover letter and submit. Meeting with AFC in regards to mitigating employer delays and possible costs which would be incurred

Review impacted programme up to end February 2015, draft cover letter and submit

03/24/2015 Respond to Impacted Programme of Works letter. Respond to Impacted Programme of Works letter
03/30/2015 Draft response to Impacted Programme of Works letter Draft response to Impacted Programme of Works letter
04/05/2015 Meeting with Planner to discuss impacted programme. Meeting with AFC to discuss impacted programme and request to submit EOT claim. Meeting with Planner to discuss impacted programme

Meeting with AFC to discuss impacted programme and request to submit EOT claim

04/09/2015 Review impacted programme for end of March and draft cover / eot claim letter and submit Review impacted programme for end of March and draft cover / eot claim letter and submit
04/20/2015 Meet with planner to discuss EOT, spoke with AFC planner, not on site today. Meet with planner to discuss EOT, spoke with AFC planner, not on site today
04/21/2015 Draft overall response to mitigation plan and delays recorded against the Baseline Programme. Draft overall response to mitigation plan and delays recorded against the Baseline Programme

While these charges were originally billed as Contract Administrator or Lump Sum amounts, the charges in Invoice 6948 are for EoT work, which may indicate why there was a change. Still, nothing the Claimant has submitted proves to the Court that these are not duplicate charges. Therefore, other than the 5.5 hours charged at post 26 April 2015 rates and the 1.25 hours for Mr A billed at the original rates for Project 2, the remainder of this invoice should be reimbursed. The Defendant’s submission regarding this invoice discounted Mr R’s hours from 29.5 to 14 and then recalculated the invoice amount using the old rates but the Court finds its own calculation to be more appropriate. The new invoice amount calculated by the Court is AED 3,492.11 (including AED 384.61 for Mr A’s time and AED 3,107.50 for Mr R’s time), compared to AED 17,667.50. This results in further AED 14,175.39 being deducted from the amount owed by the Defendant bringing the total down to AED 123,068.69.

D. The Defendant’s Entitlement to Decrease Fees

72. The above detailed review of the invoicing does give support to the Defendant’s argument that the general invoicing practice contained errors. Based on this argument, the Defendant has made a number of unilateral decreases to the invoiced amounts provided by the Claimant, reducing hours worked and amounts due as reflected in the Defendant’s submission entitled “Appendix – AR”.

73. Specifically, it seems that the Defendant has reduced any work done by Senior Contracts Administrator Mr CR to the original agreed upon rates charged for the Project 2 project in 2014. Even after new rates were agreed and when Mr R worked on different projects and in different roles (EoT work as opposed to work covered by the Lump Sum). The Defendant claims that these reductions are appropriate and that they brought up their discrepancies with the Claimant before this case began. There is some merit to their statements as there is evidence of ongoing confusion and error in the accounts. But, it seems that the parties generally worked together to remedy these challenges. Furthermore, the Defendant has not provided any proof as to why such changes to the accounts and invoices should be made. There is no documentation to indicate that Mr R’s work was meant to be billed at these original rates at all times.

74. Appendix – AR reflects an alleged over charge of AED 164,919 after the Defendant’s reductions, although the Defendant does not submit any further evidence or documentation to justify these reductions beyond the amounts already admitted by the Claimant for overcharging. Beyond what the Court can surmise from the documents provided, there is no evidence showing why further deduction should be made. Thus, the Court cannot accept these reductions in total as they fail to meet any standard of proof and should have been substantiated in order to receive further consideration.

E. Dispute Over the History of Payments and Invoicing

75. The parties have included submissions summarising the invoiced amounts over the term of the Consultancy Agreements. The Defendant has also indicated the amount it argues it should have been charged given the alleged poor service and additional costs caused by the Claimant. While the Claimant comes to the conclusion, based on their account summary, that the Defendant owes them AED 158,274.09, the Defendant contends based on their account summary that they must reduce the invoices by AED 164,919.

76. These contrary filings represent significant disagreement over the history of invoices although it is important to note that there is no dispute between the parties about the amounts already paid by the Defendant to the Claimant. The dispute remains over how much remains to be paid.

77. These conflicting statement of accounts have caused the Court to take a careful look at the invoices and corresponding time sheets provided by the Claimant to substantiate their invoicing. As mentioned above, the Court has decided to dismiss the Defendant’s unsubstantiated reductions in hours and rates as reflected in Appendix – AR in favour of the Court’s careful review as reflected above and continued here.

78. There are a number of issues with the invoicing and time sheets as provided to the Court. I cannot be sure if the lack of documentation in some areas is due to oversight or reflects a lack of evidence to support these specific figures. I will take each issue with the history of invoicing in turn.

79. First, there is no documentation provided by the Claimant for invoices 6744, 6764 and 6780, although the amounts for these invoices are reflected in the financial summaries provided by both parties. As there is little dispute between the parties on these three invoices, the Court will allow them to stand as is, even without the supporting documentation.

80. Second, as to invoice 6888, the Claimant has not provided time sheets to substantiate the hours charged for two individuals. The 4.5 hours charged for Mr.T A’s time and the 36 hours charged for Mr GWC’s time are not substantiated by corresponding time sheets as provided for the other invoices. As there are time sheets to substantiate virtually all of the other invoices, the Court deems that the Claimant has not met its burden of proof to show that these amounts were properly charged. Still, the Defendant has not challenged these particular charges as Appendix – AR does not reflect any adjustment to these two line items from Invoice 6888. Therefore, it is appropriate to leave these charges as is.

81. Third, as to invoice 6914, it seems that the Claimant has over invoiced by 1 hour. The listed time worked by Mr R is 89.5 hours but there are only 88.5 hours reflected in the attached time sheets as to the Project 2 project and therefore, this invoice should be reduced by one hour to the amount of AED 27,230.77, further reducing the alleged amount owed to AED 122,760.99.

82. Fourth, as already mentioned above, invoice 6948 includes substantial issues which have been addressed and reflected in the adjusted amounts.

83. Fifth, as also already addressed above, invoice 6949 seems to be under charged by 2 hours but is actually over charged by 3.5 hours due to duplications with invoice 6948. This is also been adjusted in the amount owed.

84. Sixth, as to invoice 6971, the Claimant has not included the time sheets to substantiate the hours of one individual, namely the 98.5 hours charged for work done by Mr CR. As there are time sheets to substantiate virtually all of the other invoices, the Court deems that the Claimant has not met its burden of proof to show that these amounts were properly charged. The Defendant has reduced these particular hours to the original rate of 195 hours at AED 60,000 in their Appendix – AR. Therefore, as the Claimant has not substantiated these charges and the Defendant has reduced them to the original rates, the Court deems it appropriate reflect the Defendant’s reduction in this case. This requires recalculating the 98.5 hours charged to the original rate, changing the total invoice amount to AED 32,306.00 and reducing the alleged amount owed further to AED 119,728.53.

F. Right to Suspend Services

85. The parties further argue about the termination of their Consultancy Agreements. The Claimant alleges a legal right to suspend services due to non-payment by the Defendant, pursuant to UAE Civil Transactions Law, Article 247. The Defendant responds that no such right was available and instead that the Claimant breached the Agreements by suspending services.

86. The relevant law, as mentioned above, is not UAE Civil Transaction Law but the DIFC Contract Law. The relevant provision is Section 79 which states “[w]here the parties are to perform simultaneously, either party may withhold performance until the other party tenders performance.”

87. The Consultancy Agreements, as written, indicate a simultaneous performance structure, as evidenced by Clause 3(ii)(a) which states “[i]nterim monthly payments are payable maximum 30 days from invoice date substantiated by daily records of work done submitted vide our weekly reports”. Therefore, the work done needed to be paid 30 days after invoiced and simultaneously with further work provided and not yet invoiced or yet due to be paid.

88. Both parties agree that at least AED 44,623.18 was due to the Claimant at the time of the Claimant’s suspension of services. In fact, the Court has found that by 17 September 2015, the date of the suspension of services, the Defendant owed the Claimant AED 120,405.46. This amount can be lessened by the AED 44,084.62 and AED 33,338.46 invoiced on 7 September 2015 and 11 October 2015 respectively, leaving AED 42,982.38 as over 30 days past due.

89. This past due amount gave the Claimant the right to suspend services as per Section 79 of the DIFC Contract Law. The Claimant did not purport to terminate the contracts and instead sought to suspend services until payment of the overdue amounts were paid. The Claimant was not outside of its legal right to do so.

G. Right to Terminate the Agreements

90. The Defendant responded to the suspension of services on 29 September 2015 with notice of termination pursuant to Clause 2.9 of the Consultancy Agreements stating that the Claimant had breached the contracts by suspending service.

91. Clause 2.9 of the Consultancy Agreements states that “[o]ne month’s written notice by either party to terminate our services and the Consultancy Agreement is required.” The Consultancy Agreements do not provide any further qualifications on the parties’ rights to terminate the agreements.

92. As the Defendant needed no reason to trigger Clause 2.9 notice and as the Defendant gave notice pursuant to Clause 2.9, there is no reason by which the Defendant can be found in breach of the Consultancy Agreements for terminating them with 30 days’ notice. The Defendant may have been in breach for long overdue payments over which there was dispute, but the Court makes no finding as to that issue.

93. Therefore, the Defendant was within its right to terminate the agreements.

Conclusion

94. Based on the above, the Claimant’s alleged claim value of AED 158,274.40 has been reduced for amounts invoiced at incorrect rates, for duplicative charges, for incorrect invoicing and for failure to provide substantiation of the invoiced amounts. In total, this amount has been reduced to AED 119,728.53 owed to the Claimant from the Defendant.

95. Neither party has been found in breach of the Consultancy Agreements. The Defendant’s claim against the Claimant is dismissed for incorrectly filing a counterclaim and for failure to substantiate that claim with proof. The Claimant’s claim for legal costs and interest are dismissed as well.

96. Therefore, the Defendant is required to provide the Claimant with AED 119,728.53 in full and final resolution of the claims between the parties.

97. Each party shall bear their own costs.

 

Issued by:

Maha Al Mehairi

Judicial Officer

Date of issue: 31 May 2016

At: 11am

The post Gilmore Associates Limited v Giulia Limited appeared first on DIFC Courts.

CFI 013/2016 Oger Dubai LLC v DAMAN Real Estate Capital Partners Limited

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Claim No: CFI 013/2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE JUSTICE SIR RICHARD FIELD

BETWEEN

OGER DUBAI LLC

                                                                                                Claimant

and

 

DAMAN REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS LIMITED

                                                                                                Defendant 

 

Hearing:            16 May 2016

Counsel:           Sean Brannigan QC instructed by Clyde & Co for the Claimant

David Allison QC instructed by Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP for the Defendant

Judgment:        16 June 2016


AMENDED JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF JUSTICE SIR RICHARD FIELD


Summary of Judgment 

In this case, Justice Sir Richard Field orders that the Defendant be wound up in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 5 of the DIFC Insolvency Law and the Insolvency Regulations, with his winding up order being stayed for 7 days to give the Defendant the opportunity to apply to the Court of Appeal for a further stay pending appeal, if so advised.

The Claimant had lodged a petition to wind up the Defendant with the DIFC Courts on 18 April 2016. The Claimant had referred a dispute with the Defendant to arbitration. By an award (“Award”) dated 19 July 2015, a DIAC arbitral Tribunal had awarded the Claimant AED 964,906,637.25. On 29 July 2015 the Defendant applied to the Dubai Courts for an annulment of the award on various grounds including that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. On 13 August 2015 the Claimant issued a DIFC Courts claim form seeking recognition and enforcement of the Award.  On 26 September 2015, Sir John Chadwick (then DCJ), granted an ex parte freezing injunction over the Defendant’s assets. The Claimant’s recognition and enforcement application and its application to continue the ex parte freezing injunction granted by Sir John Chadwick were heard by Justice Sir David Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015. Justice Steel concluded that in light of the Defendant’s assurance that a decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance would be available in about three months, the right order to make was that on condition that security for the award inclusive of costs was posted within 21 days, the Claimant’s enforcement application would be adjourned for four months.

Justice Steel’s decision was embodied in an order of the Court issued on 30 December 2015 (the “Enforcement Order”) which provided that if the Defendant did not provide security in respect of satisfaction of the Award in the sum of USD 266,494,203 by 4pm on 29 December 2015 in a form reasonably acceptable to the Claimant, the Award would immediately thereafter and without further order of the Court be deemed and stand as recognised pursuant to Article 43 of the DIFC Arbitration Law. Justice Steel also continued the freezing injunction granted by DCJ Chadwick until further order of the Court.

On 27 January 2016, the Dubai Court of First Instance dismissed the Defendant’s annulment application on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain it. On 22 December 2015, the Defendant issued an appellant’s notice seeking permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and a stay of that Order. Following a hearing on 19 January 2016, H.E. Justice Omar Al Muhairi on 22 February 2016 dismissed both the application seeking permission to appeal and the stay application. On 3 March 2016, the Defendant issued an application pursuant to Rule 44.179 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts seeking permission to re-open Justice Omar’s dismissal of its applications for permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and for a stay of that order. The application was dismissed by the Chief Justice in a decision issued on 14 June 2016 on the grounds that the Defendant had failed to show that: (i) it was necessary to reopen Justice Omar’s order to avoid real injustice; and (ii) the circumstances were exceptional making it appropriate to reopen the appeal.

On 29 March 2016, the Claimant presented its winding-up petition against the Defendant, based on the Defendant’s inability to pay the Award debt, it having failed to pay that debt following two written demands for payment dated 3 August 2015 and 5 October 2015 and it having admitted through its Counsel in the hearing before Justice Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015 that it was not good for the money owed.

On 11 April 2016, Justice Steel made an interim ex parte order restraining the Claimant from proceeding with its winding-up petition and following an inter parties hearing on 15 April 2016, he made an order dated 20 April 2016 (the “Restraining Order”) restraining the Claimant from advertising a petition to wind up the Defendant until the hearing of the Claimant’s winding-up petition. After the hearing on 16 May 2016 of the Claimant’s petition to wind up the Defendant, on 8 June 2016 the Dubai Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendant’s appeal from the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance.

Sir Richard Field held that: the effect of the Enforcement Order is not that the Claimant has a right to a winding-up order on the basis of a final and indisputable judgment debt. Instead, the effect of that order is to allow the Claimant to have recourse to such means of execution as are available to enforce its judgment debt and the Claimant must take those means of execution as it finds them. Moreover, so closely are the Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law based on sections 122 and 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, the practice and procedure of the English courts on winding-up petitions should be broadly applied by the DIFC Courts. In his view, the effect of the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal, taken together with the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance is that the jurisdiction point can no longer be regarded as having a realistic prospect of success even if, which is far from clear to the Court, it is open to the Defendant to seek to appeal to the Court of Cassation. The evidence is that the Defendant is unable to pay its debts as they fall due and in those circumstances a winding-up, which by its nature will have regard to the interests of all of the Defendant’s creditors, seems to be an entirely appropriate means of execution. Furthermore, the concerns that led to the making of the freezing order and the evidence provided on disclosure made under that order that certain valuable villas in Dubai are held in the names of third parties, subject to letters of undertaking in favour of the Defendant, indicate that the sooner the present management of the Defendant is displaced in favour of a liquidator who will be an officer of the court, the better.

 This summary is not part of the Judgment and should not be cited as such 

ORDER

UPON considering the Claimant’s petition to wind up the Defendant dated 18 April 2016 and the Skeleton Arguments filed by both parties in respect thereof

AND UPON considering the Defendant’s applications for a stay or the adjournment of the Claimant’s said winding-up petition and for a stay of the order of Justice Sir David Steel dated 30 December 2015 and the Skeleton Arguments filed by both parties in respect thereof

AND UPON considering the orders of Justice Sir David Steel dated 30 December 2015 and 20 April 2016

AND UPON reading the evidence before the Court

AND UPON considering the documents on the Court File

AND UPON hearing Counsel for both the Claimant and the Defendant on 16 May 2016

AND PURSUANT TO Chapter 5 (Compulsory Winding Up) of DIFC Law No. 3 of 2009 (the “Insolvency Law”) and the DIFC Insolvency Regulations (the “Insolvency Regulations”)

PURSUANT TO Rule 36.40 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts, paragraphs 1 and 17 of this Judgment are amended as reflected by the strikethrough and the underline

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Defendant shall be wound-up in accordance with the Insolvency Law and the Insolvency Regulations and for that purpose Mr Shahab Bilal Sajjad Haider shall be appointed Liquidator.

2. The Defendant’s applications to dismiss and/or stay and/or adjourn the Claimants’ winding-up petition are dismissed.

3. The Defendant’s application to stay the order of Justice Steel dated 30 December 2015 is dismissed.

4. The order made in paragraph 1 shall be stayed for 7 days from the issue of this order to allow the Defendant, if so advised, to apply to the Court of Appeal for a further stay pending an appeal to that court.

5. The amendments made herein to the original Judgment and Order do not affect the validity or the effectiveness of that Judgment and Order or the subsequent Order requiring the Defendant to cease trading as from the date and time of their issue on 16 June 2016.

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of Issue: 16 June 2016

Date of Re-issue: 23 June 2016

At: 12pm

 

JUDGMENT

Background

1.The Claimant referred a dispute with the Defendant to arbitration arising out of the termination by the Defendant of a building contract signed in 2008 which contained an arbitration clause requiring settlement of disputes to be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

2. By an (amended) award dated 19 July 2015 (the “Award”) a DIAC arbitral Tribunal — Mr Charles Manzoni QC SC, Mr Adrian Cole and Mr John Marrin QC (Chairman) — awarded the Claimant AED 964,906,637.25 (USD 262,559,629.18) made up of sums awarded by way of damages; fees and expenses of the Tribunal and DIAC administrative fees; and legal costs, with simple interest at the rate of EIBOR plus 3% p.a. on any sum unpaid 14 days after the date of the Award.

3. On 29 July 2015, the Defendant applied to the Dubai Courts for an annulment of the Award on various grounds including that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

4. The Dubai Chamber of Commerce (“DICC”) was established in 1975. The Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”) was established in 2004. The first set of DIAC Arbitration Rules was ratified and given effect to by Dubai Decree No.11 of 2007. In 2009, those Rules were superseded by a new set of Rules (the “DIAC Rules 2009”) as provided for in Decree No. 58 of 2009. Article 4 of that decree provided:

Rules and By-laws

Article 4.

(a) The arbitration rules in force at the Centre shall apply to all disputes that are referred to the Centre even if the parties to a dispute agreed to apply the Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry Number (12) of 1994.

(b) The arbitration rules in force at the Centre shall apply to all disputes that are referred to the Centre even if the parties to a dispute agreed to apply the Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry No. (12) of 1994.”

5. The Defendant argued before the Tribunal that since the building contract was signed after Dubai Decree No. 11 of 2007 was enacted but before the enactment of Decree No. 58 of 2009, the DIAC Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute.

6. The Tribunal rejected this contention on the ground that Article 4 (a) not only transferred jurisdiction to the DIAC in cases where the contract provides for the DICC Rules to be applied, but operated retrospectively without falling foul of Article 112 of the UAE Constitution[1] in that it was necessary that it should take such effect and such effect was expressly stipulated.

7. In applying to the Dubai Courts for the annulment of the Award, the Defendant contended that the Tribunal had erred in construing Article 4(a) of Decree No 58 of 2009 retroactively so as to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. It is also maintained that: (i) the building contract had been signed without authority; (ii) expert witnesses had wrongly been excluded from the hearing when evidence from the factual witnesses was taken; (iii) a prior condition to arbitration had not been satisfied; and (iv) the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make the costs order it made in favour of the Claimant.

8. On 13 August 2015, the Claimant issued a Claim Form seeking recognition and enforcement of the Award.

9. On 26 September 2015, Sir John Chadwick DCJ, observing that the Defendant’s conduct “points strongly to the conclusion that it is willing to take whatever course seems to be likely to further its own interests without regard to the ordinary considerations of commercial morality or proper conduct of the arbitration proceedings…”, granted ex parte a freezing injunction over the Defendant’s assets.

10. The Claimant’s recognition and enforcement application and its application to continue the ex parte freezing injunction granted by Sir John Chadwick were heard by Justice Sir David Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015. In resisting the former application, the Defendant relied on the matters canvassed in its annulment application to the Dubai Courts.

11. As he did in A v B (ARB 005/2014), Justice Steel adopted the approach articulated by Gross J in IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corp [2005] EWHC 726 (Comm) when considering enforcement of an arbitral award under ss. 101 and 103 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996:

“…the Act does not furnish a threshold test in respect of the grant of an adjournment and the power to order the provision of security in the exercise of the court’s discretion under s.103(5). In my judgment, it would be wrong to read a fetter into this understandably wide discretion (echoing, as it does, Art. VI of the New York Convention). Ordinarily, a number of considerations are likely to be relevant: (i) whether the application before the court in the country of origin is brought bona fide and not simply by way of delaying tactics; (ii) whether the application before the court in the country of origin has at least a real (i.e., realistic) prospect of success … (iii) the extent of the delay occasioned by an adjournment and any resulting prejudice. Beyond such matters, it is probably unwise to generalise; all must depend on the circumstances of the individual case. As it seems to me, the right approach is that of a sliding scale, in any event embodied in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Soleh Boneh v Uganda Govt. [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 208 in the context of the question of security:

“….two important factors must be considered on such an application, although I do not mean to say that there may not be others. The first is the strength of the argument that the award is invalid, as perceived on a brief consideration by the Court which is asked to enforce the award while proceedings to set it aside are pending elsewhere. If the award is manifestly invalid, there should be an adjournment and no order for security; if it is manifestly valid, there should either be an order for immediate enforcement, or else an order for substantial security. In between there will be various degrees of plausibility in the argument for invalidity; and the Judge must be guided by his preliminary conclusion on the point.

The second point is that the Court must consider the ease or difficulty of enforcement of the award, and whether it will be rendered more difficult…if enforcement is delayed. If that is likely to occur, the case for security is stronger; if, on the other hand, there are and always will be insufficient assets within the jurisdiction, the case for security must necessarily be weakened.””

Per Staughton LJ, at p. 212. See too: Fouchard, at p.982; Dardana v Yukos [2002] EWCA Civ 543; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 326 (CA).

12. Justice Steel found that the only contention that had a realistic prospect of success within the Defendant’s annulment application was the jurisdiction point. All the other points were fanciful. In paragraphs 22, 45, 46 and 47 of his judgment delivered on 8 December 2015, he said:

“Not only was the [jurisdiction] point rejected by three respected and experienced arbitrators, Ms Nevin described it as “purely technical and without commercial merit” and that the only justification for raising it was the hope of creating delay and expense. I agree, and, indeed, as the Deputy Chief Justice said, it is entirely consistent with a general policy to frustrate the enforcement of the award by any means.”

“[The Tribunal’s conclusion on the jurisdiction issue] is in accordance with business common sense and in accordance with a purposive reading of the relevant articles and rules.”

“In reaching that conclusion, this distinguished and experienced Tribunal have embarked on a detailed analysis of the issues and the arguments. The Defendant merely proposes to rerun the very same arguments”

“….In the result, despite the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal appeared to have some difficulty in coming to a conclusion on the topic, I regard the prospects of success in pursuing this technical and unmeritorious challenge as, at best, only just overcoming the threshold requirement of having a realistic prospect of success.”

13. In paragraph 56 of his judgment, Justice Steel concluded that in light of the Defendant’s assurance that a decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance would be available in about three months, the right order to make was that on condition that security for the award inclusive of costs was posted within 21 days, the Claimant’s enforcement application would be adjourned for four months.

14. Justice Steel’s decision was embodied in an order of the Court issued on 30 December 2015 (the “Enforcement Order”) which provided that if the Defendant did not provide security in respect of satisfaction of the Award in the sum of USD 266,494,203 by 4pm on 29 December 2015 in a form reasonably acceptable to the Claimant, the Award would immediately thereafter and without further order of the Court be deemed and stand as recognised pursuant to Article 43 of the Arbitration Law and the Claimant shall be at liberty to enforce the Award in the same manner as a judgment or order of the Court pursuant to Article 42 of the Arbitration Law.

15. Justice Steel also continued the freezing injunction granted by DCJ Chadwick until further order of the Court.

16. On 27 January 2016, the Dubai Court of First Instance dismissed the Defendant’s annulment application on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain it.

17. On 22 December 2016 2015, the Defendant issued an appellant’s notice seeking permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and a stay of that Order.

18. Following a hearing on 19 January 2016, H.E. Justice Omar Al Muhairi on 22 February 2016 dismissed both the application seeking permission to appeal and the stay application.

19. On 3 March 2016, the Defendant issued an application pursuant to Rule 44.179 of the Rules of the DIFC Courts seeking permission to re-open Justice Omar’s dismissal of its applications for permission to appeal the Enforcement Order and for a stay of that order. The application was dismissed by the Chief Justice in a decision issued on 14 June 2016 on the grounds that the Defendant had failed to show that: (i) it was necessary to reopen Justice Omar’s order to avoid real injustice; and (ii) the circumstances were exceptional making it appropriate to reopen the appeal.

20. On 29 March 2016, the Claimant presented its winding-up petition against the Defendant by way of a Part 8 Claim Form. The petition is based on the Defendant’s inability to pay the Award debt, it having failed to pay that debt following two written demands for payment dated 3 August 2015 and 5 October 2015 and it having admitted through its Counsel in the hearing before Justice Steel on 6 and 7 December 2015 that it was not good for the money owed.

21. On 11 April 2016, Justice Steel made an interim ex parte order restraining the Claimant from proceeding with its winding-up petition and following an inter parties hearing on 15 April 2016, he made an order dated 20 April 2016 (the “Restraining Order”) restraining the Claimant from advertising a petition to wind up the Defendant until the hearing of the Claimant’s winding-up petition.

22. After the hearing on 16 May 2016 of the Claimant’s petition to wind up the Defendant, on 8 June 2016 the Dubai Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendant’s appeal from the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance.

The relevant provisions of the DIFC Insolvency Law No. 3 of 2009 (the “Insolvency Law”)

23. Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law provide:

“50. Circumstances in which Company may be wound up by the Court

A Company may be wound up by the Court if:

(a) the Company has resolved that the Company be wound up by the Court;

(b) the Company is unable to pay its debts;

(c) at the time at which a moratorium for the Company under Article 9 comes to an end, no voluntary arrangement approved under Part 2 has effect in relation to the Company;

(d) the Court may make such an order pursuant to any provision of or under DIFC Law; or

(e) the Court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the Company should be wound

  1. Definition of inability to pay debts

(1) A Company is deemed unable to pay its debts:

(a) if a creditor to whom the Company is indebted in a sum exceeding $2,000.00 then due has served on the Company a written demand requiring the Company to pay the sum so due and the Company has for 3 weeks thereafter neglected to pay the sum or to agree terms in relation to its payment to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor; or

(b)  if execution or other process issued on a judgment, decree or order of any Court in favour of a creditor of the Company is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; or

(c) if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the Company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due.

(2) A Company is also deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the value of the Company’s current assets is less than the amount of its current liabilities, taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities.”

The parties’ rival contentions

The Claimant’s case

24. It was submitted on behalf of the Claimant that the Enforcement Order, coming into effect as it did following the Defendant’s failure to provide security in the sum of the Award, disentitled the Defendant from arguing that its annulment proceedings in the Dubai Courts precluded the Court from granting the winding-up petition. The effect of the Enforcement Order was that, within the jurisdiction of the DIFC, the resulting judgment debt was final and indisputable.

25. It followed that, since it was common ground that the Defendant could not pay its debts within the meaning and effect of Article 50 of the Insolvency Law, the winding-up petition should be granted.

The Defendant’s case

26. The Defendant argued that the Enforcement Order did not mandate the making of a winding-up order. The question was whether the Court, on the facts before it, should exercise its discretion under Article 50 of the Insolvency Law to order the Defendant’s winding-up.

27. In this connection, the practice and procedure of the English Courts on winding-up petitions was directly applicable in the DIFC Courts on the basis that Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law are based on sections 122 and 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. Under that practice and procedure, the Court will dismiss a winding-up petition where the debt is genuinely disputed on substantial grounds, viz grounds which are real as opposed to frivolous, that is to say they have a realistic prospect of success; see Turner v The Royal Bank of Scotland [2000] BPIR 683, Re Arena Corporation Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 371 (at [53]); Abbey National plc v JSF Finance and Currency Exchange Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 328 (at [46]) and Argentum Lex Wealth Management Ltd v Gianotti [2011] EWCA Civ 1341 (at [17]).

28. In this respect, winding-up stands on a footing different from other means of execution. Thus, where a judgment has been obtained and permission to appeal has been granted but there is no stay of execution pending appeal, execution other than by way of winding-up may be available, but not a winding-up order. This is because: (i) winding-up is a class remedy that is usually the death knell of the company; and (ii) winding-up proceedings are unsuited for determining any dispute about the existence of the debt.

29. The Defendant further submitted that the annulment proceedings in the Dubai Courts were based on grounds that were not frivolous but had a realistic prospect of success. This in effect was the conclusion of Justice Steel in deciding: (i) to stay the Claimant’s enforcement and recognition claim for four months on terms that the Defendant provided security in the sum of the Award; and (ii) granting the Restraining Order over to the hearing of the petition. The Dubai Court of First Instance’s decision to reject the annulment application on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the application was surprising and clearly incorrect. Dubai being the seat of the arbitration, the Dubai Courts plainly had jurisdiction as the appropriate supervisory court to determine the annulment jurisdiction issue.

30. If the Dubai Court of Appeal held that the Dubai Courts had no jurisdiction to review the question of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it was accepted that that would be a very relevant factor for the winding-up court when considering whether Justice Steel’s earlier finding that there was a realistic prospect of success remained a good one.

31. In the alternative, the Court should refuse to make a winding-up order on the ground that to do so would be oppressive and unfair given: (i) that the Defendant’s annulment case in the Dubai Courts has a real, as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success; and (ii) the continuation of the freezing injunction. Further, there were other means of execution open to the Claimant short of winding-up the Defendant.

Discussion and Decision

32. In my judgment, the effect of the Enforcement Order is not that the Claimant has a right to a winding-up order on the basis of a final and indisputable judgment debt. Instead, the effect of that order is to allow the Claimant to have recourse to such means of execution as are available to enforce its judgment debt and the Claimant must take those means of execution as it finds them. I am also of the opinion that, so closely are the Articles 50 and 51 of the Insolvency Law based on sections 122 and 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, the practice and procedure of the English courts on winding-up petitions should be broadly applied by the DIFC Courts.

33. The central question therefore is whether the Defendant’s challenge to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in the Dubai Courts has a realistic prospect of success. In my judgment, the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal upholding the Court of First Instance’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the Defendant’s application is a “game changer”. In his judgment given on 8 December 2015, Justice Steel regarded the Defendant’s prospects of success in pursuing this “technical and unmeritorious challenge” as, at best, only just overcoming the threshold requirement of having a realistic prospect of success. In my view, the effect the decision of the Dubai Court of Appeal, taken together with the decision of the Dubai Court of First Instance is that the jurisdiction point can no longer be regarded as having a realistic prospect of success even if, which is far from clear to the Court, it is open to the Defendant to seek to appeal to the Court of Cassation.

34. I turn then to consider the Defendant’s case that to order a winding-up would be oppressive and unfair. I reject this contention. The evidence is that the Defendant is unable to pay its debts as they fall due and in those circumstances a winding-up, which by its nature will have regard to the interests of all of the Defendant’s creditors, seems to me to be an entirely appropriate means of execution. I also think that the concerns that led to the making of the freezing order and the evidence provided on disclosure made under that order that certain valuable villas in Dubai are held in the names of the third parties, subject to letters of undertaking in favour of the Defendant, indicate that the sooner the present management of the Defendant is displaced in favour of a liquidator who will be an officer of the court, the better.

35. I therefore propose to order that the Defendant be wound up in accordance with the requirements of the Insolvency Law and the Insolvency Regulations.

36. Finally, I consider it appropriate to stay the order winding up the Defendant for 7 days from the date of the order herein to give the Defendant the opportunity to apply to the Court of Appeal for a further stay pending appeal, if so advised. In all the circumstances of this case, there will be no extension of this 7 day period.

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CFI 032/2014 The Dubai Financial Services Authority v ES Bankers (Dubai) Limited

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Claim No. CFI 032/2014

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGULATORY LAW (NO. 1 OF 2004) 

IN THE MATTER OF THE DIFC INSOLVENCY LAW (NO. 3 OF 2009)

BETWEEN

THE DUBAI FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY

 

Claimant

and

 

ES BANKERS (DUBAI) LIMITED

Defendant


ORDER OF JUSTICE SIR DAVID STEEL


UPON reviewing Application Notice CFI-032-2014/22 dated 23 June 2016 and the supporting documents seeking to vary the Order of Justice Sir David Steel dated 23 March 2016 for remuneration and disbursements of the Joint Provisional Liquidators

AND UPON reading the documents recorded on the case file

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Order of Justice Sir David Steel dated 23 March 2015 (the “Order“) fixing the basis of the Joint Liquidators’ remuneration and disbursements be varied as follows with effect from 19 October 2015 in relation to the period 19 October 2015 onwards:

(a) Paragraph 1 of the Order be deleted and replaced with the words “The basis of the Joint Liquidators’ remuneration shall be fixed by the Liquidation Committee of ES Bankers (Dubai) Limited (in Liquidation) (“ESBD”) in accordance with Regulation 5.33.2(b) of the DIFC Insolvency Regulations of 2009“;

(b) Paragraph 2 of the Order be deleted and replaced with the words “The exact amount of remuneration be set by the Liquidation Committee of ESBD upon request by the Joint Liquidators periodically in accordance with the mechanism set out in the Schedule to this Order“;

(c) The words “to be made at the same time as the periodic application for remuneration referred to in paragraph 2 of this Order” in paragraph 5 of the Order be deleted;

(d) The words “the Court” in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Schedule to the Order be deleted and replaced in each instance with the words “the Liquidation Committee of ESBD“; and

(e) The words “apply” and “this application” in paragraph 4 of the Schedule to the Order be deleted and replaced with the words “request” and “this request” respectively.

2. That the costs of and occasioned by this application be costs in the liquidation; and

3. Further or other relief with liberty to apply.

 

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of issue: 30 June 2016

At: 1pm

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CFI 013/2016 Oger Dubai LLC v Daman Real Estate Capital Partners Limited

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Claim No:  CFI 013/2016

          THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

OGER DUBAI LLC 

                                                                                                                                     Claimant

and

 

DAMAN REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS LIMITED 

Defendant


ORDER OF JUSTICE SIR RICHARD FIELD


UPON considering Decree No. 19 of 2016

AND UPON considering the Order dated 28 June 2016 issued by the Acting Chief Justice of the Dubai Court of Cassation to the Chief Justice of the DIFC Courts

AND UPON considering the Orders made herein dated 16 June 2016 as amended by the Order dated 23 June 2016

AND UPON considering the evidence before the Court and hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendant at a hearing on 29 June 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Order of Justice Sir Richard Field that the Defendant be wound up made on 16 June 2016 be stayed until a judicial decision is taken pursuant to Decree No. 19 of 2016 as to the competent court.

2. The Order of Justice Sir Richard Field requiring the Defendant to cease trading made on 16 June 2016 (the “Cessation of Trading Order”) be continued until close of business London time on Thursday 30 June 2016 unless by that time the Defendant gives a cross-undertaking to the Court in conventional terms in respect of the Cessation of Trading Order in which event the said order will continue until further order.

3. The Defendant have liberty (if so advised) to serve by close of business London time on Friday 1 July 2016 proposals for amending the Cessation of Trading Order to the extent necessary only to ensure the continued viability of the Defendant.

4. There be a hearing to consider any proposals of the Defendant to amend the Cessation of Trading Order at 10am London time on Wednesday 6 July 2016.

5. In the meantime, the Defendant has liberty to apply on notice to the Defendant for any amendment of the Cessation of Trading Order which it bona fide and reasonably believes is so urgently required for the continued viability of the Defendant that the application must be made before the hearing due to take place on Wednesday 6 July 2016.

 

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date: 30 June 2016

At: 2pm

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CFI 036/2015 Philippe Yves Moser v ES Bankers (Dubai) Limited (in Liquidation)

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Claim No: CFI-036-2015

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

PHILIPPE YVES MOSER 

                                                                            Claimant

and

 

ES BANKERS (DUBAI) LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)

Defendant


  ORDER OF H.E. JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI


UPON reviewing the Claimant’s Request for Default Judgment, dated 2 June 2016, seeking a default judgment and interest resulting from misrepresentation and/or fraud and/or breaches of contract and positive duties as the Defendant failed to file an acknowledgment of service, admission or defence to the Claimant’s Claim and the time for doing so has expired

AND UPON reviewing the Certificate of Service submitted by the Claimant on 30 March 2016

AND UPON reading the Order of Judicial Officer Maha Al Mehairi dated 2 June 2016, denying the Claimant’s request for default judgment

AND UPON reading the Claimant’s request for a de novo review dated 7 June 2016, requesting a review of the Order dated 2 June 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The Order of Judicial Officer Maha Al Mehairi dated 2 June 2016 be upheld.

2. The Claimant’s request for Default Judgment be denied.

 

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date of issue: 30 June 2016

At: 2pm

REASONS

1.The current application arises out of the winding up of ES Bankers (Dubai) Limited (the “Defendant”), following the decision of Mr Phil Bowers in his capacity as joint liquidator on 9 November 2015, whereby he rejected Mr Philippe Moser’s (the “Claimant”) deposit claim / Proof for USD 76,399.86 against the Defendant.

2. The Claimant made a request to this Court for Default Judgment against the Defendant, which was denied by Judicial Officer Maha Al Mehairi’s Order dated 2 June 2016 (the “Order”), as the Court was not satisfied that the Claim Form had been served by the Claimant in accordance with Part 9 of the Rules of the DIFC Court (“RDC”); furthermore, that pursuant to Article 56 of the DIFC Insolvency Law, leave of the Court should have been sought before the commencement of proceedings against the Defendant. The Claimant now seeks a review of that decision, which I consider below.

3. With respect to service of the Claim Form, the Claimant submits that it was served upon the Defendant by fax and by email on 24 March 2014. RDC 9.3 states:

“9.3 Where a document is to be served by electronic means:

(1) the party who is to be served or his legal representative must previously have expressly indicated in writing to the party serving:

(a) that he is willing to accept service by electronic means; and

(b) the fax number, e-mail address or electronic identification to which it should be sent;”

4. The Claimant failed to provide evidence pertaining to the Defendant’s accepted methods of service or confirmation of the Defendant’s email and fax details. Therefore, in the absence of such evidence being provided to satisfy Rule 9.3, I am inclined to find that service has not been shown to have been effected in accordance with the RDC.

5. Moreover, the issue of whether the correct procedure has been adopted by the Claimant comes into question. Article 56 of the DIFC Insolvency Law states:

“Consequences of winding-up order

When a winding-up order has been made, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the Company or its property, except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose.”

6. The liquidator emailed the Court on 6 April 2016 requesting clarification over whether the Claimant had successfully sought the leave of the Court before the commencement of his proceedings against the Defendant. I confirm that in relation to Claim No. CFI-036-2015 the Claimant has not sought the leave of this Court to date.

7. Pursuant to Article 5.19.2 of the DIFC Insolvency Regulations (“DIFC IR”):

“5.19.2 If the liquidator rejects a Proof in whole or in part, he shall prepare a written statement of his reasons for doing so, and send it forthwith to the creditor.”

8. The Claimant’s case is that his Proof for USD 76,399.86 was rejected in full by the liquidator. If a statement of reasons has not been provided to the Claimant or he is dissatisfied with the liquidator’s decision, it would be open to him to make an application against the liquidator in that regard. The procedure to be followed is set out in Article 5.20 of DIFC IR:

“5.20 Appeal against decision on Proof

5.20.1 If a creditor is dissatisfied with the liquidator’s decision with respect to his Proof (including any decision on the question of preference), he may apply to the Court for the decision to be reversed or varied.

5.20.2 The application must be made within twenty-one (21) days of his receiving the statement sent under Regulation 5.19.2.”

9. The terms of Article 56 of the DIFC Insolvency Law are clear, leave of the Court is required in circumstances where proceedings are commenced directly against a company that has been wound-up, and therefore, the leave of the Court is a prerequisite for any proceedings against the Defendant.

10. Accordingly, I find that a request for Default Judgment, without the permission of the Court is certainly premature and must be denied.

CONCLUSION

11.In light of the aforementioned, the Order of Judicial Officer Maha Al Mehairi dated 2 June 2016 is upheld.

12. The Claimant’s request for a Default Judgment is denied.

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CFI 020/2016 Brookfield Multiplex Constructions llc v (1) DIFC Investments llc (2) Dubai International Financial Centre Authority

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Claim No:  CFI 020/2016

          THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE JUSTICE SIR JEREMY COOKE

BETWEEN

 

BROOKFIELD MULTIPLEX CONSTRUCTIONS LLC

 

                                                                                                                                     Claimant

and

 

(1) DIFC INVESTMENTS LLC

(2) DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE AUTHORITY

 

Defendants


ORDER OF JUSTICE SIR JEREMY COOKE


UPON the Claimant’s Application Notice CFI-020-2016/1 dated 16 June 2016 for an interim injunction (the “Claimant’s Application”) restraining the Defendants from continuing, prosecuting or assisting in the prosecution of certain proceedings in the Dubai Courts and from commencing proceedings before the Dubai Courts

AND UPON the Defendants’ Application Notice CFI-020-2016/2 dated 16 June 2016 disputing the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts (the “Defendants’ Application”)

AND UPON reading the submissions and evidence recorded on the Court file

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendants on 22 June 2016 by way of videoconferencing and 27 June 2016 by way of telephone

IT IS HEREBY DECLARED THAT:

1.There is a binding arbitration agreement between the Claimant and the Defendants contained in the construction contract executed on 22 May 2003 which applies to the subject matter of the dispute which has given rise to the non-DIFC Dubai Court Proceedings.

AND IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Claimant’s Application is dismissed.

2. There shall be no order as to the Defendants’ Application.

3. The Claimant shall pay 75% of the Defendants’ costs of the Claimant’s Application and of the Defendants’ Application, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

 

Issued by:

Natasha Bakirci

Assistant Registrar

Date: 30 June 2016

At: 4pm

The post CFI 020/2016 Brookfield Multiplex Constructions llc v (1) DIFC Investments llc (2) Dubai International Financial Centre Authority appeared first on DIFC Courts.

CFI 021/2016 Driver Consult LLC v (1) DAMAN Real Estate Capital Partners Limited (2) DAMAN Investments Psc

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Claim No: CFI 021/2016

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

 

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

DRIVER CONSULT LLC

                                                                            Claimant

and

(1) DAMAN REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS LIMITED

(2) DAMAN INVESTMENTS PSC

Defendants


  ORDER OF DEPUTY REGISTRAR AMNA AL OWAIS


UPON reviewing the First Defendant’s Application Notice CFI-021-2016/1 dated 10 July 2016 seeking an extension of time to filing a Defence

AND UPON reviewing the Second Defendant’s Application Notice CFI-021-2016/2 dated 10 July 2016 seeking an extension of time to file an application contesting jurisdiction

AND UPON reviewing the Claimant’s response to the applications dated 12 July 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1.The First Defendant’s Application be granted and the period for filing a Defence be extended to 4pm on Sunday 24 July 2016.

2. The Second Defendant’s Application be granted and the period for filing an application contesting jurisdiction be extended to 4pm on Sunday 24 July 2016.

3. Each party shall bear their own costs.

 

Issued by:

Amna Al Owais

Deputy Registrar

Date of issue: 13 July 2016

At: 1pm

The post CFI 021/2016 Driver Consult LLC v (1) DAMAN Real Estate Capital Partners Limited (2) DAMAN Investments Psc appeared first on DIFC Courts.

CFI 012/2016 Peter Matthew James Gray v Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

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Claim No: CFI-012-2016 

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BEFORE H.E. JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI

BETWEEN

 

PETER MATTHEW JAMES GRAY

                                                                                                                    Claimant/Respondent

and

 

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

Defendant/Applicant 

                                                                                               

Hearing: 22 June 2016

Counsel: Patrick Hennessey as lead counsel for the Claimant, with Julian Critchlow assisting (Al Bawardi Advocates & Legal Consultants)

Graham Lovet as lead counsel for the Defendant, with Ryan Whelan assisting (Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP)

Judgment:        14 July 2016


JUDGMENT OF H.E. JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI


Summary of Judgment

This Application arose out of a claim commenced by an employee (the “Claimant”) against his employer (the “Defendant”). In response, the Defendant subsequently brought this Application, relying on Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law in submitting that the Claimant’s Claim relates to an employment dispute which is subject to an Arbitration Agreement and as such, the DIFC Court should declare it does not have jurisdiction to deal with the Claim, choose not to exercise its jurisdiction, dismiss the proceedings or stay them until it has been determined that the Arbitration Agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The Claimant responded with Article 12(2) of DIFC Arbitration Law, contending that the Arbitration Agreement cannot be enforced against him as he has not provided his written consent after the dispute has arisen, nor has he submitted to arbitration proceedings.

The learned Judge was satisfied that the DIFC Courts would ordinarily have jurisdiction to deal with the claim under one or more of the jurisdictional gateways provided for under Article 5(A)(1) of Dubai Law No.12 of 2014, as the Claim arises out of a contract partly or wholly concluded, finalised or performed within the DIFC. He also determined that the provision for a phased alternative dispute resolution process within the arbitration agreement did not preclude it from being valid.

The arbitration agreement did not specify a Seat of Arbitration, rather, it allowed for the parties to agree upon an arbitrator and forum at the relevant time, with a direction for the arbitration to be referred to California in the event that there is no agreement between the parties. Counsel for both parties had also indicated that they had entertained the possibility of arbitration in Dubai or London as an alternative to California. The learned Judge found that the Seat of Arbitration had not yet been determined, although it was likely to be outside of the DIFC and this was definitive in considering the application of DIFC Arbitration Law.

The learned Judge found that due to the Seat of Arbitration being undetermined or likely to be outside of the DIFC and pursuant to Part 2(7) of DIFC Arbitration Law No. 1 of 2008, Article 13 applied to affording the parties an opportunity to arbitrate. It was decided that the proceedings would not be dismissed as the DIFC Courts would ordinarily have jurisdiction to deal with the claim, rather a stay was ordered in favour of arbitration in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement.

 This summary is not part of the Judgment and should not be cited as such 

ORDER

UPON reviewing the Claimant’s Claim Form dated 22 March 2016

AND UPON reviewing the Defendant’s Application Notice CFI-012-2016/1 dated 20 April 2016 seeking an Order declaring that the DIFC Court does not have or shall not exercise its jurisdiction to deal with the Claimant’s case, further and in the alternative, that these proceedings should be dismissed or stayed pending a decision by this Court that the Arbitration Agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed

AND UPON reviewing all correspondence and evidence on the Court file

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendant on 22 June 2016

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The proceedings in CFI-012-2016 be stayed pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings.

2. The Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs, to be determined by the Registrar if not agreed.

 

Issued by:

Mark Beer

Registrar

Date of issue: 14 July 2016

At: 4pm 

 

JUDGMENT

Background

1.This application arises out of the Claimant’s claim for declarations, indemnities and monetary compensation arising out of the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant (the “Claim”).

2. The Claimant was a non-equity Special Partner employed by the Defendant from 26 April 2012 to 22 April 2015. The Claimant’s employment was terminated following The Hon. Mr. Justice Flaux’s criticism of the Claimant’s deliberate misleading of the Court, in his judgment for the London Commercial Court dated 23 March 2015 (the “Judgment”), which is currently under appeal.

3. The Defendant determined that the Claimant’s conduct, which gave rise to Justice Flaux’s findings, made his position as Special Partner untenable. Therefore, the Claimant’s employment was terminated with cause, for misconduct, on 22 April 2015.

4. In his Claim, the Claimant asserts that he was wrongly dismissed for cause and that the Defendant should provide written reasons for his dismissal in addition to indemnifying him for the costs of his appeal of the Judgment and related disciplinary proceedings and satisfying his employment-related monetary claims.

5. The Defendant subsequently applied to this Court seeking an Order that these proceedings be dismissed under Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law, on the basis that the contract governing the employment relationship between the parties contained an agreement to arbitrate in Clause 13 (the “Arbitration Agreement”). Therefore, the Defendant submits that the dispute is the subject of a valid arbitration agreement which provides that parties shall first undertake informal negotiations, then if necessary non-binding mediation and finally, a binding arbitration in order to resolve their dispute. 

History of Proceedings

6. The Claimant’s initial action against the Defendant was issued in the DIFC Court’s Small Claims Tribunal (“SCT”) on 21 May 2015, under Claim No. SCT-088-2015. The Claimant sought an interim declaration that the arbitration clause in the Agreement was valid and for the proceedings to be stayed.

7. On 24 November 2015 the parties partook in a consultation with Judicial Officer Nassir Al Nasser. It was agreed that the Claimant would amend his Claim Form to reflect the actual value of the Claim. In light of the amended Claim Form being filed in the DIFC Court of First Instance, the SCT case was dismissed by an Order of Judicial Officer Maha Al Mehairi on 25 April 2016.

Defendant submissions

8. The Defendant applies to this Court seeking:

(a) An order pursuant to Rule 12.1 of the Rules of the DIFC Court (“RDC”) declaring that the Court has no jurisdiction over the Claimant’s Claim or alternatively, should not exercise any jurisdiction which it may have;

(b) Further and in the alternative, that pursuant to Article 13(1) of the Arbitration Law (DIFC Law No.1 of 2008), these proceedings be dismissed;

(c) Further and in the alternative, that pursuant to Article 13(1) of the Arbitration Law, these proceedings be stayed pending a decision by this Court that the Arbitration Agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. (The “Application”)

9. The Defendant acknowledges the territorial jurisdiction of the DIFC Court by virtue of this dispute arising from employment within the DIFC. However, it is submitted that DIFC Employment Law does not reserve employment disputes solely to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts and parties are entitled to agree that an arbitral body should determine any disputes.

10. It is the Defendant’s case that as the Arbitration Agreement is compliant with UAE Federal Law (Article 203(2) of Law No. 11 of 1992) and the DIFC Arbitration Law, it should be enforced in accordance with Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law, which seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the New York Convention 1958.

11. Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law states:

“If an action is brought before the DIFC Court in a matter which is the subject of an Arbitration Agreement, the DIFC Court shall, if a party so requests not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, dismiss or stay such action unless it finds that the Arbitration Agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”

12. The Defendant submits that the Claimant has acknowledged the Arbitration Agreement’s validity in submitting the present dispute to arbitration under Articles 13(c) and (d) of the Arbitration agreement; the Claimant commenced negotiations and a mediation.

13. Having established the Claimant’s claims are the subject of a valid arbitration agreement for the purposes of Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law, the Defendant invites the DIFC Court to dismiss the Claimant’s action, or alternatively, stay the proceedings until it is found by a Tribunal convened under the Arbitration Agreement (or by this Court) that the Arbitration Agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

Claimant’s submissions

14. The Claimant opposes the Defendant’s Application on the following grounds:

(i) The Defendant has misinterpreted the Agreement

The Arbitration Agreement is in fact an alternative dispute resolution clause which sets out a phased process for resolving controversy between the parties. The employment contract is a generic document which provides that its dispute resolution provisions are enforceable only insofar as they are compatible with local law. The Claimant submits that DIFC Arbitration Law has the effect of allowing parties discretion to negotiate and/or mediate a potential dispute but will intervene to prevent a binding arbitration being forced upon an employee.

(ii) The arbitration provision cannot be enforced against the Claimant;

The Claimant relies on Article 12(2) of DIFC Arbitration Law which provides that an arbitration agreement cannot be enforced against the employee except with his written consent given after the dispute has arisen, where he has submitted to arbitration proceedings commenced under the arbitration agreement or where the DIFC Court has made an order disapplying this Article, on the grounds that it is satisfied it is not detrimental to the interests of the employee for the dispute to be referred to arbitration instead of being determined by proceedings before a Court. The Claimant submits that as he has not provided written consent, nor has he submitted to arbitration proceedings, nor has this Court made an order disapplying Article 12(2), the Arbitration Agreement cannot be enforced against the Claimant. The Claimant notified the Defendant in December 2015 that he would only progress to the arbitration stage of the alternative dispute resolution procedure if certain preconditions were met.

(iii) The Claimant was given permission to bring the Claim at the SCT consultation of 24 November 2015 by agreement; the Defendant’s attempt to reopen this issue is an abuse of process;

The Claimant submits that these issues have previously been subject to consideration by these Courts at the SCT Consultation. Accordingly, notwithstanding the Claimant’s primary position that as a matter of law this Court is the appropriate forum, the Defendant has already had the opportunity to object to the Claimant’s proposed amendment of his Claim Form but failed to do so; therefore, this Application is a collateral attack on the agreed outcome of the SCT Consultation and is an abuse of process.

(iv) This Court is the appropriate forum and the interests of justice require trial in this Court.

The Claimant submits that there is no question that the Claim falls within the jurisdictional gateway provided under Article 5(A)(1) of Dubai Law No.12 of 2004 and that there is no forum more convenient to deal with these proceedings. Moreover, the parties and all potential witnesses are within this Court’s jurisdiction, the material events and meetings underlying the Claim occurred within this Court’s jurisdiction and much of the relief sought by the Claimant is unique to this jurisdiction.

15. The Claimant views the Application as an attempt by an employer to force an employee into a materially disadvantageous dispute resolution forum to make it more difficult for him to enforce rights unambiguously afforded to him by the DIFC Employment Law and, accordingly, invites this Court to dismiss the Application.

Analysis

16. In summary, and central to the Application before me is that the Defendant relies on Article 13(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law in submitting that the Claimant’s Claim relates to an employment dispute which is subject to an Arbitration Agreement and as such, the DIFC Court should declare it does not have jurisdiction to deal with the Claim, choose not to exercise its jurisdiction, dismiss the proceedings or stay them until it has been determined that the Arbitration Agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The Claimant responds with Article 12(2) of DIFC Arbitration Law in contending that the Arbitration Agreement cannot be enforced against him as he has not provided his written consent after the dispute has arisen, nor has he submitted to arbitration proceedings.

17. I am satisfied that the DIFC Courts would ordinarily have jurisdiction to deal with this Claim under one or more of the jurisdictional gateways provided for under Article 5(A)(1) of Dubai Law No.12 of 2014, particularly as the Claim arises out of a contract partly or wholly concluded, finalised or performed within the DIFC.

18. The question is therefore, whether there is a valid Arbitration Agreement and how the DIFC Arbitration Law should apply in these particular circumstances.

19. I accept the Claimant’s submission that Clause 13 of the employment contract provides for a phased alternative dispute resolution process to be followed by the parties in the event of any dispute or ‘controversy’ arising. However, the existence of an additional provision for informal negotiation and non-binding mediation prior to any binding arbitration does not, in my view, prevent Clause 13 from presenting as an effective Arbitration Agreement.

20. I am also satisfied that the Claimant has accepted the terms of the Arbitration Agreement by his following of its first and second steps for negotiation and mediation respectively and he has demonstrated to this Court a willingness to arbitrate by way of his initial SCT action seeking a declaration that the Arbitration Agreement was valid and his request to the Defendant for particular arbitration locations.

21. As the existence of an Arbitration Agreement has been established, I must turn my attention to the actual forum or venue of the Arbitration it provides for. Clause 13(e) of the contract of employment (the Arbitration Agreement) states:

“Third Step – Binding Arbitration. In the event the mediation process set forth above does not resolve the Controversy, the Controversy shall be determined by arbitration before a single arbitrator, utilizing an arbitration provider mutually acceptable to you and the Firm; provided, however, that in the event you and the Firm are unable to agree upon an arbitrator and forum within thirty (30) days of a demand by any party for arbitration, then the arbitration shall be referred to the Los Angeles, California office of JAMS for processing as a confidential, final and binding arbitration pursuant to its comprehensive Rules and Procedures then in effect.”

22. The Arbitration Agreement does not specify a Seat of Arbitration, rather, it allows for the parties to agree upon an arbitrator and forum at the relevant time and there is a clear direction for the arbitration to be referred to California in the event that there is no agreement between the parties. During the hearing, Counsel for both parties indicated that they had entertained the possibility of arbitration in Dubai or London as an alternative to California. However, there is no apparent reference whatsoever, either in the employment contract or discussions between the parties, to the potential for arbitration within the DIFC. Therefore, I am satisfied, on the basis of what I have heard from the parties and read in the documents submitted into Court, that the Seat of Arbitration is likely to be outside of the DIFC, although not yet determined.

23. The location of the Seat of Arbitration is crucial in determining the scope of the application of DIFC Arbitration Law and considering the parties submissions in relation to Articles 12 and 13 of said law. Part 2 of DIFC Arbitration Law No. 1 of 2008 states the following:

7. Scope of application of Law

(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article, this Law shall apply where the Seat of the Arbitration is the DIFC.

(2) Articles 13 14, 15, Part 4 and the Schedule of this Law shall apply where the Seat of Arbitration is one other than the DIFC.

(3) Article 13 shall also apply where no Seat has been designated or determined.”

24. In light of the afore-mentioned, it is clear to me that Article 13 applies in the circumstances as the Seat of Arbitration has not been designated or determined and even in the event that the Seat of Arbitration was one other than the DIFC (which I deemed to be likely from the evidence before me) Article 13 would still apply.

25. Article 13 of DIFC Arbitration Law operates to afford the parties an opportunity to arbitrate a dispute which is the subject of an Arbitration Agreement, provided that the party requesting this opportunity has done so ‘not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute’. I am satisfied that the Defendant made this Application at the earliest opportunity as it was in response to the Claimant’s filing of his Claim Form No. CFI-012-2016 on 22 March 2016.

26. I shall not dismiss the proceedings as I am convinced that the DIFC Courts would ordinarily have jurisdiction to deal with the Claim, rather I am ordering a stay of the proceedings in favour of arbitration in accordance with the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. In the event that the nominated arbitrator does not find that he has adequate authority/jurisdiction to deal with the Claim, it shall return to the DIFC Courts for resolution.

Conclusion

27. I grant the Defendant’s Application for a stay in these proceedings pursuant to Article 13(1) of DIFC Arbitration Law.

28. Costs are awarded in favour of the Defendant.

 

Issued by:

Mark Beer

Registrar

Date of issue: 14 July 2016

At: 4pm

 

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